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California Unlawful Detainer Timelines: Court Days vs. Calendar Days

Overview of Timelines in Unlawful Detainer (Eviction) Cases

California’s unlawful detainer statutes impose expedited deadlines for notices, responses, and motions. Some deadlines are measured in “court days” (excluding weekends and judicial holidays), while others run in calendar days. Below is an analysis of key statutes and deadlines, indicating whether each uses court days or calendar days, the specific time period and context, and any pertinent case law interpretations. Notice to Terminate Tenancy (Pre-Lawsuit Notices)

3-Day Notices to Quit or Cure (Code of Civil Procedure §1161): CCP §1161(2) – Nonpayment of Rent: Requires a 3-day notice for a tenant to pay rent or quit. Measured in court days – “three days’ notice, excluding Saturdays and Sundays and other judicial holidays,” must be given codes.findlaw.com codes.findlaw.com . In 2019, AB 2343 amended §1161(2) to exclude weekends/holidays, giving tenants a true three court-day period to pay or vacate blawg401.com . Case law emphasizes strict compliance: a notice that fails to exclude non-business days (or otherwise deviates from statutory form) is defective and will not support an eviction blawg401.com . (Before AB 2343, 3 days were counted as calendar days with extension if the last day fell on a weekend blawg401.com .) CCP §1161(3) – Breach of Lease Covenants: Requires a 3-day notice to perform covenants or quit for curable breaches (other than rent). Measured in court days – similarly excludes weekends and holidays codes.findlaw.com . The tenant has 3 court days to cure the breach or vacate codes.findlaw.com . Like rent notices, these must strictly comply with the statute. After AB 2343, the 3-day cure period is calculated in court days blawg401.com . CCP §1161(4) – Nuisance/Waste/Unlawful Use: Permits termination without opportunity to cure for serious breaches (nuisance, illegal activity, etc.), with a 3-day notice to quit. Measured in calendar days – the statute does not exclude weekends/holidays codes.findlaw.com . The notice need only give a straight three days to vacate. The 2019 changes did not amend this subdivision blawg401.com , so a 3-day nuisance notice includes weekends (though if the third day falls on a weekend or court holiday, the period extends to the next business day by general rules (CCP §12a)). Courts have held that 3-day notices must be clear and of at least three full days, but since §1161(4) lacks the “excluding holidays” clause, those days are counted consecutively blawg401.com . CCP §1161a – Post-Foreclosure Notice to Quit: Applies when a property is sold and the new owner evicts holdover occupants. Typically requires a 3-day notice to quit to the former owner or holdover (subject to longer notice for bona fide tenants per other law). Measured in calendar days – §1161a was not amended by AB 2343 blawg401.com , so the 3-day period runs normally. (Notably, bona fide residential tenants after foreclosure are generally entitled to 90 days’ notice under CCP §1161b or federal law, but former owners can be given 3 days gavel.io .) Case law (e.g. Covina Manor v. Hatch) confirms that even a tenancy at will (which a holdover former owner essentially has) requires at least 30 days’ notice unless a shorter period is specified by statute law.justia.com . Here, §1161a provides that specific authority for a 3-day post-foreclosure notice to quit, counted in regular days. 30/60-Day Notices for Periodic Tenancies (Civil Code §§1946, 1946.1): Civil Code §1946 – 30-Day Notice (Month-to-Month Tenancy): A landlord may end a month-to-month tenancy with at least 30 days’ written notice (or the tenant may give 30 days’ notice to vacate) gavel.io . This is measured in calendar days – the statute does not exclude weekends. If the tenant has resided in the unit for less than one year, 30 days is sufficient; if one year or more, §1946.1 requires 60 days. These longer notices are unaffected by the recent UD timing legislation blawg401.com . (Local rent control or just-cause eviction laws may impose additional requirements, but the time length (30/60 days) is set by state law gavel.io .) Civil Code §1946.1 – 60-Day Notice (Longer Tenancies): For residential tenants in possession ≥12 months, a 60-day notice to quit is required absent cause gavel.io . This notice is also calendar days; the two-month period runs continuously. There is no statutory exclusion of weekends/holidays for 30/60-day notices blawg401.com . In practice, the termination date stated in the notice should be at least 30 or 60 actual days out. (Case law: Lamanna v. Vognar held that a defective longer notice can derail an eviction, underscoring the need to strictly follow the 30/60-day requirement, though it doesn’t alter how days are counted.) Civil Code §789 – Tenancies at Will: When a tenant is in possession “at will” (no fixed term or rent schedule), the law requires at least 30 days’ written notice to terminate law.justia.com . This is calendar days (the statute simply requires a 30-day notice in writing, served like a 3-day notice). In Covina Manor, Inc. v. Hatch (1955), the court confirmed that a landlord must give a full 30-day notice to an at-will occupant before filing an unlawful detainer, as mandated by Civil Code §789 law.justia.com . No weekend/holiday exclusion applies. If the occupant fails to vacate after 30 days, the landlord may proceed with an unlawful detainer (treated similarly to a holdover tenant). Key Takeaway: Only the 3-day notices to pay rent or cure a breach (§1161(2) and (3)) use court days (no weekends/holidays) codes.findlaw.com codes.findlaw.com . All other pre-lawsuit notices (3-day quit for nuisance, 30/60-day termination, etc.) run on calendar days blawg401.com gavel.io . Recent tenant-protection legislation (AB 2343 in 2019) specifically changed the rent and covenant notices to court days to give tenants more time blawg401.com , but it left the other notice periods unchanged blawg401.com . Summons and Response Deadlines in Unlawful Detainer Actions

Once an unlawful detainer lawsuit is filed, the statutory timelines remain extremely short. Here, too, some deadlines use court days and others use calendar days: CCP §1167 – Time to Respond to UD Summons: By default, a defendant in an unlawful detainer must respond within 5 days of service of the summons and complaint trackbill.com . However, this 5-day period is calculated as court days (excluding weekends and judicial holidays) trackbill.com . In effect, every UD summons says the tenant has “5 days, not counting Saturdays, Sundays, and court holidays,” to file a response. AB 2343 (2019) amended §1167 to exclude non-court days from the 5-day answer period blawg401.com . For example, a UD complaint served on a Friday would have its 5-day clock skip the weekend, giving the tenant until the following Friday to respond. Tenants thus always had at least a week in real time blawg401.com . AB 2347 (2024) further amended §1167, effective Jan. 1, 2025, to extend the response time from 5 court days to 10 court days hansonbridgett.com . Now a tenant has roughly two weeks (excluding weekends/holidays) to respond to the eviction complaint, doubling the prior timeline hansonbridgett.com . For example, a tenant served on a Monday now has until the second Monday (assuming no holidays) to file an answer. This change was intended to afford tenants a more meaningful opportunity to seek legal help and avoid default sjud.senate.ca.gov sjud.senate.ca.gov . The 5-day answer deadline remains measured in court days through 2024, and will be 10 court days in 2025 and beyond hansonbridgett.com . Service Method Extensions: If service of the summons is not personal (for instance, if served by substituted service with mailing, or by posting and mailing under court order), the effective “response clock” starts later. Under prior law, a defendant had 5 court days from effective service – e.g. if served by posting, service is deemed complete on the 10th day after mailing (CCP §415.45), then 5 court days from that date to respond. Additionally, former CCP §1167 allowed 10 days (excluding non-court days) to respond if the summons was served by certified mail as part of a Secretary of State address confidentiality program trackbill.com . (Those provisions will likely be adjusted correspondingly under AB 2347 to 10 and 20 court days, respectively, though the core rule is now 10 court days for an answer in all residential UD cases hansonbridgett.com .) Case Law: Courts have upheld the constitutionality of the short UD answer period. In Deal v. Municipal Court (1984), a tenant argued that 5 days was too short to respond, violating due process. The Court of Appeal disagreed, noting the summary nature of unlawful detainer and the availability of relief for good cause. The court emphasized that the UD statutes “provide expedited and summary procedure” to promptly restore possession, and the 5-day answer deadline (now 10-day) is a reasonable component of that process clrc.ca.gov . However, if a tenant can show “good cause” for delay (e.g. through a motion under CCP §473), a default might be set aside – thus the law strikes a balance clrc.ca.gov . CCP §1170.5(a) – Trial Setting Within 20 Days: Once a UD case is “at issue” (usually meaning after the tenant files an answer), trial must be set no later than the 20th day thereafter, unless continued for good cause sjud.senate.ca.gov sjud.senate.ca.gov . This 20-day period is calendar days, as the statute does not exclude weekends. In practice, courts schedule trial in unlawful detainers very quickly – often exactly on the 20th day or as soon as the court’s calendar allows. The timeline was not changed by recent legislation and remains in effect blawg401.com . Interpretation: The 20-day trial rule is intended to protect landlords’ right to a speedy resolution sjud.senate.ca.gov . Case law indicates this deadline is directive, not jurisdictional – a trial starting beyond 20 days isn’t automatically invalid. However, a defendant can demand a speedy trial, and unwarranted delay might violate the spirit of the summary proceedings (see Housing Authority v. Gomez (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 366, 372). In practice, most UD trials occur within roughly 3 weeks as required. The policy is clear: unlawful detainer plaintiffs are entitled to priority trial setting (to regain possession), so calendar days are counted for this purpose. Expedited Pre-Trial Motions and Discovery Deadlines

Unlawful detainer cases not only shorten the answer and trial times, but also compress the timeline for pre-trial motions and discovery. Most of these deadlines are expressed in calendar days (the statutes themselves do not exclude weekends), though by necessity they often span very short periods. CCP §1170.7 – Summary Judgment Motions: In ordinary civil cases, a summary judgment motion requires 75 days’ notice before the hearing (CCP §437c). In UD cases, however, CCP §1170.7 allows a motion for summary judgment to be made at any time after the answer is filed, on 5 days’ notice to the opposing party rulings.law . This is measured in calendar days (with the usual addition of 5 days if notice is by mail – CCP §1013). The statute has not been altered by recent law, so the 5-day notice remains the rule blawg401.com . Purpose and Case Law: The dramatically shortened notice (5 days vs. 75) again reflects the “basic statutory purpose of unlawful detainer – a speedy determination of the right to possession.” amadorcourt.org Courts have upheld applying summary judgment in UD as consistent with due process, given the limited issues and need for speed (see Knowles v. Robinson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 620, 625). A moving party must still meet the normal summary judgment standard (no triable issue of fact) amadorcourt.org , but they can obtain a hearing on extremely short notice. Five days’ notice is counted consecutively (calendar days) absent an explicit exclusion. CCP §1170.8 – Discovery Motions (Motions to Compel): Discovery disputes in UD are fast-tracked. CCP §1170.8 provides that motions regarding discovery may be made on at least 5 days’ notice (and may be granted or denied by the court before trial) download.pli.edu . For example, a motion to compel answers or production can be filed and heard on 5 days’ notice, rather than the 16-court-day notice ordinarily required for motions. These 5 days are calendar days (with mailing extensions if applicable). The law remains unchanged post-2019 blawg401.com . Practice: This means a landlord or tenant can bring a motion to compel very quickly if the opposing party fails to respond to discovery in the few days allotted. The court can hear and decide such motions even as the trial date approaches. Given that discovery itself is extremely expedited in UD (see below), the ability to move to compel on 5 days’ notice is crucial to enforce discovery rights within the short timeframe. Parties must be diligent; courts often hear discovery motions in the week or two after an answer is filed, sometimes literally on the eve of trial (since trial is only ~20 days out). The 5-day notice is counted in regular days, so weekend days do count toward the notice period blawg401.com . Expedited Discovery Timelines: The Civil Discovery Act has special provisions for unlawful detainers that shorten when discovery can be initiated and how long a party has to respond: CCP §2025.270(b) – Depositions: In general civil cases, a plaintiff must wait 20 days after service of summons to notice a deposition (CCP §2025.210), and depositions require at least 10 days’ notice (plus mail time). In unlawful detainer actions, §2025.270(b) allows depositions on only 5 days’ notice download.pli.edu . A deposition can be scheduled as soon as 5 days after the notice is served (or 10 days if notice is by mail, per CCP §1013) webblawgroup.com . Additionally, no deposition can be set for a date later than 5 days before trial (to ensure completion before trial) download.pli.edu . These are calendar days – the statute does not exclude weekends, so a notice served Monday could set a deposition as early as Saturday (though in practice one would pick the next business day). This compressed schedule requires parties to act immediately in scheduling depositions. There is also a 5-day “waiting period” after service of summons in UD before any deposition may be taken clrc.ca.gov (this is effectively moot since notice itself must be 5 days). The key point is depositions can be initiated almost immediately and on minimal notice, reflecting the urgency of UD proceedings. CCP §2030.020(c) – Interrogatories: Ordinarily, a plaintiff must wait 10 days after service of summons (or after defendant’s appearance, whichever is first) to propound interrogatories. In a UD case, §2030.020(c) shortens that to 5 days download.pli.edu . A landlord can serve written interrogatories on the tenant just 5 days after serving the summons and complaint (or 5 days after tenant appears, if earlier). Responses to interrogatories are also expedited – the responding party has only 5 days to respond (CCP §2030.260(b) specifically sets a 5-day response deadline in UD) download.pli.edu . Both the 5-day waiting period and 5-day response time are counted as calendar days (no special exclusion), absent a statute saying otherwise. This means a tenant who is served interrogatories right after being served the lawsuit might have to respond within 5 days of receiving them – an incredibly short window compared to the normal 30 days. No known published case has invalidated this on due process grounds, but the summary nature of UD is the justification (the tenant can always ask the court for a brief extension or relief if 5 days is unworkable). CCP §2031.020(c) – Inspection Demands: Similarly, a landlord may serve a demand for inspection or production of documents 5 days after service of summons in a UD action download.pli.edu (vs. 10 days in other cases). The tenant has at least 5 days to respond to a document demand (CCP §2031.260(b)) download.pli.edu . These are calendar days. The demand must specify a date for production at least 5 days out, giving the tenant essentially the same window to respond or object. Again, this extremely truncated timeline requires tenants to gather and produce documents (or raise objections) almost immediately upon being sued. CCP §2033.020(c) – Requests for Admission: A plaintiff may serve requests for admission after 5 days as well download.pli.edu . The responding party has only 5 days to respond (CCP §2033.250(b)) download.pli.edu . This means a tenant could be deemed to admit crucial facts if they fail to serve responses within 5 days of receiving RFAs. Because of these stakes, courts will carefully scrutinize service and receipt of discovery – but the timeline itself (5 days) is clearly prescribed by statute. All these discovery periods (interrogatories, requests for documents, admissions) remain counted in normal (calendar) days; the 2019 AB 2343 changes did not extend discovery response times blawg401.com . CCP §2024.040(b)(1) – Discovery Cutoff: All discovery in an unlawful detainer must be completed on or before the 5th day before trial codes.findlaw.com . This means discovery closes 5 calendar days before the trial date. For example, if trial is set for a Monday, all depositions and other discovery must be done by the Wednesday prior codes.findlaw.com . (If that day falls on a weekend or holiday, by operation of CCP §10 the cutoff would likely be the preceding court day.) Five days before trial is extremely early by normal standards, but necessary to allow any last-minute motions (and because trial is so soon after filing). This rule remains unchanged – it is explicitly in §2024.040(b)(1) codes.findlaw.com . Notably, “five days before trial” is not stated as court days, so calendar days are used; however, since trials are typically on weekdays, this effectively often excludes a weekend by its nature (e.g., trial Monday → cutoff Wednesday) codes.findlaw.com . Practical Effect and Case Notes: The compressed discovery timeline in UD has been upheld as part of the summary process. In Deal v. Municipal Court (1984), the court rejected a due process challenge to the 5-day discovery response rule, noting that a UD defendant can seek relief for good cause (e.g., an extension) and that the Legislature has determined the need for speed justifies the short timeline clrc.ca.gov . The Law Revision Commission has noted the “special short time requirements” for UD discovery, which exist to balance the tenant’s right to defend with the landlord’s right to a prompt remedy clrc.ca.gov . Attorneys practicing in this area emphasize that one must “relearn how to count to five” because so many UD deadlines are five days or less blawg401.com . In sum, all of these discovery and motion deadlines use calendar days (unless otherwise noted). Only the initial notice to respond (5->10 days) and 3-day cure notices are “court days” – the rest of the UD litigation proceeds on calendar days to preserve the accelerated schedule blawg401.com . Motions to Vacate Default Judgments in Unlawful Detainer

Because the statutory deadlines in unlawful detainers are so short, tenants often miss them and suffer default judgments. However, California law provides several avenues to seek relief from a default or default judgment, even in eviction cases. The legal framework for vacating defaults in UD is the same as in other civil cases – primarily CCP §473(b) (relief for mistake/inadvertence) and CCP §473.5 (no actual notice), plus the court’s equitable authority to set aside a judgment for extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction. This section summarizes those mechanisms and relevant case law: CCP §473(b) – Relief for Mistake, Inadvertence, Surprise, or Excusable Neglect: A tenant (or any party) can move to set aside a default or default judgment within 6 months of its entry, if they can show their failure to respond was due to excusable neglect or other specified reasons. The motion must be accompanied by a proposed answer (or other pleading) and a declaration explaining the mistake or neglect. Courts apply this provision stringently – the moving party bears a “double burden” of showing a satisfactory excuse for the default and diligence in seeking relief once discovered law.justia.com law.justia.com . For example, if a tenant discovered a default judgment and waits months to file for relief without good reason, the motion can be denied for lack of diligence law.justia.com . Standard for Excusable Neglect: The neglect or mistake must be “excusable” – of the sort a reasonably prudent person might have under the circumstances. Simple forgetfulness or misunderstanding may not suffice if it shows lack of reasonable care. In McClain v. Kissler (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399, the Court of Appeal affirmed denial of a §473(b) motion where the defendants deliberately ignored the rules and deadline. The court noted relief under §473(b) is reserved for “honest, reasonable mistakes”, and should not reward parties who “ignore or flout the most basic rules”, causing delay caselaw.findlaw.com caselaw.findlaw.com . McClain emphasizes that while the law favors resolving cases on the merits, there are countervailing policies of efficiency and respecting court procedures caselaw.findlaw.com . If relief were too freely granted, “no case would merit denial of relief and the Legislature might as well make such relief mandatory in all circumstances”, which it has not caselaw.findlaw.com . UD Context: In unlawful detainers, courts recognize that tenants often default simply due to the rapid timeline or confusion. Judges may be somewhat sympathetic if the tenant moves promptly to set aside and has a colorable defense (e.g., wrong amount of rent or habitability issues). However, the short answer period itself is not grounds for automatic relief – the tenant must show a specific excuse (such as never receiving the summons, being in the hospital, or believing an agreement with the landlord obviated the need to respond). Each case is fact-specific. The burden is on the tenant to show excusable reasons for missing the deadline and to act within 6 months. (Notably, if an attorney caused the default by mistake, §473(b) has a “mandatory” relief provision requiring the court to vacate the default if the attorney swears to his or her error. But in UD cases, many tenants are self-represented, so this mandatory-relief provision is less frequently invoked.) Illustrative Cases: Kendall v. Barker (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 619 highlights the need for diligence. There, a defaulting defendant obtained relief in the trial court, but the appellate court reversed because the defendant waited too long after learning of the default. The court quoted the rule that a §473 motion must be made within a reasonable time, and that “the moving party has a double burden: He must show a satisfactory excuse for his default, and he must show diligence in making the motion after discovery of the default.” law.justia.com Because the record showed no adequate excuse for the delay in seeking relief, the order vacating the default was overturned law.justia.com . The lesson for UD tenants is that if you default, you should move as soon as possible (weeks, not months) to set aside, and explain both why you originally failed to respond and why you didn’t act sooner. CCP §473.5 – Relief When No Actual Notice of the Suit: Section 473.5 is a remedy designed for the scenario where a default or default judgment is entered without the defendant ever having actually been aware of the lawsuit in time to defend. It applies when service of summons did occur in some manner (so the judgment isn’t void on its face), but the defendant did not receive actual notice in time to respond (for reasons not caused by the defendant’s own avoidance or neglect). In an eviction context, this often comes up if the summons was served by substituted service or “nail and mail” posting, and the tenant never saw the papers. The tenant can file a §473.5 motion, accompanied by a sworn declaration that they did not have actual notice in time, and a proposed answer. The motion must be filed within a reasonable time – no more than two years after entry of the default judgment, or 180 days after discovering it (whichever is earlier). The court may set aside the default and judgment and allow the tenant to defend, on such terms as are just (often the tenant must reimburse the landlord’s costs, etc., as a condition). Key Limit – Service vs. No Service: Section 473.5 only applies if the summons was served in a manner consistent with law (e.g., substitute service to someone at the home, or posting after a court order) but the defendant simply didn’t find out. If no valid service ever occurred, §473.5 is not the proper vehicle – the judgment in that case is void (see below) and can be attacked at any time. The distinction was highlighted in Ramos v. Oros (2023) (Cal. Ct. App., unpublished). There, a default judgment was entered, and the defendant convinced the trial court to set it aside under §473.5 claiming lack of notice. On appeal, it turned out the defendant was asserting he was never served at all. The Court of Appeal reversed the order vacating under §473.5, holding that §473.5 does not apply when the defendant was never served – if there was no service, the judgment is void for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the proper remedy is a different motion (or independent action) to vacate as void casemine.com casemine.com . In other words, §473.5 is for valid service without actual notice, not no service. UD Examples: In eviction cases, tenants commonly seek relief under §473.5 when they first learn of a default judgment – for instance, when the sheriff posts a 5-day notice to vacate on the door (after the landlord got a default). If the tenant swears they never knew about the lawsuit because the summons was posted or left with someone who failed to give it to them, courts will often grant relief if timing allows. The tenant must act within 180 days of learning of the judgment. If granted, the default and judgment are set aside and the case litigation picks up as if an answer were filed. The tenant may need to pay one month’s rent into court (to reassure the landlord) as authorized by §473.5(c). Case law like Ellard v. Conway (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 540 underscores that a default judgment entered without the defendant’s knowledge can be set aside when the statutory conditions are met – but again, §473.5 cannot rescue a defendant who was properly served and simply forgot to respond; it’s aimed at those who through no fault of their own didn’t know of the action. Void Judgments and Equitable Relief (No Time Limit): In addition to the statutory remedies above, courts have inherent and equitable power to set aside a default judgment that is void or where there has been extrinsic fraud or mistake. Unlike §473 motions, these are not strictly time-limited to 6 months or 2 years (though unreasonable delay can waive equitable relief). Two main scenarios: Lack of Personal Jurisdiction (Void Judgment): If the tenant was never validly served with the summons and complaint, any resulting default judgment is void as a matter of law. The tenant can move to vacate a void judgment under CCP §473(d) or the court’s inherent authority, even beyond the 6-month limit. A judgment entered without proper service violates fundamental due process. For example, if a landlord files a false proof of service or serves the wrong person, the tenant can come even years later to overturn the judgment for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court must vacate a void judgment once proven. In Ramos v. Oros, as noted, the Court of Appeal indicated the correct approach where no service occurred is to treat the judgment as void for lack of jurisdiction, not to analyze it under §473.5’s narrower actual-notice standard casemine.com . Case Illustration: Kawada Co. v. Ebanos Crossing, LLC (2020) (unpublished) provides a dramatic example in the UD context. A commercial landlord obtained court permission to serve a summons by posting and mailing, claiming the tenant could not be found. The landlord did so and got a default judgment, but failed to disclose to the court that the tenant had actually abandoned the premises months earlier. The subterfuge meant the tenant and its guarantors never received notice of the suit. When the truth came out, the guarantors (who were named defendants) moved to quash service and vacate the default. The trial court granted the motions, effectively voiding the default judgment due to the improper service case-law.vlex.com . The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding service was not valid and the default was appropriately set aside case-law.vlex.com . This scenario amounts to extrinsic fraud on the court – the landlord misrepresented facts to obtain service by posting – and the resulting judgment could not stand. The takeaway is that if a default judgment is obtained by some unfair trick or without proper notice, courts are inclined to vacate it to give the tenant a chance to be heard. Equitable Relief – Extrinsic Fraud or Mistake: Even where service was technically valid and the 6-month §473 deadline has passed, a court can grant relief from a default judgment on equitable grounds in exceptional cases. The classic grounds are extrinsic fraud (where the plaintiff’s conduct prevented the defendant from participating in the case) or extrinsic mistake (where some external factor led to the default). Equitable relief is a last resort – the California Supreme Court has said, “When a default judgment has been obtained, equitable relief may be given only in exceptional circumstances.” supreme.courts.ca.gov (quoting Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975). In Rappleyea, the Supreme Court outlined the requirements: To set aside a default on equitable grounds after the statutory period, the defendant must satisfy a three-part test: (1) a meritorious defense to the action, (2) a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense in time (i.e. a reason the default happened that is “extrinsic” to the case), and (3) diligence in seeking to set aside the default once discovered law.justia.com . These mirror the common law elements of extrinsic mistake/fraud relief. Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic: Extrinsic factors are those outside the litigation that prevent a fair trial – e.g., the defendant was tricked by the plaintiff, or never knew about the lawsuit due to some mix-up not of his own making. Intrinsic mistake (like a defendant simply misunderstanding the law or neglecting to respond) is not enough once the 6 months has passed. In Rappleyea, the defendants argued that a court clerk’s mis-advice about the filing fee caused their default (they mailed an answer without the proper fee, which led to rejection and default). The Supreme Court agreed this was an extrinsic mistake – “a mistake led a court to do what it never intended” – because the clerk’s error prevented the defendants’ timely answer from being filed law.justia.com law.justia.com . The court found the defendants met the three-part test (they acted diligently and had a meritorious defense) and ordered the default vacated even though over 6 months had elapsed law.justia.com law.justia.com . UD Implications: In unlawful detainers, an example of extrinsic fraud might be a landlord telling a tenant “you don’t need to file an answer, I won’t proceed with the eviction,” then obtaining a default – the tenant was lulled into not responding. Or a tenant’s English proficiency or physical illness might be so severe that they were deprived of the opportunity to defend (though courts are careful with such arguments, as they border on intrinsic excuses). One published case, Weitz v. Yankosky (1966) 63 Cal.2d 849, allowed equitable relief where a defendant’s insurer failed to defend a lawsuit, resulting in default – the defendant himself never knew of the suit due to extrinsic factors. A court would likely apply similar principles to relieve a tenant who can show he was kept unaware or unable to respond due to forces outside his control. The Rappleyea decision confirms that even after the 6-month window, courts may exercise discretion to set aside a default in an eviction case for extrinsic reasons, but only if the tenant was sufficiently diligent and innocent in the matter law.justia.com law.justia.com . In summary, motions to vacate defaults in unlawful detainers proceed under the same statutes as other cases, but courts recognize the high stakes (loss of housing) and often scrutinize service and notice issues closely. CCP §473(b) (6-month limit) is commonly invoked if the tenant moved fast; CCP §473.5 is a crucial remedy if the tenant truly never knew of the suit casemine.com ; and even beyond those, a default can be attacked for fundamental flaws like no service or extrinsic fraud. Case law (e.g., McClain, Kendall, Rappleyea) shows that while relief is possible, it is not automatic – the tenant must show a credible excuse and a potentially valid defense. Courts will deny relief to those who simply “change their mind” after letting default occur sanbenito.courts.ca.gov , but will grant relief in the interest of justice when the circumstances merit it. Especially in UD cases, where a default means eviction, judges are often willing to vacate a default if the tenant promptly comes forward with a reasonable explanation and a triable issue (for example, proof that the rent was paid or that no notice was received). Court Days vs. Calendar Days: Statistical Summary and Trends

Of the core unlawful detainer statutes analyzed, the vast majority still measure time in calendar days, with only a select few using court days: Statutes using “court days”: CCP §§1161(2) and 1161(3) (3-day notices to pay or cure) and CCP §1167 (time to respond to the complaint, 5 days -> 10 days) explicitly exclude weekends and holidays codes.findlaw.com hansonbridgett.com . Additionally, recent amendments in AB 2347 prescribe that certain motion hearings (e.g. demurrers or motions to strike in UD) be set 5–7 court days after filing hansonbridgett.com , reflecting a trend to use court days for very short periods. In total, only about 3–4 provisions in the UD scheme count days as court days. Statutes using “calendar days”: At least a dozen provisions use straight calendar days. These include CCP §§1161(4) and 1161a (3-day quit notices without cure) codes.findlaw.com , CCP §1170.5(a) (20 days to trial) blawg401.com , CCP §§1170.7 and 1170.8 (5 days’ notice for summary judgment and discovery motions) blawg401.com , Civil Code §§789, 1946, 1946.1 (30/60-day termination notices) gavel.io , and the discovery provisions CCP §§2024.040(b)(1), 2025.270(b), 2030.020(c), 2031.020(c), 2033.020(c) (all of which specify 5-day limits counted in normal days) download.pli.edu download.pli.edu . These amount to 10+ statutes using calendar days. Trend: The recent legislative changes (AB 2343 in 2019, AB 2347 in 2024) show a clear policy shift toward affording tenants a bit more time by using court days for critical response periods. Before 2019, every UD deadline was effectively a calendar-day count (with only the common-law rule extending periods that ended on a weekend) blawg401.com . AB 2343 carved out the 3-day notices and 5-day answer period and turned those into court-day calculations blawg401.com , thereby lengthening the actual time a tenant has (especially if a notice or summons is served near a weekend). AB 2347 doubled the answer period entirely (from 5 to 10 court days) hansonbridgett.com , further tilting the balance toward giving tenants more opportunity to respond. Conversely, the landlord’s interest in a prompt resolution is preserved by keeping other deadlines short and counted in every day on the calendar. The 20-day trial setting remains calendar days (ensuring quick trial) blawg401.com . The 5-day notices for motions remain calendar days blawg401.com , and discovery is still extremely expedited in real time. Thus, while tenants now get a bit of a breather to respond to the lawsuit or cure a default in rent, the overall unlawful detainer process is still one of the fastest civil procedures in law. Policy implications: These adjustments reflect an effort to increase fairness without undermining the summary nature of eviction cases. By using court days for the initial notice and response periods, the Legislature acknowledged that tenants often need access to courts or legal assistance that isn’t available on weekends or holidays. It aims to prevent tenant defaults that result simply from a weekend running out the clock sjud.senate.ca.gov sjud.senate.ca.gov . On the other hand, keeping later stages on calendar days motivates both parties to move swiftly through discovery and toward trial. Landlords still benefit from a process that – even with recent changes – typically concludes far faster than ordinary litigation (often within 4–6 weeks from filing to judgment). Statistically, we see about 3 key timelines now measured in court days versus roughly 13 measured in calendar days. The trend in new laws is to increase the use of court days for timeframes that directly affect a tenant’s ability to appear and contest the case, which can be viewed as a tenant protection measure. This trend may continue (for example, future legislation could conceivably make the 5-day notice period for motions into 5 court days, though that has not occurred yet). For now, California has struck a compromise: the most urgent tenant response windows (notices to pay or quit, and time to answer the complaint) are calculated in court days, affording a bit more time, while everything else that keeps the case moving quickly – trial scheduling, motion practice, and discovery – remains on a rapid calendar-day schedule. This reflects a policy judgment to mitigate the harshest effects of the summary eviction process without depriving landlords of the fundamental benefit of a quick resolution sjud.senate.ca.gov sjud.senate.ca.gov . Sources: Cal. Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1161, 1161a, 1167, 1170.5, 1170.7, 1170.8 codes.findlaw.com codes.findlaw.com hansonbridgett.com blawg401.com . Cal. Civil Code §§ 789, 1946, 1946.1 law.justia.com gavel.io . Cal. Code of Civil Procedure §§ 2024.040(b)(1), 2025.270(b), 2030.020(c), 2031.020(c), 2033.020(c) codes.findlaw.com download.pli.edu download.pli.edu . AB 2347 (2024), extending UD answer deadlines to 10 court days hansonbridgett.com . AB 2343 (2019), excluding weekends/holidays from certain UD periods blawg401.com . Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981-985 law.justia.com law.justia.com (equitable relief from default – extrinsic mistake standard). McClain v. Kissler (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399, 414-415 caselaw.findlaw.com caselaw.findlaw.com (section 473(b) not a “get out of jail free” card; only for honest, reasonable mistakes). Kendall v. Barker (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 619, 623-625 law.justia.com law.justia.com (moving party must show excuse and diligence for default relief). Deal v. Municipal Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 991, 997-998 clrc.ca.gov (5-day UD answer period upheld; due process challenge rejected given “good cause” exception). Ramos v. Oros (2023) – Court of Appeal (unpub.), Case No. B330395 (improper to use §473.5 when no service; judgment void for lack of notice) casemine.com . Covina Manor, Inc. v. Hatch (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d Supp. 790, 793 law.justia.com (30-day notice required to terminate tenancy at will under Civ. Code §789). Knowles v. Robinson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 620 (UD plaintiff may use summary judgment with abbreviated notice, consistent with speedy UD policy) amadorcourt.org amadorcourt.org . Law Revision Commission, Tentative Recommendation – UD Procedure (June 2006) (discussing 5-day discovery response rules and due process) clrc.ca.gov . California Courts Self-Help Portal – Eviction FAQs (clarifying notice periods and response times in days).