In multiply mode BIP-38 defines three new artifacts:

• intermediate code
• confirmation code
• encrypted private key

It also makes use of existing standard artifacts:

• private key
• public key
• payment address

The multiply mode scenario envisions two actors, an owner and a printer:

1. The owner creates an intermediate code using a secret passphrase (on a trusted platform).
2. The owner provides the intermediate code to the printer.
3. The printer generates an encrypted private key from the intermediate code.
4. The printer provides the encrypted private key and a confirmation code to the owner.
5. The printer has access to the public key and payment address and may provide these to the owner as well.
6. The printer has no ability to obtain the corresponding private key without the original passphrase.
7. The owner validates information obtained from the printer using the passphrase (more below).

From a privacy standpoint the only material issue is that the owner has given the printer knowledge of the public key of an owner private key. This means that any payment to a payment address derived from that public key can be associated with the owner's person (i.e. tainted). The printer is therefore trusted to not disclose this association.

The owner must validate information returned from the printer. Otherwise there are several ways the printer can steal (i.e. intentionally) or lose (i.e. through negligence) the owner's money. Validation must be done on a trusted platform, such as the one first used to generate the intermediate code. Otherwise the private key of the encrypted private key may have been compromised.

The printer could just generate an encrypted private key without using the owner's intermediate code. In this case any money spent to the public key of the encrypted private key would be spendable by the printer and not by the owner. The owner can prevent this by validating the confirmation code against the originating intermediate code.

The printer could return a payment address (or public key) that is unrelated to the intermediate code. If the intermediate code is valid but does not represent the corresponding payment address any money sent to the payment address will be spendable by the printer and not the owner. Therefore the validation step must accept the payment address as a parameter.

The printer could generate a valid confirmation code using the owner's intermediate code and return an unrelated encrypted private key. If the owner validates the confirmation code against the intermediate code the owner will know that the printer cannot spend money sent to the related payment address. However this offers no assurance whatsoever that the owner can spend from the validated payment address.

In all respects the confirmation code is actually a public analog to the encrypted private key. In other words it retains the encrypted public key of the private key that is encrypted within the encrypted private key. As such, using the original passphrase, only the owner can decrypt the confirmation code. However the printer has access to its public key as well, so this offers no protection against the printer.

The confirmation code cannot be used to validate the encrypted private key. Protecting against denial of money by the printer requires the owner to validate the encrypted private key provided by the printer against the payment address using the original passphrase. This is the only way the owner protects against both theft and denial of money.

...if the payment address can be recreated by decrypting its encrypted private key with a passphrase, and it's a strong passphrase one can be certain only he knows himself, then he can safely conclude that nobody could know the private key to that payment address.

In other words, the confirmation code is NOT used to validate the owner's ability to spend from the payment address using the encrypted private key.

The party generating the payment address has the option to return a confirmation code back to owner which allows owner to independently verify that he has been given a payment address that actually depends on his passphrase, and to confirm the lot and sequence numbers (if applicable). This protects owner from being given a payment address by the second party that is unrelated to the key derivation and possibly spendable by the second party. If a payment address given to owner can be successfully regenerated through the confirmation process, owner can be reasonably assured that any spending without the passphrase is infeasible.

The "confirmation process" refers to use of the confirmation code by the owner to validate that the payment address is associated to the owner-generated intermediate code. Note however that the guarantee provided is only against theft of money, not against denial: "any spending without the passphrase is infeasible".

The name confirmation code is misleading from a security standpoint and complicates an understanding of multiply mode. The value is actually a public key derived from the private key of the encrypted private key and encrypted for the owner. For this reason libbitcoin refers to this artifact as the encrypted public key.

In the name intermediate code the term "intermediate" is vague, as there are several steps and artifacts in the scenario. The term "code" does not refine "intermediate" as all of the artifacts are codes of some sort. In the interest of clarity and brevity libbitcoin refers to the intermediate code as a token.

Given that the multiply mode scenario rests on the presumption that the owner cannot trust the printer, we conclude that there is no valid use case for the confirmation code. We strongly recommend against use of the confirmation code and that BIP-38 be modified to remove the Confirmation Code section altogether.

The scenario should be:

1. The owner creates a intermediate code using a secret passphrase.
2. The owner provides the intermediate code to the printer.
3. The printer generates an encrypted private key from the intermediate code.
4. The printer provides the encrypted private key to the owner.
5. The owner extracts the payment address from the encrypted private key using the passphrase.

• Steps 1 and 5 must be carried out on a trusted platform by the owner.
• The printer will have knowledge of the public key (and payment address).
• Lot and sequence validation (as applicable) must use the encrypted private key.

Bitcoin Explorer key encryption commands