How do concepts develop? - lydgate/mindmeld GitHub Wiki
The arc of the development of concepts, and/or categories, is one that starts from birth and is fundamentally social. First, the foundations of conceptual development emerge through primary intersubjectivity, as Trevarthen's microanalytic work demonstrates. The precise temporal coordination between infants and caregivers, manifesting in proto-conversations and rhythmic exchanges, establishes the basic architecture for shared meaning-making. This early capacity for intersubjective engagement, evident in infants as young as two months, provides the crucial platform from which all later conceptual development emerges. The immediate disruption of infant behavior during the "still-face" paradigms reveals how fundamentally human cognition is oriented toward social meaning-making from the earliest moments of development. Malloch's studies of musical interaction between mothers and infants similarly showed temporal coordination down to fractions of a second, suggesting an innate and emergent capacity for intersubjective rhythm and timing (see MindMeld page on "Intersubjectivity" for tons more information and examples of specific studies).
Thelen and Smith's dynamic systems approach revolutionized our understanding of how concepts emerge from patterns of action. Their empirical work on reaching behavior, for example, demonstrates how spatial categories (e.g., near, far, in-reach/out-of-reach) develop through the real-time integration of perception and action, rather than through abstract mental representations (which was the consistent hypothesis before their work came along: that is, it was thought that infant had proto-concepts fully formed and innate, for things like "reachable" or "delicious" and they would move towards those things based on this preconceived category). The real-time observations of how infants rapidly adapt their reaching strategies when wearing weighted sleeves reveals the fundamentally embodied nature of early precursors to conceptual development.
Smith's work on the "shape bias" showed that by 24 months, children preferentially extend new words to objects of similar shape rather than color or texture, demonstrating how sensorimotor experience shapes early categorization. Sensorimoter experiences are also always embedded in contexts that have varying demands, words and categories don't sit still in meaning across all these shifting demands in the real world. For instance, Samuelson and Smith's studies of word learning showed how children's categorization of objects varies depending on context. When presented with novel objects on a table, 2-year-olds used shape to categorize; when the same objects were presented in substances like water or sand, they used material properties. This demonstrated how concepts are assembled "on the fly" based on context. Their "spatial-temporal binding" studies showed how where and when children learn words affects what properties they attend to. Their work is so important because it forced us to reconceptualize cognitive development as emerging from the dynamic interaction between body, brain, and environment, rather than from predetermined mental structures.
Researchers who followed these dynamic systems develpmentalists started looking at all sorts of ways to disrupt word learning that previously was considered fixed: Jean Mandler's research on early concepts showed how infants' first categories are based on what objects do rather than what they look like. For example, 7-month-olds categorized animals together based on their self-initiated movement, not their physical appearance. Waxman and Markow demonstrated that even 12-month-olds extend labels differently for objects versus actions, showing early sensitivity to the pragmatic functions of different word types. The functional nature of words used to be ignored entirely before these people showed these kinds of examples.
Now let's take Luria's documentation of how cultural tools reorganize mental functioning. In "The Working Brain" (1973), he demonstrated how literacy acquisition fundamentally restructures not just abstract thinking but perception itself. This work was obviously before the contemporary neuroimaging studies showing how cultural practices literally reshape neural organization -- actual physical restructuring. His detailed case studies of how newly literate ADULTS developed categorical thinking gives us the historical foundation for understanding how conceptual development continues throughout the lifespan, mediated by cultural tools and practices.
Nelson's event-based theory provides crucial insights into how early conceptual understanding is grounded in temporal and social patterns. Her detailed documentation of how children develop scripts for routine events like restaurant visits or bedtime routines reveals how conceptual understanding emerges from participation in socially structured activities. These scripts don't merely represent knowledge; they constitute the basic building blocks from which more abstract conceptual understanding develops. (No, these early manifestations are not the taxonomic forms we think about as "concepts" from some philosophical perspectives, but they are meant to be understood as the micro-elements that give rise to these more abstract concepts). The progressive elaboration of these scripts, from simple action sequences to complex understanding of social roles and institutional practices, demonstrates how conceptual development is inherently embedded in social practice (and are assumed to be different across cultures because of the variability in said social practices).
The same Katherine Nelson did longitudinal work that highlighted how temporal concepts emerge through a complex interplay between experienced events and cultural tools. Her detailed observations of parent-child dialogues reveal the precise mechanisms through which children transition from event-based temporal understanding ("after breakfast") to conventional time concepts (10:00 am). These transitions don't merely replace earlier understanding but rather integrate new levels of meaning into existing frameworks, creating increasingly sophisticated conceptual structures that maintain access to multiple levels of meaning simultaneously (they can hold in mind, and use differently when contexts shift, EITHER the "after bedtime" OR the 10:00 am).
Tomasello's research on the emergence of joint attention and intentional communication is related: he reveals the fundamentally social nature of conceptual development also, with his work with infants and chimps. So, for example, his empirical studies of how infants progress from dyadic to triadic interaction, culminating in sophisticated understanding of others' mental states, demonstrates how social-cognitive capabilities scaffold conceptual development. The observation that 12-month-olds point not merely to request objects but to share attention and information reveals how early communicative behaviors reflect and support developing understanding of others' mental states; they're social and functional in nature.
Vygotsky's analysis of concept formation through his "double stimulation method" reveals the progressive transformation of conceptual understanding through development. His work showed how kids go from perceptual to functional to abstract classification strategies, with their conceptual understanding becoming increasingly sophisticated through social interaction and the internalization of cultural tools. So more specifically, he found that young children (4-6) grouped by perceptual similarity, older children (7-11) grouped by functional relationships, and adolescents could sort using abstract principles. In the classic study, when presented with the word "dax" and shown various objects, young children grouped based on color, older children grouped based on use, and adolescents could understand arbitrary classification rules.
Then Rogoff's cross-cultural studies built on Vygotsky's and Luria's work and fundamentally challenged assumptions about universal pathways of conceptual development. By observing how Mayan children develop sophisticated spatial concepts through participation in weaving practices, she demonstrates how conceptual understanding emerges through culturally-specific activities. The contrast between these apprenticeship-based learning patterns and traditional Western educational approaches reveals how different social practices lead to equally sophisticated but qualitatively distinct forms of conceptual understanding. This work compels us to reconceptualize cognitive development as inherently situated within specific cultural practices rather than following a universal trajectory and upends any notion of teleology or comparative superiority across cultures.
The more recent work of Yu and Smith's, using their innovative methodology with head-mounted cameras has concretized and radically specified our understanding of the microstructure of concept formation. Their detailed analysis of parent-child interactions reveals the precise temporal and spatial coordinates of successful word learning, demonstrating how conceptual understanding emerges from the dynamic coordination of attention, action, and social interaction. The finding that successful word learning requires specific durations of joint attention, coupled with physical object manipulation, highlights how conceptual development is grounded in embodied, social experience rather than passive exposure to information. The embodied nature of concept learning isn't restricted, or doesn't stop, in childhood and adolescence. Recent work by Casasanto (2009??) showed that right-handed people associate "good" with the right side and "bad" with the left, while left-handed people show the opposite pattern, demonstrating how even abstract concepts are grounded in bodily experience.
Now, let's integrate Luria's work again, before going into neuroscience research. Luria's methodology, combining careful experimental work with detailed case studies, demonstrates how conceptual understanding emerges through the integration of multiple functional systems. His work with patients with brain injuries (see: "Higher Cortical Functions in Man," 1966) revealed how concepts are supported by distributed neural networks integrating perception, action, and language. He provides historical support for contemporary embodied approaches to conceptual development (like Thelen, Smith, and even Varela's group, though they're not developmental), suggesting how abstract understanding emerges from the coordination of multiple functional systems rather than residing in any single neural location (which was assumed by many cognitive scientists who conceived of concepts as unitary and static, once established or "acquired").
In Luria's "Language and Cognition" (1981), he showed how the acquisition of literacy transforms children's relationship to their own mental processes, enabling new forms of categorical thinking while maintaining access to more practical, situation-based understanding. This work provides historical support for contemporary findings about the multiple, parallel pathways of conceptual development and the maintenance of different levels of conceptual understanding throughout development. This is super important, this evidence of concepts never being actually fixed despite us acting as if they are. This was foundational and inspirational to interdisciplinary academics like the "neuroanthropologist" (HOW COOL), Terrence Deacon.
Deacon's theoretical framework (e.g., 1997 book) provides a crucial bridge between evolutionary, developmental, and cultural approaches to concept development. His analysis of how concepts like "water" operate simultaneously at perceptual, functional, scientific, and cultural levels demonstrates the inherently multi-layered nature of conceptual understanding. The empirical support for his framework, including neuroimaging studies showing distinct neural activation patterns for different aspects of concept use, suggests that conceptual understanding is fundamentally heterarchical rather than hierarchical. Over tons of different methodological angles, he shows how concepts maintain multiple, context-dependent meanings that are activated based on specific pragmatic demands "in situ". His specific lab experiments and observational work is very compelling.
So, the above is really a list and summary of some of the key players in developmental psychology that I think are most relevant to the question of how concepts emerge, whether and how they develop, and the extent to which they become fixed, over development or within/across cultures. The integration of these theoretical perspectives reveals how conceptual development emerges through multiple, parallel processes operating at different timescales. From the microsecond-level coordination of early social interactions to the years-long development of abstract conceptual understanding, these processes work together to create increasingly sophisticated forms of understanding. Rather than viewing conceptual understanding as progressing through discrete stages toward increasingly abstract representation (like the stage theorists including Piaget and neo-Piagetians), this work (and my main argument/interests) shows a process of progressive integration where new levels of meaning are incorporated into existing understanding while maintaining access to more basic levels. This multi-level conceptual structure allows for flexible, context-dependent activation of different aspects of meaning, serving specific pragmatic and social goals while maintaining connection to embodied experience and cultural practice. Again, to nail this critical point: this inherently social, context-dependent, and plural account is in contrast to more conventional -- and for a long time, the only well-respected -- views of concepts as abstract mental representation.
Why we care: The implications of this framework extend beyond developmental psychology to fundamental questions about the nature of human cognition and learning, and have direct applications to teaching, intervention, and the design of learning and develpment CONTEXTS that encourage personal and collective develpment. Rather than focusing on the transmission of abstract knowledge (like what most of schooling does right now), these approaches would emphasize creating conditions for embodied exploration, social interaction, and meaningful participation in cultural practices… [I wonder: Shall we springboard to Liminal Learning; can we integrate the Neither / Nor framework, its 6 principles, and the related practices? Is there a paper in which we take some of the basic ideas from McGilchrist and extend them with N/N treatments combined with this develpmental synthesis to suggest direct implications for intervention/education? ]
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MORE NOTES TO INTEGRATE:
In more detail, with some empirical examples: Pre-conceptual Intersubjective Meaning-Making: Trevarthen demonstrated this through microanalysis of mother-infant interactions, showing how 2-month-olds engage in proto-conversations with precise timing. In one famous study, when mothers were asked to maintain a "still face" rather than respond normally, infants showed immediate distress and attempted to re-establish the interaction. This showed how even pre-verbal infants are fundamentally oriented toward social meaning-making. Malloch's studies of musical interaction between mothers and infants showed temporal coordination down to fractions of a second, suggesting an innate capacity for intersubjective rhythm and timing.
Sensorimotor Phase: Thelen and Smith's work on reaching behavior demonstrated how concepts of "reachable" emerge from actual reaching attempts. In their classic "spring-loaded arm" experiments, they showed how infants wearing weights on their arms quickly adjusted their reaching strategies, suggesting that spatial concepts are built from actual motor experience. Smith's work on the "shape bias" showed that by 24 months, children preferentially extend new words to objects of similar shape rather than color or texture, demonstrating how sensorimotor experience shapes early categorization.
Event-Based Understanding: Nelson documented how children as young as 3 years old could describe detailed "scripts" for familiar events like going to McDonald's, including ordered sequences like: "You go in, you wait in line, you tell them what you want, they give you the food, you sit down, you eat." These scripts formed the basis for more abstract conceptual understanding. She showed how children's understanding of "restaurant" began with these specific script-based experiences before developing into a more general category. Social-Pragmatic Development: Tomasello's studies of pointing behavior showed that by 12 months, infants point not just to request objects but to share attention and information. In one study, infants pointed to inform an adult about the location of an object the adult was seeking, demonstrating understanding of others' knowledge states and intentions. Bates documented how early gestures like showing and giving predicted later vocabulary development, with gestures serving as bridges to symbolic communication.
Transformation of Concepts: Vygotsky's research on concept formation used the "double stimulation method" where children sorted blocks varying in multiple dimensions (color, shape, size). He found that young children (4-6) grouped by perceptual similarity, older children (7-11) grouped by functional relationships, and adolescents could sort using abstract principles. For example, when presented with the word "dax" and shown various objects, young children grouped based on color, older children grouped based on use, and adolescents could understand arbitrary classification rules.
Embodied Foundation: Linda Smith's lab demonstrated this through "body-scaled perception" studies. When children were given different-sized tools to reach objects, their concept of "reachable" adjusted immediately. Similarly, Glenberg's work showed that children's understanding of sentences like "the pencil is in the cup" was facilitated when they physically enacted the spatial relationships. Recent work by Casasanto showed that right-handed people associate "good" with the right side and "bad" with the left, while left-handed people show the opposite pattern, demonstrating how even abstract concepts are grounded in bodily experience.
Dynamic Assembly: Samuelson and Smith's studies of word learning showed how children's categorization of objects varies depending on context. When presented with novel objects on a table, 2-year-olds used shape to categorize; when the same objects were presented in substances like water or sand, they used material properties. This demonstrated how concepts are assembled "on the fly" based on context. Their "spatial-temporal binding" studies showed how where and when children learn words affects what properties they attend to.
Pragmatic Function: Jean Mandler's research on early concepts showed how infants' first categories are based on what objects do rather than what they look like. For example, 7-month-olds categorized animals together based on their self-initiated movement, not their physical appearance. Waxman and Markow demonstrated that even 12-month-olds extend labels differently for objects versus actions, showing early sensitivity to the pragmatic functions of different word types.
Additional Key Research Supporting Integration:
Cultural-Historical Development: Katherine Nelson's longitudinal studies showed how children's concepts of time develop from event-based understanding ("after nap") to conventional time units ("at 3 o'clock"). This demonstrated how cultural tools transform basic concepts.
Social Construction of Meaning:
Barbara Rogoff's cross-cultural studies showed how different cultural practices lead to different paths of conceptual development. For example, Mayan children who observe complex weaving patterns develop spatial concepts differently from peers in schools.
Multimodal Nature of Concepts:
Critical Examples of Multiple Meanings: Deacon on symbolic development shows how even simple concepts like "water" have multiple context-dependent meanings: • Perceptual level: wet, flowing substance • Functional level: for drinking, washing • Scientific level: H2O, molecular structure • Cultural level: purification, life source These
Details of research: Cultural-Historical Development (Nelson's Work):
Nelson's longitudinal studies (1996, "Language in Cognitive Development") followed children from ages 2-7, documenting how temporal concepts evolved: • Age 2-3: Time understood through event sequences ("after breakfast") • Age 4-5: Beginning to use clock time but tied to routines ("when the big hand is on 12") • Age 6-7: Abstract time concepts emerge ("half an hour") She documented specific dialogues showing how parents scaffold this development: Parent: "When do you want lunch?" Child (3): "After playground" Parent: "It's 12 o'clock now, lunchtime" This interaction shows the bridging between event-based and conventional time concepts.
Rogoff's Cross-Cultural Studies: In her 2003 work "The Cultural Nature of Human Development," Rogoff documented:
- Spatial Concept Development: • Mayan weaving apprentices (ages 6-8) developed advanced spatial concepts through: o Observation of patterns o Hands-on practice o Limited verbal instruction • Compared to school-based learning where spatial concepts were taught abstractly
- Different Learning Patterns: • Indigenous communities: concepts learned through observation and participation • Western schooling: concepts taught through explicit instruction These differences led to different but equally sophisticated conceptual understanding.