criticism on BE - arcturus9/useful-link GitHub Wiki

  • heuristic is not bias. it's better rational approach(by Gerd Gigerenzer)
    http://www.economicsonline.co.uk/Behavioural_economics/Criticisms_of_behavioural_economics.html

  • the idea that most people are stupid ==> μ–΄λ¦¬μ„μŒ λ³Ό 수 μžˆλŠ” μ „λ¬Έκ°€ http://econlog.econlib.org/archives/2016/01/behavioral_econ_1.html
    if your entire career is built around the idea that most people are stupid,
    and you're one of the select few to see through their stupidity,
    then you better be pretty sure that you have your facts right, or else have a thick skin.
    당신은 κ·Έλ“€μ˜ 어리 μ„μŒμ„ 톡해 λ³Ό μˆ˜μžˆλŠ” λͺ‡ μ•ˆλ˜λŠ” μ„ μˆ˜ ​​쀑 ν•˜λ‚˜μž…λ‹ˆλ‹€. κ·Έλ ‡λ‹€λ©΄ 당신은 λ‹Ήμ‹ μ˜ 사싀이 μ˜³μ€μ§€, κ·Έλ ‡μ§€ μ•ŠμœΌλ©΄ λ‘κΊΌμš΄ ν”ΌλΆ€λ₯Ό κ°€μ§€κ³  μžˆλŠ”μ§€ 더 잘 ν™•μ‹  ν•  수 μžˆμŠ΅λ‹ˆλ‹€

  • p29 "some preferences are rational" ==> into the realm of philosophy. (합리성 νŒλ‹¨μ€ μ² ν•™μ˜ μ˜μ—­μœΌλ‘œ λ„˜κΈ΄λ‹€)
    https://web.stanford.edu/~hammond/ratEcon.pdf
    Full rationality is much more than mere structural consistency.
    This is especially true if one believes that full rationality also requires suitable attention to ethical values and respect for other people, as well as animals, etc. Such considerations, and the judgement that some preferences are rational while others are not, goes beyond traditional economics and into the realm of philosophy

  • tanstaafl λ“± 쒋은 comment λ§Žμ€ 질문 μ‹Έμ΄νŠΈ https://www.bogleheads.org/forum/viewtopic.php?t=197678
    Kahneman's and Tversky's general thoughts on decision making: people have rapid intuitive/emotional judgments (system 1) that can systematically bias decisions, and slower deliberative judgments (system 2) that can help overcome these wrong "gut" reactions. Kahneman acknowledges that these gut reactions are often correct - he suggests that we wouldn't have evolved such processes if they always led us astray. However, he supports interventions that slow our thinking down to take advantage of system 2's deliberative approach, and stresses that people be encouraged to take full advantage of deliberative judgment.

Gigerenzer's view: Like K&T, he acknowledges that people rely often on heuristics in decision making. Unlike (sort of) K&T, he places more value on system 1 than system 2 because in his view, system 2 is limited by working memory and so may often struggle to actually help make better decisions, particularly for complex choices. He seems to place more trust in system 1 thinking, and argues that people should be better educated about statistical decision making and that through this familiarity with probability we will make better heuristic choices (he calls this the adaptive toolbox - basically suggesting that training is all that is needed to make better choices).

(1) μ‘λ‹΅μžμ— μΌνšŒμ„± μ˜μ‚¬ κ²°μ • λ¬Έμ œμ—λ§Œ 적용됨. 섀문쑰사와 μ‹€μ œ market은 λ‹€λ₯΄λ‹€λŠ” μ£Όμž₯.

  • μΌλ°˜ν™” 된 경제 ν–‰μœ„κ°€ μ•„λ‹Œ μ˜μ‚¬ κ²°μ •μ˜ λͺ¨λΈμ΄λ©° μ‹€ν—˜ μ°Έμ—¬μž λ‚˜ μ„€λ¬Έ μ‘λ‹΅μžμ—κ²Œ μΌνšŒμ„± μ˜μ‚¬ κ²°μ • λ¬Έμ œμ— λŒ€ν•΄μ„œλ§Œ 적용될 수 μžˆλ‹€κ³  지적

(2) μΌκ΄€λœ 이둠이 μ—†μ–΄ κ΄€μ°°μ˜ λͺ¨μŒμΌ 뿐

  • λ§Žμ€ μˆ˜μ‚¬ν•™μ—λ„ λΆˆκ΅¬ν•˜κ³  μ‹€μ œλ‘œ μΌκ΄€λœ 행동 이둠이 μ—†λ‹€λŠ” 것. λŠμŠ¨ν•˜κ²Œ κ΄€λ ¨λ˜κ±°λ‚˜ κ΄€λ ¨μ΄μ—†λŠ” κ΄€μ°°μ˜ λͺ¨μŒ.

(3) μ„€λ¬Έ 쑰사 기법에 회의적.

  • 전톡적인 κ²½μ œν•™μžλ“€μ€ 행동 κ²½μ œν•™μ΄ κ΄‘λ²”μœ„ν•˜κ²Œ μ‚¬μš©ν•˜λŠ” μ‹€ν—˜ 및 μ„€λ¬Έ 쑰사 기법에 회의적. κ²½μ œν•™μžλ“€μ€ 일반적으둜 경제적 κ°€μΉ˜μ˜ κ²°μ •μ—μ„œ λͺ…μ‹œλœ μ„ ν˜Έλ„ (μ„€λ¬Έ 쑰사)보닀 μ„ ν˜Έλ„λ₯Ό κ°•μ‘°. μ‹€ν—˜ 및 μ„€λ¬Έ μ‘°μ‚¬λŠ” 체계적 편ν–₯, μ „λž΅μ  행동 및 μΈμ„Όν‹°λΈŒ ν˜Έν™˜μ„±μ˜ μœ„ν—˜μ΄ 있음.
    Traditional economists are also skeptical of the experimental and survey-based techniques which behavioral economics uses extensively. Economists typically stress revealed preferences over stated preferences (from surveys) in the determination of economic value. Experiments and surveys are at risk of systemic biases, strategic behavior and lack of incentive compatibility