Security Toolbox Forensics & Analysis Resources 26 - itnett/FTD02H-N GitHub Wiki
Case Study: MIPS-based Malware Targeting IoT Devices Using MITRE ATT&CK Framework
Scenario:
In this fictitious case, a cybersecurity researcher at a large organization detects unusual network traffic coming from a set of IoT devices, specifically smart home routers. The routers are manufactured by a well-known brand, but they have recently shown suspicious behavior, including unexplained spikes in outbound traffic. Upon investigation, the researcher suspects that the routers have been compromised by a botnet leveraging MIPS-based malware.
Initial Detection and Traffic Analysis
Step 1: Network Traffic Monitoring
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Tool: Suricata or Zeek (formerly Bro)
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Objective: Monitor network traffic for any anomalous behavior.
Outcome: The network traffic analysis reveals several outgoing HTTP connections over non-standard ports (e.g., TCP 50720). This is flagged as unusual because most of the IoT routers typically only communicate over standard ports like 80 or 443.
- MITRE ATT&CK Technique:
- T1571: Non-Standard Port usage.
- T1071.001: Application Layer Protocol - Web Protocols.
Action: Collect the URLs and IP addresses involved in these requests.
- MITRE ATT&CK Technique:
Step 2: URL Reputation and Sandbox Analysis
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Tool: VirusTotal and Hybrid Analysis
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Objective: Check if the URLs found in the traffic are known to be associated with malicious activity.
Outcome: One URL (http://maliciousurl[.]com/bin.sh) was flagged as suspicious by multiple antivirus engines. When analyzed using Hybrid Analysis, the URL hosted a MIPS-based ELF executable. The file was downloaded by the routers.
- MITRE ATT&CK Technique:
- T1105: Ingress Tool Transfer.
Action: The file is downloaded for further analysis.
- MITRE ATT&CK Technique:
Step 3: File Analysis (MIPS ELF Binary)
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Tool: Binwalk and Ghidra (for reverse engineering)
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Objective: Perform static analysis to understand the purpose of the binary.
Outcome: The analysis of the ELF binary reveals that it is a botnet client designed to exploit vulnerabilities in IoT devices. The malware allows remote control over the infected devices, enrolling them into a botnet. The binary was statically compiled for MIPS architecture, indicating it specifically targets routers and similar embedded devices.
- MITRE ATT&CK Technique:
- T1072: Software Deployment Tools (Using tools to compromise devices).
Action: The binary's code is further analyzed to detect any known vulnerabilities or exploits.
- MITRE ATT&CK Technique:
Step 4: Dynamic Malware Analysis
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Tool: Cuckoo Sandbox or Any.Run
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Objective: Execute the malware in a controlled environment to observe its behavior.
Outcome: During dynamic execution, the malware establishes communication with a Command and Control (C2) server via a non-standard port (e.g., TCP 50720) and begins sending device information and receiving commands from the C2. The commands allow the attacker to:
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Initiate Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks.
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Download and execute further payloads on the infected devices.
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MITRE ATT&CK Technique:
- T1102: Web Service (for C2 communication).
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Step 5: Identifying Command and Control Server
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Tool: URLHaus and Passive DNS lookup services
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Objective: Investigate the C2 server to determine its history and related activity.
Outcome: The C2 server (e.g., C2command[.]xyz) is traced back to several past attacks, including its use in a recent IoT botnet campaign. DNS logs show that the domain was first registered about 30 days ago, suggesting this may be a recent campaign.
- MITRE ATT&CK Technique:
- T1483: Domain Generation Algorithms (used by the malware to find and communicate with its C2 server).
Action: The domain and IP addresses associated with the C2 server are blacklisted in the organization’s firewall to prevent further communication.
- MITRE ATT&CK Technique:
Step 6: Identifying Lateral Movement
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Tool: Wireshark or Tshark
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Objective: Identify if there is any lateral movement happening across the network.
Outcome: Analysis of the packet captures shows that the malware attempts to spread laterally by scanning the internal network for other vulnerable devices. It uses a known RCE (Remote Code Execution) exploit affecting outdated versions of the router's firmware.
- MITRE ATT&CK Technique:
- T1078: Valid Accounts (using credentials or exploiting known vulnerabilities to gain access).
Action: A vulnerability assessment is carried out on the entire IoT device network.
- MITRE ATT&CK Technique:
Step 7: Mitigation and Cleanup
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Tool: Velociraptor or OSQuery
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Objective: Deploy host-based forensic agents to gather evidence and help clean up the infected devices.
Outcome: Using Velociraptor, forensic agents are deployed across the network to identify all devices infected by the botnet malware. Infected routers are factory reset, and firmware is upgraded to patch the vulnerability.
- MITRE ATT&CK Technique:
- T1210: Exploitation of Remote Services (leveraging unpatched routers to gain access).
Action: The IT team enforces stronger password policies and ensures all devices are running the latest firmware.
- MITRE ATT&CK Technique:
Step 8: Monitoring and Threat Intelligence Integration
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Tool: MISP (Malware Information Sharing Platform) and Splunk (for continuous monitoring)
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Objective: Integrate the findings into the organization’s SIEM (Security Information and Event Management) to monitor for future attacks.
Outcome: Indicators of Compromise (IOCs), such as the malicious URLs, IP addresses, file hashes, and C2 domain, are added to the organization's MISP instance. Alerts are configured in Splunk to flag any communication attempts to the identified C2 servers or use of non-standard ports (e.g., 50720).
- MITRE ATT&CK Technique:
- T1020: Automated Exfiltration (preparing defenses against future similar attacks).
Action: A continuous monitoring process is established to detect any recurring threats.
- MITRE ATT&CK Technique:
Conclusion:
The investigation reveals that the organization's IoT routers were compromised by a botnet leveraging MIPS-based malware, likely to be used for DDoS attacks. The malware utilized non-standard ports and communicated with a C2 server, enrolling the devices into a larger network. By following the steps outlined in the MITRE ATT&CK framework, the organization successfully identified, mitigated, and eliminated the threat while bolstering its defenses for future attacks.
Tools Used in This Case:
| Tool | Purpose | Link |
|---|---|---|
| Suricata | Network traffic monitoring and IDS/IPS | https://suricata.io/ |
| VirusTotal | Reputation check of URLs and files | https://www.virustotal.com/ |
| Hybrid Analysis | Sandbox for dynamic malware analysis | https://www.hybrid-analysis.com/ |
| URLHaus | Checking malicious URLs and C2 servers | https://urlhaus.abuse.ch/ |
| Binwalk | Firmware and binary analysis | https://github.com/ReFirmLabs/binwalk |
| Ghidra | Reverse engineering of binaries | https://ghidra-sre.org/ |
| Any.Run | Interactive malware analysis | https://any.run/ |
| Wireshark | Deep packet inspection | https://www.wireshark.org/ |
| Velociraptor | Host-based forensic analysis | https://github.com/Velocidex/velociraptor |
| MISP | Threat intelligence sharing | https://www.misp-project.org/ |
| Splunk | SIEM and continuous monitoring | https://www.splunk.com/ |
This is a fictional case meant to demonstrate how the MITRE ATT&CK framework and a comprehensive toolset can be used in tandem to detect, investigate, and mitigate a sophisticated IoT-based botnet threat.