Configuration - NormB/sipnab GitHub Wiki

sipnab reads configuration from a TOML file. CLI flags (cli-reference.md) always override config file values.

Configuration is optional.

  • With no file present, sipnab runs on its built-in defaults.
  • A config file exists to set persistent defaults for your environment.

Minimal Config

If you only need to override a few defaults, keep it short:

# ~/.config/sipnab/sipnab.toml
[capture]
device = "eth0"
# Your trunks also use 5080: widen the signaling ports.
portrange = "5060-5080"

[diagnosis]
# Local traffic: report setup slower than 6 seconds.
post_dial_delay_secs = 6.0

sipnab -D prints the configuration it loaded. So you can check the file took effect.

File Locations

sipnab reads configuration from the first file it finds in this order:

Priority Source
1 --config <FILE> (must exist; errors if missing)
2 $SIPNAB_CONFIG environment variable
3 $XDG_CONFIG_HOME/sipnab/sipnab.toml, or ~/.config/sipnab/sipnab.toml when $XDG_CONFIG_HOME is unset, empty or not an absolute path
4 ~/.sipnabrc
5 /etc/sipnab/sipnab.toml

sipnab reads only that first file.

  • It does not merge a later one into it.
  • So a setting in ~/.sipnabrc does nothing while ~/.config/sipnab/sipnab.toml exists.

When more than one of rows 3 to 5 exists, sipnab says which file it read and which it did not. It says so in three places:

  • a warning on stderr;
  • a line in --dump-config output;
  • the status line when the terminal UI opens.

A --config file or $SIPNAB_CONFIG is your choice, so it raises no such notice.

# Loaded from: /home/you/.config/sipnab/sipnab.toml
# Also present and NOT read: /home/you/.sipnabrc
  • Use --no-config (-F) to skip all file loading.
  • Use --dump-config (-D) to print which file sipnab loaded and the keys it set. See the note under Full example for what -D does and does not show.

Unknown keys produce a warning and go no further. So one config can span versions.

Environment variables in values

Any string value may contain ${NAME}. sipnab substitutes that environment variable's value when it reads the file:

[crash]
report_dir = "/home/${SUDO_USER}/sipnab"

The case this exists for is sudo.

  • Capture needs privileges, so sipnab often runs under sudo.
  • After sudo -i, a file written by that run lands in root's directory. It does not land in the directory of whoever ran the command.
  • ${SUDO_USER} is the only thing that can say which one that is at the moment sipnab reads the file.

Four rules, and they hold everywhere a string does:

  • ${NAME} expands.
    • NAME is an ASCII letter or _ followed by letters, digits or _.
    • sipnab rejects shell's ${NAME:-default} and ${NAME-other} outright rather than half-supporting them.
  • An unset variable is an error.
    • sipnab names the setting and the variable and does not start.
    • Expanding to nothing would turn /home/${SUDO_USER}/sipnab into /home//sipnab.
    • That is a real, writable directory that is not the one you meant.
  • $$ is a literal $. Write $${NAME} for a literal ${NAME}.
  • A bare $NAME is literal text. Braces are the whole syntax.

What a variable expands to is data. sipnab never scans it again. So a value that itself contains ${...} stays as it is.

--dump-config prints values after expansion. That is what sipnab is actually using.

Format

Standard TOML. All sections and keys are optional. Only set values you want to change from defaults.

A file sipnab cannot read, or a value in it sipnab refuses, stops the run before anything starts.

  • The exit status is 1, and the message names the key.
  • The same value given as a flag exits 2.
  • See Exit codes.

Sections

[capture]

Packet capture defaults.

Key Type Default Description
device string -- Default network interface. --device overrides it
node_name string hostname Name this box reports as, in capture_identity.node on every MCP and REST answer. Lets an agent querying several servers tell WHICH one saw a given fact. --node-name overrides it, so a deployed config can name the box while a one-off command relabels it. The default puts the hostname on the wire. Clipped to 64 characters. sipnab refuses an empty value (exit 1)
portrange string "5060-5061" SIP signaling port range; media is never gated by it. sipnab skips any SIP message with both ports outside the range, and a skipped message reaches no count, no dialog and no output — so this key decides how much of a capture you analyze at all. Widen it ("1-65535") unless you know every port in play. --portrange overrides it
ws_ports string "80, 443, 8080, 8443" Ports carrying SIP-over-WebSocket (RFC 7118), as one inclusive "START-END" range in the same grammar as portrange. The shipped set is the browser's view of the web, not a deployment's: Kamailio, OpenSIPS and Janus each default to WSS outside it, and behind a reverse proxy sipnab sees whichever port the proxy forwards to — on such a capture the entire WebRTC signaling leg stays invisible. A range replaces the shipped set, exactly as portrange replaces the default signaling ports. sipnab counts the SIP-over-WebSocket it declines to unwrap and names the ports it arrived on. --ws-portrange overrides it
snaplen integer 65535 Snapshot length in bytes. sipnab refuses 0, which keeps no byte of any packet, as --snaplen does. --capture-profile overrides it; --snaplen overrides it
buffer integer 64 Kernel capture buffer size in MiB (per device). sipnab refuses 0, which asks the kernel for no ring, as --buffer does. --buffer overrides it
buffer_budget_mb integer 64 Memory budget for the in-flight capture→processing queue. Grows under load up to this budget (capped, never OOM) and shrinks when idle. --buffer-budget overrides it
no_rtp boolean false Disable RTP capture by default. --no-rtp turns it on. --rtp forces it off
promisc boolean true Put a named interface into promiscuous mode (the any device is never promiscuous). --no-promisc overrides this to false
hep_parse boolean false Unwrap HEP-encapsulated SIP found in the capture, as -E / --hep-parse does: each message takes the addresses and the time the HEP packet carries, or the time sipnab captured the wrapper when the HEP packet carries none. For a proxy that mirrors HEP to a loopback port that sipnab sniffs (device = "lo"), so that several readers can see the same copies. Keep a receiver bound to that port: with no process bound to it, some senders lose messages, as the note below this table describes. --no-hep-parse turns it off for one run. Feature: hep
bpf_filter string -- Capture (BPF) filter, as the trailing positional filter on the command line takes, handed to libpcap as typed. Not the display filter, which is [filter] expression. While it holds a filter, sipnab generates none from portrange. The trailing positional filter (<BPF_FILTER>) or --bpf-file replaces it. It applies to capture files too, and a run that reads a file through it says so on stderr
[capture]
device = "eth0"
portrange = "5060-5080"
ws_ports = "8080-8090"
snaplen = 65535
buffer = 16
buffer_budget_mb = 64
no_rtp = false
promisc = true

The loopback HEP deployment, from the file alone. A proxy mirrors HEP to UDP/9063 on lo, and any number of readers sniff it at once:

[capture]
device = "lo"
portrange = "1-65535"
ws_ports = "1-65535"
hep_parse = true
bpf_filter = "udp dst port 9063"

sipnab reads the copies without any process listening on UDP/9063. But a port with no listener costs messages with some senders.

  • The kernel answers each datagram sent to a closed port with an ICMP port-unreachable message.
  • A sender that uses a connected UDP socket then fails its next send.
  • Measured on 2026-10-07 with sipnab's own sender before it changed:
    • sipnab -H 127.0.0.1:19063 sent a 7-message call to a port with no listener;
    • 3 of the 7 sends failed;
    • a reader on lo saw 4 messages.
  • sipnab's -H now sends UDP from an unconnected socket.
    • The kernel does not report the ICMP message to that socket.
    • So it loses no message this way.
    • On 2026-10-08 the same run to a port with no listener reported 7 sent and none failed.
  • Other senders, such as a proxy's HEP module, still may.
    • Whether a proxy loses copies this way depends on whether its HEP sender uses a connected socket.

Keep a receiver bound to the port while you sniff it. sipnab -L 127.0.0.1:9063 is one, and it reads the copies itself.

[display]

Output and TUI display settings.

Key Type Default Description
color string "auto" Color mode: "auto", "always", "never". sipnab refuses any other value, naming the key. --color overrides it
payload_limit integer -- Maximum payload bytes to display. --payload-limit overrides it
delta_time boolean false Show delta time between messages by default. --delta-time turns it on. --no-delta-time forces it off
from_to string "default" From/To column display: "default" (user else host:port), "host-port", "user", "user-host-port". Cycle at runtime with u; --from-to-mode overrides this
mouse_capture boolean true Whether the TUI captures the mouse when it starts. false opens it with capture off, so the terminal's own drag-to-select works; F12 toggles capture at runtime. With capture on, the mouse wheel scrolls
view_filter_detail string "summary" How status line 3 shows the filter the F7 dialog built. "summary" names each selection in a few words, such as F7: 7 methods, From~alice. "full" shows the expression. A filter typed as an expression is always shown in full. The filter_detail key (default F) toggles it at runtime. sipnab refuses any other value, naming the key
visible_columns array of strings all columns Call-list columns to show, by name (case-insensitive): "#", "Method", "From", "To", "Source", "Destination", "State", "Msgs", "Date", "PDD", "Duration". Adjust at runtime with F10; s in the column selector writes the layout into the config file this run loaded (or the user config file ($XDG_CONFIG_HOME/sipnab/sipnab.toml, by default ~/.config/sipnab/sipnab.toml) when none was), so it persists across sessions. sipnab refuses that save when the settings came from /etc/sipnab/sipnab.toml
[display]
color = "always"
payload_limit = 4096
delta_time = true
from_to = "user-host-port"
view_filter_detail = "full"
visible_columns = ["method", "from", "to", "source", "destination", "state", "msgs", "pdd"]

[filter]

Default filter presets applied at startup.

Key Type Default Description
from string -- Default From header filter (regex). sipnab refuses a pattern that does not compile when the file loads, naming the key. --from overrides it
to string -- Default To header filter (regex). sipnab refuses a pattern that does not compile when the file loads, naming the key. --to overrides it
expression string -- Default filter DSL expression. --filter overrides it
[filter]
from = "^1001@"
to = "^1002@"
expression = "method == 'INVITE'"

[filters]

Named filters. Each key is a name and each value a filter expression.

Use a name as @name wherever sipnab takes a filter expression:

  • --filter;
  • --export-vcon-when;
  • [filter] expression;
  • the REST filter parameter;
  • an MCP tool's filter argument;
  • the TUI filter dialog's Named filter field.

See Named filters.

Key Type Default Description
any name string -- A filter expression, which may reference other names and the built-in aliases as @name. A name is 1 to 64 ASCII letters, digits, - or _, and starts with a letter or digit
[filters]
carrier-a = "src.ip in_subnet '203.0.113.0/24'"
support   = "to.user == '7000' OR header.X-Queue == 'support'"
sales     = "@carrier-a AND to.user =~ '^8[0-9]{3}$'"

sipnab resolves every name when it starts. It refuses to start, exit code 1, naming the entry, when:

  • a name does not parse or is a built-in alias;
  • an entry references a name nothing defines;
  • entries reference each other in a loop;
  • an expansion is not a valid expression.

[vcon]

vCon export settings: the export rules and enrichment services, each an array of tables that you write once per entry, and the sealing keys every rule inherits when it does not set its own.

Key Type Default Description
rule array of tables [] Export rules, each [[vcon.rule]]. See the export rule keys
enrich array of tables [] Enrichment services, each [[vcon.enrich]]. See the enrichment keys
encrypt_to string or array -- The encrypt_to of every [[vcon.rule]] that sets none: with it, every rule except a sign_only one encrypts. One certificate, or a list of them. sipnab refuses an empty list. A rule's own value overrides it
sign_key string -- The sign_key of every encrypting or sign_only [[vcon.rule]] that sets none. A rule's own value overrides it
sign_cert string -- The sign_cert of every encrypting [[vcon.rule]] that sets none. A rule's own value overrides it
compress string none The compress of every encrypting [[vcon.rule]] that sets none: none or gzip. A rule's own value overrides it

Export rules. Each pairs a filter with the directory its vCon containers go to and what they carry.

  • A run can hold several.
  • sipnab writes a call matching several once per rule.
  • See Write calls by rule.
Key Type Default Description
name string -- The rule's name, 1 to 64 ASCII letters, digits, - or _. Required and unique
when string -- The filter a call must match; @name named filters resolve. Required
dir string -- The directory the rule writes to. Required
audio string omit inline carries the retained audio inside each container; url writes it to a file beside the container and names it by URL (see audio_url_base); both turn audio retention on for the run. omit carries none
audio_url_base string -- For audio = "url": the HTTPS base URL your storage serves the rule's audio files from. sipnab writes each file beside its container and names <base>/<file> in it
audio_format string wav The format of the audio an inline or url rule carries. wav: audio/x-wav. opus: Ogg Opus, audio/ogg, at 24 kbit/s per channel; needs a build with the opus feature. sipnab refuses any other value, and the key on an omit rule, at startup. See Audio as Ogg Opus
max_inline_media_mib integer --vcon-max-inline-media The largest audio this rule's containers inline, in MiB; sipnab writes a call above it without its audio, saying so
live_audio boolean false Serve each matching call's audio while it is in progress on the REST API's /v1/calls/{call_id}/audio WebSocket, and list the calls at /v1/calls/live. Turns audio retention on. See Hear a call while it is in progress
live boolean false On a live capture, write each matching call's container as the call starts and rewrite it in place, with updated_at, each time the call changes. No effect with -I. See Follow a call while it is in progress
encrypt_to string or array -- A PEM certificate, or a list of them, whose RSA or EC P-256 keys the rule encrypts its containers to: one container with one recipient entry per certificate. Set, the rule writes only the encrypted form of draft-ietf-vcon-vcon-core-04 section 5.3. Needs sign_key and sign_cert. sipnab refuses an empty list. See Encrypt what a rule writes
sign_key string -- The PEM RSA or EC P-256 private key an encrypting or sign_only rule signs with, readable by its owner only. An RSA key signs RS256, an EC P-256 key ES256
sign_cert string -- The PEM certificate chain of sign_key, leaf first, carried in each signature's x5c
sign_cert_url string -- An https:// URL that serves the PEM chain of sign_cert. sipnab writes it as each signature's x5u (draft-ietf-vcon-vcon-core-04 section 5.2.2), beside the x5c. Refused when it is not https://, and on a rule that does not sign. See Name the chain by URL
sign_only boolean false true: write the signed form of draft-ietf-vcon-vcon-core-04 section 5.2 alone, signed with sign_key and sign_cert, with no encryption. The rule takes sign_key, sign_cert and compress from [vcon], and not [vcon] encrypt_to. Refused beside the rule's own encrypt_to, and without a signing key. See Sign without encrypting
compress string none For an encrypting or sign_only rule: gzip signs the gzip (RFC 1952) of the vCon instead of the vCon, as draft-ietf-vcon-vcon-core-04 section 5.2 allows, and the encrypted form names cty: "application/vcon+gzip"; none signs the vCon as it is. Refused on a rule without encrypt_to. See Encrypt what a rule writes
sealed_updates string new-uuid What an encrypting rule writes when a call it already wrote changes. new-uuid: a new instance with a new uuid whose amended names the prior one (draft-ietf-vcon-vcon-core-04 section 4.1.9). same-uuid: rewrite the file under the same uuid, with a startup warning. final-only: write once, when the call ends. sipnab refuses any other value at startup. No effect without encrypt_to. See When an encrypted call changes
sip_messages boolean false Attach the initial INVITE and its final response in wire format, as sip-invite and sip-response, and each one's SDP as sip-sdp. The rule's inline budget covers them. --redact removes them. See The INVITE and the final response
dtmf_events boolean false Write each DTMF key press as keydown and keyup events, with the digit, in the signaling Dialog Object's party_history, from INFO application/dtmf-relay and RFC 4733 telephone events. Turns telephone-event decoding on for the run, as --telephone-event does. --redact removes the events. See What the Dialog Object says about the call
campaign_header string -- The SIP header whose value becomes the signaling Dialog Object's campaign, from the first message that carries it. See Contact-center labels
skill_header string -- The SIP header whose value becomes skill, such as X-Queue
interaction_id_header string -- The SIP header whose value becomes interaction_id
grouping string leg leg: one container per dialog, each naming the call's other legs. call: one container per call, holding every leg the rule selects and the ties between them. See Calls through a PBX or a B2BUA
[[vcon.rule]]
name  = "support-with-audio"
when  = "to.user == '7000'"
dir   = "/var/spool/sipnab-vcon/support"
audio = "inline"

Enrichment services.

  • sipnab sends each one the calls of the rules it names, before it writes their containers.
  • It appends the Analysis Objects of its answer.

See Enrich a call before it is written.

Key Type Default Description
name string -- The service's name, recorded in every container sipnab sent it. 1 to 64 ASCII letters, digits, - or _. Required and unique
rules array of strings -- The [[vcon.rule]] names whose calls go to this service. Required
url string -- Where sipnab POSTs the request: https://, or http:// to a loopback address only. One of url and command
command string -- A program run per call, reading the request on stdin and answering on stdout. One of url and command
auth_file string -- A file holding one Header-Name: value line sent with each request, such as Authorization: Bearer .... Never written to a container
timeout_secs integer 120 How long sipnab waits for the answer, 1 to 3600: the default is DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_SECS (120) and the largest MAX_TIMEOUT_SECS (3600) in src/app/vcon_enrich.rs
send array of strings ["audio", "signaling"] What sipnab sends the service: audio (each leg's WAV), signaling (the container), or both. Sending audio turns audio retention on for the run
lawful_basis bool false Carry a lawful_basis attachment the service answers with, checked for the shape of draft-howe-vcon-lawful-basis-02 and recorded as the service's. With false, an answer holding any attachment is malformed

[pbx]

The PBX sipnab runs beside, for the filter field side.

Key Type Default Description
addresses array of strings [] The PBX's own addresses, each an IP address or a CIDR range. side is inbound for a call whose opening request went to one of them and outbound for one sent from one of them. sipnab refuses to start, exit code 1, naming the entry, when an entry is neither
[pbx]
addresses = ["192.0.2.10", "198.51.100.0/24"]

[sip]

SIP protocol handling.

Key Type Default Description
xcid_headers array [] Header names used to correlate B2BUA call legs (sip.xcid). A dialog whose message carries one of these headers pointing at another dialog's Call-ID joins that dialog. Add your estate's headers here. Empty by default: sipnab picks no X- name for you (RFC 6648), and the identifier that crosses a B2BUA by design is RFC 7989 Session-ID, which correlates with no configuration. An empty list turns the header strategy off
leg_correlation_window_ms integer 2000 How far apart, in milliseconds, one call's two legs may start and still correlate on TIMING alone. This is the B2BUA timing heuristic's whole content, and the only strategy left once a B2BUA has rewritten every identifier the other six compare. The shipped two seconds describes a PBX placing the outbound leg immediately, not one doing an LNP or ENUM dip, or walking an LCR cascade, before it places one. Widen it on such a hop; every correlation still reports the strategy that matched, so a guess stays labeled as one. --leg-correlation-window overrides it
active_idle_window_secs integer 3600 Seconds a dialog may go untouched and still count toward the active-dialog and active-call gauges every surface publishes. The shipped hour is twice RFC 4028's default Session-Expires, which grounds it for a trunk carrying session timers and not for a contact center, where a caller parked on hold past an hour is a channel in use the gauge stops counting. Widening it widens the opposite error -- a call that never sent its BYE keeps counting for longer, and that one never recovers on its own -- so raise it for traffic that genuinely goes quiet. --active-idle-window overrides it. 0 fails validation and names the key
[sip]
xcid_headers = ["X-Call-ID", "X-CID"]
leg_correlation_window_ms = 8000
active_idle_window_secs = 7200

[security]

Security detection defaults.

Key Type Default Description
kill_scanner boolean false Enable scanner detection. --kill-scanner turns it on. --no-kill-scanner forces it off
kill_response integer 200 SIP response code for scanner reports (100-699). --kill-response overrides it
fraud_detect boolean false Enable fraud detection heuristics. --fraud-detect turns it on. --no-fraud-detect forces it off
alert array of strings [] Alert channels: "syslog", "json", "exec". --alert overrides it; --alert-json also turns it on; --syslog also turns it on
alert_exec string -- Command to execute on alert. --alert-exec overrides it
reg_flood_threshold integer 50 Challenged failures from one source inside one reg_flood_window_secs window before --reg-flood reports a flood: REGISTERs that carried credentials and drew a 401 or 407 on the same transaction. The default is a carrier-registrar figure: it never sees the ten-a-second brute force a small PBX gets. Counted in capture time, so a file replays as the traffic it recorded. --reg-flood-threshold overrides it. 0 fails validation and names the key
reg_flood_window_secs integer 1 How much capture time one registration-flood counting window spans, in seconds. reg_flood_threshold counts failures per window, so this decides how concentrated a credential-guessing run has to be: one refusal every two seconds never puts two inside the default one-second window. Range 1-3600. sipnab refuses 0, which would reset the count on every packet, and anything past an hour, where the count is a daily tally rather than a rate, and names the key. --reg-flood-window overrides it
reg_flood_transaction_timeout_ms integer 32000 How long a credentialed REGISTER stays open to the 401/407 that answers it, in milliseconds. The default is RFC 3261 Timer F, 64 times T1 at the default T1 of 500 ms. sipnab never counts a challenge that arrives later as a failure. Set it to 64 times your network's T1, or to your registrar-side proxy's final-response timer when that is longer (see Registration-flood timers). Range 1000-600000. Below one second every challenge arrives after its transaction ends and the detector counts nothing, so sipnab refuses the value and names the key. --reg-flood-transaction-timeout overrides it
kill_rate_limit integer 10 Scanner-kill responses per second sipnab may put on the wire. This bounds the one feature that answers an address out of the capture, and whoever forged the source address chose where each response goes, so there is no unlimited setting and 0 fails validation. A per-destination cap of 3 per minute applies underneath, so raising this widens how many distinct hosts sipnab answers, never how hard it hits one. --kill-rate-limit overrides it
business_hours string -- Business hours as "START-END" in whole UTC hours, for example "8-18". A wrapping range such as "22-6" is the overnight window. This is what makes the off-hours fraud detection reachable: with no window declared there is no outside for a call to fall in. --business-hours overrides it
fraud_short_call_secs integer 3 Measured call duration below which --fraud-detect counts a completed call as short for wangiri detection. Three seconds is under a normal ring-no-answer on some carriers, which reports ordinary unanswered calls as lures. --fraud-short-call overrides it
fraud_wangiri_calls integer 3 Short calls to one destination prefix before --fraud-detect reports wangiri. --fraud-wangiri-calls overrides it
fraud_destination string -- Destination countries --fraud-detect reports an INVITE to, as comma-separated ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 codes (DO,VG,MA). sipnab reads numbers through the common international prefixes (+, 00, 011) and resolves them by longest calling code, so +1 809 is DO, not US; a number with no prefix is domestic and never matches. --fraud-destination overrides it
fraud_sequential_calls integer 3 Consecutive refused numbers before --fraud-detect reports sequential scanning. --fraud-sequential-calls overrides it
fraud_volume_multiplier integer 5 Multiple of a source's own baseline call rate that --fraud-detect reports as a volume spike. --fraud-volume-multiplier overrides it
fraud_volume_min_calls integer 6 Calls a source must place inside the volume window before --fraud-detect reports a spike at all. --fraud-volume-min-calls overrides it
fraud_volume_window_secs integer 60 How much capture time one volume-spike window spans, in seconds. The count and the source's own baseline are both measured over this window, so a steady source reads the same at any width; what the width alone decides is how CONCENTRATED a burst has to be, since a burst shorter than the window averages into the ordinary traffic beside it. --fraud-volume-window overrides it
fraud_wangiri_window_secs integer 60 How much capture time one wangiri window spans, in seconds. The detector drops short calls older than this, so it decides how slowly a lure may arrive and still count as one pattern. No setting of fraud_wangiri_calls reaches a lure paced wider than the window: the only count that reports anything is one, which reports every ordinary short call as a lure too. --fraud-wangiri-window overrides it
scanner_behavioral_probes integer 10 Probes from one source inside the scanner window, above which --kill-scanner reports a rate detection. Behind an SBC every source collapses to one address, so ordinary aggregated traffic clears ten in five seconds and the whole site reads as one scanner. --scanner-behavioral-probes overrides it
scanner_enumeration_targets integer 5 Distinct target extensions from one source inside the scanner window, above which --kill-scanner reports extension enumeration. --scanner-enumeration-targets overrides it
scanner_rejected_probes integer 5 Rejected probes inside the scanner window at which a source reads as probing rather than operating. This is the evidence gate: neither behavioral signal reports anything until a source clears this or scanner_unanswered_probes, which is what separates an enumeration sweep from a trunk running keepalives at the same rate. --scanner-rejected-probes overrides it
scanner_unanswered_probes integer 5 Probes inside the scanner window that drew no response, at which a source reads as sweeping, provided they also outnumber the rest of what it sent. --scanner-unanswered-probes overrides it
scanner_window_secs integer 5 How much capture time one scanner window spans, in seconds. Every scanner count above is per window, so this is the binding constraint on a paced sweep rather than the counts: one probe every ten seconds never puts two inside the shipped five-second window, so the rate and the spread both stay at one however low the counts go. --scanner-window overrides it
scanner_established_factor integer 4 How much more evidence --kill-scanner needs from a source that has completed a registration or a call. A registered endpoint that starts probing is a compromised phone worth reporting, but it is also the peer whose ordinary working traffic looks most like probing, and the peer a false positive costs most. --scanner-established-factor overrides it
scanner_answer_grace_ms integer 500 How long a probe may go without a response before --kill-scanner counts it as unanswered, in milliseconds. The default is RFC 3261's Timer T1, the round-trip estimate at which SIP itself gives up waiting and retransmits. Raise it on a link whose round trip runs longer than that, where the default reports every probe still in flight as one nobody answered. --scanner-answer-grace overrides it
findings_history integer 1000 Security findings kept in memory for later retrieval. 0 keeps none, which is a real setting rather than a mistake. --findings-history overrides it
hep_hmac_window_secs integer 30 Seconds either side of now within which sipnab still honors a --hep-auth-mode hmac token's timestamp. On an agent/collector pair with poor NTP sipnab turns every packet away as out-of-window, and what the operator sees is a collector receiving NOTHING -- a symptom they attribute to routing, a firewall, or a dead agent long before a clock. Widening it is a security trade rather than a convenience: the window is exactly how long a packet an on-path attacker captured stays acceptable, and it is how far back the receiver's nonce cache must remember. Range 1-300. Past 300 the sender has no working time daemon, which is what to repair, so sipnab refuses the value and names the key. On a run without --hep-listen it does nothing, and sipnab says so in a startup warning naming the key. --hep-hmac-window overrides it

HEP HMAC token version 2, and what a mixed fleet sees. sipnab 0.5.131 moved HMAC_TOKEN_VERSION from 1 to 2 and refuses v1 by name. Two things follow.

  • A sender still on 0.5.130 or earlier against a newer collector has every packet refused.
    • The symptom is a collector receiving nothing.
    • Operators reliably attribute that to routing, a firewall, or a dead agent long before they suspect a token version.
    • Upgrade the collector last, or upgrade both together.
  • The second thing is the reason it is not a compatible change.
    • v1's MAC did not cover the addressing chunks.
    • So an attacker who captured a v1 token from one sender could replay it against a third party.
    • The attacker could also point a published --hep-allow-kill control somewhere nobody issued it for.
    • v2 covers them.
    • There is no flag to accept v1 again, deliberately.

sipnab bounds reg_flood_window_secs and reg_flood_transaction_timeout_ms at both ends.

  • A value outside the range fails validation. The message holds the key, the range and the value.
  • The --reg-flood-window and --reg-flood-transaction-timeout flags refuse the same values.
  • That is because both doors read the same constants in src/security/reg_flood.rs:
    • MAX_WINDOW_SECS (3,600);
    • MIN_TRANSACTION_TIMEOUT_MS (1,000);
    • MAX_TRANSACTION_TIMEOUT_MS (600,000).

Every scanner_* key above rejects 0 and names the key.

  • A zero count reports the first probe of any kind as a scanner.
  • A zero window resets the counters on every packet, so nothing ever accumulates.
  • A zero grace restores the very defect scanner_answer_grace_ms exists to prevent.
[security]
kill_scanner = true
kill_response = 403
kill_rate_limit = 10
fraud_detect = true
business_hours = "8-18"
fraud_short_call_secs = 2
fraud_wangiri_window_secs = 900
reg_flood_threshold = 10
reg_flood_window_secs = 10
reg_flood_transaction_timeout_ms = 64000
scanner_window_secs = 60
scanner_behavioral_probes = 40
scanner_enumeration_targets = 12
findings_history = 5000
alert = ["syslog", "json"]
alert_exec = "/usr/local/bin/sipnab-alert.sh"

[tfps]

The peer this needs. These read TFPS through its tfps_ctl program in JSON mode, the --json flag.

  • TFPS gained that mode in sippulse/tfps#6, merged on 2026-09-18.
  • No tagged release carries it yet. v0.2.1, the newest, rejects --json.

Until the next release, build TFPS from its master branch.

  • To check the tfps_ctl you have, run tfps_ctl status --json.
    • One line of JSON means it is ready.
    • unknown option: --json means it predates the mode.
  • Against an older tfps_ctl, these answer with that error and name what to install.

The kernel-drop question (GET /v1/tfps/dropped, the tfps_dropped MCP tool) is the exception. It needs a dropped subcommand that no TFPS build has, released or on master.

Where the toll-fraud prevention system (TFPS) is, when one runs on this host.

TFPS is optional peer software. It condemns sources and enforces that decision in the firewall.

  • sipnab bans nothing on its own.
  • It asks TFPS to ban only when you turn that on under [actions].
  • The tfps_* MCP tools and the /v1/tfps/ REST routes ask it through its tfps_ctl program.
  • This section says where that program and its database are.
  • Leave the section out, and sipnab:
    • looks for tfps_ctl on PATH the moment a TFPS tool runs;
    • does nothing about TFPS at any other time.
Key Type Default Description
ctl string -- Path to tfps_ctl. --tfps-ctl overrides it. Absent: sipnab looks on PATH the moment a TFPS tool runs. On a machine with no tfps_ctl anywhere, every read answers installed: false, and sipnab refuses a ban that actions allow, as one it could not ask TFPS about (502 over REST). An empty string fails validation and names the key
db string -- The TFPS database, passed to every tfps_ctl call as --db <path>: two arguments, which a wrapper script standing in for tfps_ctl receives as "$@". Absent: tfps_ctl uses its own default. An empty string fails validation and names the key
[tfps]
ctl = "/usr/local/bin/tfps_ctl"
db = "/var/lib/tfps/tfps.db"

[actions]

What sipnab may change in another system, and from where. Empty by default: sipnab changes no system outside itself.

  • It publishes what it saw to destinations you name.
  • It asks other software read-only questions.
  • An action, such as asking TFPS to ban a source, runs only when enabled here or with --allow-action. The two add together.

One key per target. Each is a list of the surfaces that may ask:

  • "rest" for the REST API;
  • "mcp" for the MCP tools.

A target or surface sipnab does not know stops it at startup. sipnab does not read it as "nothing enabled".

Key Type Default Description
tfps list of strings [] Surfaces that may ask TFPS to ban and unban, and back a ban out: POST /v1/tfps/ban, /unban and /v1/actions/revert over REST; tfps_ban, tfps_unban and actions_revert over MCP. A REST caller also needs a token minted with --token-scope actions, and so does an MCP client over HTTP. --allow-action adds to it

Enabling anything needs the actions journal. sipnab refuses to start without a directory it can use for it.

[actions]
tfps = ["rest"]

[action_limits]

The limits every action passes. They exist for two reasons:

  • so a stolen credential or a runaway agent can do only so much;
  • so that every ban ends on its own.

Rules for the keys:

  • Each key left out keeps the value shown.
  • None can be 0. That would turn the limit off, so sipnab refuses to start instead.
  • The limits survive a restart. sipnab rebuilds them from the journal, so crashing it does not reset them.
Key Type Default Description
per_minute integer 10 Actions per minute from everyone together
per_caller_per_minute integer 5 Actions per minute from one caller: one token, or one MCP stdio client. Cannot be above per_minute
address_cooldown_secs integer 60 Seconds an address rests after an action on it before the next, so no one can flip a ban on and off
default_ban_secs integer 3600 How long a ban lasts when the caller does not say
max_ban_secs integer 604800 The longest ban sipnab asks for (7 days). sipnab refuses a longer request, or 0 (TFPS's "forever"), rather than shortening it

Whatever these say, sipnab never bans some addresses:

  • 0.0.0.0;
  • the broadcast address;
  • loopback and multicast addresses.
[action_limits]
per_minute = 20
per_caller_per_minute = 5
address_cooldown_secs = 60
default_ban_secs = 1800
max_ban_secs = 86400

[journal]

Where sipnab records the actions it takes. After a restart or a crash, it then knows:

  • which bans are its own;
  • what was in flight;
  • how much of each limit it has spent.

sipnab --journal-show prints what it holds. sipnab --revert-actions backs actions out.

Key Type Default Description
dir string /var/lib/sipnab/journal The journal directory. --journal-dir overrides it. sipnab creates it with mode 0700 if absent, and the packaged service gets /var/lib/sipnab from systemd. Each record reaches the disk before the action it describes runs, and the files hold no token or request body. Files close at 16 MiB, and sipnab deletes closed files more than 90 days old when the next one starts. An empty string fails validation and names the key
[journal]
dir = "/srv/sipnab/journal"

[diagnosis]

Thresholds the signaling and media checks compare against.

  • A number here decides whether a call that is working gets reported as broken.
  • So the defaults are standards figures.
  • A network that knows its own numbers beats a recommendation written for the general case.

Every value must be a finite number greater than zero.

  • sipnab refuses 0, a negative number, nan and inf, naming the key.
  • duration_asymmetry_pct must also be 100 or less.
  • cn_suppression_ratio must be 1 or less.
  • late_media_ms is a whole number of at least 1.
  • The matching flags follow the same rules.
Key Type Default Description
post_dial_delay_secs float 11.0 Post-dial delay over which sipnab reports a call as slow, in seconds. The default is the ITU-T E.721 Table 2 target that 95 percent of international connections must meet, because a capture does not say which kind of call it holds. Tighten it to 8.0 for toll or 6.0 for local traffic. --pdd-threshold overrides it
ack_timeout_secs float 32.0 Seconds a 2xx may go unacknowledged before the missing ACK counts as a fault rather than as a capture that stopped early. The default is RFC 3261 Timer H. --ack-timeout overrides it
no_final_response_secs float 180.0 Seconds an INVITE may sit without a final response before the silence gets reported. The default is RFC 3261 Timer C. Below it, every call still ringing when the capture stopped gets reported. --no-final-response-timeout overrides it
duration_asymmetry_pct float 5.0 Percentage difference between the two legs' durations that counts as asymmetric. Must be 100 or less. --duration-asymmetry-pct overrides it
duration_asymmetry_secs float 2.0 Absolute difference between the two legs' durations that counts as asymmetric, in seconds. A call has to clear both this and the percentage, so raising either one alone quiets the detection. --duration-asymmetry-secs overrides it
late_media_ms integer 500 Milliseconds after the 200 OK that media may start before it gets reported as late. --late-media-ms overrides it
cn_suppression_ratio float 0.3 Share of a call's packets, as a fraction of 1, that must be comfort noise before sipnab accepts comfort noise as the explanation for one-directional media. The one threshold here that withholds a finding instead of raising one, so it fails as silence: a VoLTE or mobile trunk running aggressive voice-activity detection routinely passes 30 percent comfort noise, and above the ratio sipnab never reports one-way audio on that trunk — the most-reported VoIP fault there is. Raise it toward 1 on such a trunk; lower it where a call carrying any comfort noise at all still has to be bidirectional. Must be greater than 0 and 1 or less, and a value that is not fails validation and names the key. --cn-suppression-ratio overrides it
[diagnosis]
post_dial_delay_secs = 6.0
ack_timeout_secs = 32.0
no_final_response_secs = 180.0
duration_asymmetry_pct = 5.0
duration_asymmetry_secs = 2.0
late_media_ms = 500
cn_suppression_ratio = 0.3

[media]

Properties of the observed media path that a passive tap cannot measure for itself.

Key Type Default Description
one_way_delay_ms float -- One-way network path delay in milliseconds, feeding the delay term of every MOS. The single MOS input no observer can measure from the wire directly: only the endpoints and you have it. A declared value beats an RTCP-reported round trip, because no packet can rewrite a config file; that beats the round trip sipnab derives from a sender-report echo carried in a receiver report, which anchors on the capture point and so reads as a lower bound; with none of the three, sipnab assumes 100 ms and labels the figure assumed rather than presenting it as measured. --one-way-delay overrides it
codec_ie table -- Equipment impairment factors (ITU-T G.107 Ie) for codecs sipnab has no published value for, written as a [media.codec_ie] sub-table of "CODEC" = <Ie> pairs. sipnab knows G.711, G.729 and Opus; every other codec -- G.722, G.726, iLBC, AMR, EVS -- falls to a placeholder and scores identically to a stream whose codec was never identified. A declared codec comes back as mos_grounding = "operator_declared" rather than as published, so a figure from this file is never presented as an ITU-T citation, and a codec nobody declared still says its MOS is a placeholder. Keys match case-insensitively. Values must sit in 0.0 to just under 95.0: at 95 the E-model's loss term vanishes, and above it more packet loss would RAISE the score, so sipnab fails validation on such a value and names the codec
listening_context string "monotic" How the far end listens, for wideband (AMR-WB) MOS: "monotic" (a handset or one-ear headset, ITU-T G.113 Table IV.1) or "diotic" (a stereo headset or speakerphone, Table IV.3). At 6.6 kbit/s the two differ by about 0.59 MOS, and a capture cannot tell which one was in use, so you declare it. Every wideband score names the context sipnab read it in. Case and surrounding spaces do not matter; any other value stops the run with an error naming the key
[media]
one_way_delay_ms = 45.0
listening_context = "diotic"   # the far end uses a stereo headset or speakerphone

# Impairment factors for codecs sipnab has no published value for.
[media.codec_ie]
G722 = 12.0
iLBC = 11.0

[quality]

Where the quality color column turns yellow, and where it turns red.

  • A number here decides only what catches an operator's eye during triage.
  • That is a different question from [diagnosis]. That one decides whether a call that is working counts as broken.

The defaults suit a general-purpose trunk. The right values belong to the network you are watching.

  • 30 ms of jitter is already a fault on a LAN PBX.
  • 1 percent loss is unremarkable on an international one.

Rules for the values:

  • Unset keys keep the shipped default. So a file may move one boundary without restating the other seven.
  • Every value must be a finite number of zero or more.
  • Each warn boundary must leave a reachable middle against its matching bad boundary. A set that does not fails validation and names the key.
  • Zero itself counts as a real setting. loss_warn_pct = 0.0 means any loss at all is worth a color.

These bands paint the TUI.

  • A -N run prints the measurements themselves rather than a color.
  • So sipnab validates a band set on a non-interactive run and then never consults it.
Key Type Default Description
jitter_warn_ms float 30.0 Jitter at or above which the column turns yellow, in milliseconds. --jitter-warn-ms overrides it
jitter_bad_ms float 50.0 Jitter at or above which the column turns red, in milliseconds. --jitter-bad-ms overrides it
loss_warn_pct float 1.0 Loss at or above which the column turns yellow, in percent. --loss-warn-pct overrides it
loss_bad_pct float 5.0 Loss at or above which the column turns red, in percent. --loss-bad-pct overrides it
mos_warn float 4.0 MOS below which the column turns yellow. MOS bands run downward, so this must sit at or above mos_bad. --mos-warn overrides it
mos_bad float 3.0 MOS below which the column turns red. --mos-bad overrides it
rtt_warn_ms float 300.0 Round trip at or above which the column turns yellow, in milliseconds. The default is ITU-T G.114's 150 ms one-way guidance doubled. --rtt-warn-ms overrides it
rtt_bad_ms float 800.0 Round trip at or above which the column turns red, in milliseconds. The default is G.114's 400 ms one-way figure doubled. --rtt-bad-ms overrides it
[quality]
jitter_warn_ms = 10.0
jitter_bad_ms = 20.0
loss_warn_pct = 0.5
loss_bad_pct = 2.0
mos_warn = 4.2
mos_bad = 3.5
rtt_warn_ms = 120.0
rtt_bad_ms = 300.0

[limits]

Resource limits to prevent unbounded memory growth.

Key Type Default Description
dialog_limit integer 100000 Maximum tracked dialogs. --limit overrides it
mcp_max_rows integer 1000 Maximum rows in ONE list-style MCP response. Distinct from dialog_limit above, which bounds the whole run; these differ by 100x and bound different things. 0 fails validation and names the key. --mcp-max-rows overrides it
max_streams integer 50000 Maximum RTP streams. 0 fails validation and names the key. --max-streams overrides it
max_reassembly integer 10000 Maximum TCP reassembly sessions. 0 fails validation and names the key. --max-reassembly overrides it
reassembly_ttl_secs integer 30 Seconds sipnab holds an incomplete IP datagram or half-read TCP stream before a sweep drops it. max_reassembly bounds how MANY entries sipnab holds and says nothing about how long. Thirty seconds describes IP fragments in flight, and the TCP reassembler inherited it: a persistent SIP/TCP or SIP/TLS trunk to a carrier goes quiet for far longer on any ordinary night, and sweeping its half-read stream means the next segment re-initializes mid-message, so the peer that sent a valid message is the one reported broken. Raise it on such a trunk; max_reassembly caps the extra state either way. --reassembly-ttl overrides it. 0 fails validation and names the key
hep_rate_limit integer 50000 Maximum HEP packets per second. On a run without --hep-listen it does nothing, and sipnab says so in a startup warning naming the key. --hep-rate-limit overrides it
max_header_line integer 8192 Maximum bytes in a single SIP header (defense-in-depth)
max_headers_per_message integer 200 Maximum SIP headers per message (defense-in-depth)
max_messages_per_dialog integer 500 Maximum stored messages per dialog (defense-in-depth)
idle_compact_after_secs integer 600 Seconds of silence before sipnab compacts a dialog's stored messages. 0 fails validation and names the key
keep_messages_per_idle_dialog integer 20 Messages an idle dialog keeps after compaction
max_audio_frames integer unset Maximum RTP payload frames retained per stream for WAV and vCon export. Unset keeps the whole call. When set, the oldest frame goes first, and the export says PARTIAL and counts the frames dropped. At 20 ms packetization, 1500 frames is 30 seconds. 0 fails validation and names the key
max_audio_bytes integer 1073741824 Bytes of retained RTP payload across every stream, the bound on audio retention. See Audio retention budget. Below 1048576 (1 MiB) fails validation and names the key
lint_max_per_rule integer 25 Findings one lint rule may report for one dialog. A dialog that retransmits an INVITE eleven times trips a message rule eleven times and every one of them is true, so this decides whether the other rules stay readable underneath. --lint-max-per-rule overrides it. 0 fails validation and names the key
exec_queue_depth integer 100 Hook commands allowed to be running at once before sipnab drops --on-dialog-exec and --on-quality-exec events. The second ceiling above --exec-rate-limit, and the binding one for any hook that takes longer than a second: its slot is still occupied when the next second's budget arrives, so on a busy trunk this is what events actually meet. --exec-queue-depth overrides it. 0 fails validation and names the key
mcp_max_body_bytes integer 4096 Bytes of SIP body or matched snippet in ONE MCP response. mcp_max_rows bounds how many rows an answer carries; this bounds how wide one row may be, and a caller can ask for fewer rows but cannot widen one. --mcp-max-body-bytes overrides it. 0 fails validation and names the key
mcp_max_response_bytes integer 1048576 Bytes of ONE whole paged MCP response: the JSON page, the provenance note and the completeness fields. mcp_max_rows bounds how many rows a page carries and mcp_max_body_bytes how wide one body in a row can be; this bounds the page as a whole. Past it the tool drops whole rows from the end of the page, never part of one, and answers truncated: true, truncated_by: "bytes" and a next_cursor to the rest. A page always keeps at least one row, so following the cursor always moves forward. A caller narrows it per call with max_response_bytes and cannot exceed it. The default, 1 MiB, is under twice the largest response measured on the sample captures in tests/pcap-samples (561,420 bytes, list_dialogs with limit: 1000), so it changes no answer on those. --mcp-max-response-bytes overrides it. 0 fails validation and names the key
mcp_max_wait_seconds integer 60 Longest ONE await_condition MCP call may wait, in seconds. mcp_max_rows and mcp_max_body_bytes bound what an answer carries; this bounds how long a caller may hold one of --mcp-max-concurrent slots while carrying nothing. sipnab clamps a larger request to it and says so in the response. It also bounds wait_seconds on find_in_captures and find_in_captures_status. --mcp-max-wait-seconds overrides it. 0 fails validation and names the key
mcp_max_findings integer 1000 Findings the MCP save_findings tool accepts before refusing further writes. The one WRITE budget on that surface: mcp_max_rows and mcp_max_body_bytes bound what an agent may READ, this bounds what it puts into the operator's journal. Past it sipnab refuses the write and says so, and drops nothing to make room -- a finding is a log line the journal already holds, so sipnab keeps no copy a newer one could displace. Raise it for a long agent session on a large capture, where a thousand annotations is a session doing its job. --mcp-max-findings overrides it. 0 fails validation and names the key
mcp_sweep_max_files integer 20 Files one MCP find_in_captures sweep may open. It is the ceiling on the tool's per-call max_files: sipnab clamps a larger request to it, and 0 or no request means this value. A rotated spool of forty files needs 40 here before one sweep can reach the oldest file. The response reports the limits applied and files_examined, files_total and complete, so a sweep that stopped early says so. --mcp-sweep-max-files overrides it. 0 and values above 4294967295 (the largest per-call max_files, a 32-bit unsigned integer) fail validation and name the key
mcp_sweep_deadline_ms integer 30000 Milliseconds one MCP find_in_captures sweep may spend. It is the ceiling on the tool's per-call deadline_ms, applied the same way as mcp_sweep_max_files. The sweep runs as a background job and checks it before each file and before each packet. --mcp-sweep-deadline-ms overrides it. 0 and values above 43200000 (twelve hours, the longest one background sweep may run) fail validation and name the key
mcp_sweep_max_running integer 4 MCP find_in_captures sweeps one server runs at once. Each running sweep is an operating system thread reading capture files. sipnab refuses a start past this many with a message that reports the bound and names this key and --mcp-sweep-max-running, rather than queueing it. --mcp-sweep-max-running overrides it. 0 and values above 64 (each sweep holds a thread and its own scratch stores) fail validation and name the key
mcp_sweep_max_held_results integer 16 Finished MCP find_in_captures results one server holds for collection. Past this many, sipnab drops the result of the earliest-started sweep first, and refuses a poll of its job id. --mcp-sweep-max-held-results overrides it. 0 and values above 256 (four held results per running sweep at the running maximum of 64) fail validation and name the key
mcp_sweep_result_retention_secs integer 600 Seconds a finished MCP find_in_captures result waits for its poll, counted from the moment the sweep finished. After it, the job id is unknown, and sipnab refuses a poll of it with a message that reports this value. --mcp-sweep-result-retention-secs overrides it. 0 and values above 43200 (twelve hours, the longest one sweep may run) fail validation and name the key
max_lost_sequences integer 1000 Lost RTP sequence numbers retained per stream. This is the window the Packet Loss Map draws and the burst/gap analysis reasons over, so a 30-minute call losing 1 % shows only its last minute at the default. The burst/gap window widens with it. --max-lost-sequences overrides it. 0 fails validation and names the key
quality_interval_secs integer 5 Seconds between RTP quality snapshots, which is the resolution of the per-stream quality trend on rtp_stats, GET /v1/streams/{id}, the TUI and the browser analyzer. The shipped five seconds averages away any burst shorter than itself. The trend still covers an hour of call time whatever this is, so a one-second setting retains 3600 snapshots per stream rather than 720 — resolution costs memory, never history. --quality-interval overrides it. Anything outside 1-300 fails validation and names the key
max_groups integer 100000 Distinct --group-by keys one run retains, the same figure dialog_limit ships so a grouped run cannot outgrow an ordinary capture. Past it sipnab refuses new keys and warns that the output is incomplete. --max-groups overrides it
max_grouped_messages integer 200000 Messages --group-by buffers across every group. Grouping cannot stream — the last packet may belong to the first group — so this is memory held until the capture ends. --max-grouped-messages overrides it
max_metadata_file_bytes integer 2147483648 Bytes of pcapng sipnab reads into memory for embedded names and TLS secrets. A memory-exhaustion guard on untrusted input. Raising it to N lets ONE file claim N bytes of this host's RAM — roughly 2N while --strip-secrets writes its copy — on nothing but a file size, before sipnab can tell the file is a capture at all. Raise it for captures you produced; leave it for captures someone sent you. --max-metadata-file-bytes overrides it
max_gunzip_bytes integer 1073741824 Bytes a gzip-compressed capture may inflate to where sipnab does the inflating: the embedded names and TLS secrets read out of a .pcapng.gz, the copy --strip-secrets rewrites, and the whole capture in the browser build. libpcap inflates the packet stream of a -I capture.pcap.gz run and this does not bound it. A gzip-bomb guard. Inflation stops one byte past the ceiling, so raising it to N lets a few kilobytes claim N bytes of RAM. Raise it for archives you compressed yourself. --max-gunzip-bytes overrides it
max_tcp_buffer integer 65536 Bytes one SIP/TCP direction may buffer before sipnab flushes it. The only limit here that destroys data rather than truncating a report. TCP sets no such ceiling and neither does RFC 3261: on a carrier trunk a message carrying ISUP encapsulation, a long Record-Route set or a fat SDP offer passes 64 KiB legitimately, and sipnab then flushes the buffer mid-message so both halves parse as malformed — the peer that sent a valid message is the one reported broken. Raise it on such a trunk. The floor is one SIP header line (8192); below that no message survives, and sipnab refuses the value by name. --max-tcp-buffer overrides it
api_max_rows integer 1000 Rows one list-style REST response returns. The REST counterpart of mcp_max_rows, settable for the same reason: the right ceiling belongs to the consumer, not to sipnab. A batch consumer piping /v1/dialogs to a file wants every row; a dashboard drawing a table wants far fewer. --api-max-rows overrides it. 0 fails validation and names the key
api_rate_limit_per_peer integer 100 REST requests one client IP may make per second. The limiter counts by source address, so a dashboard polling /v1/streams on a short timer, or several collectors behind one NAT, share a single allowance and see 503 (503 rather than 429 because the limiter runs before authentication, so the refusal says nothing about the credential). 0 disables the cap, the reading hep_rate_limit and mcp_rate_limit_per_peer also give it. At most 4294967295; a larger value fails validation and names the key. --api-rate-limit-per-peer overrides it
metrics_max_conn integer 16 Metrics scrapes served at once before further ones get 503. The gate stops a burst of slow clients exhausting threads and taking monitoring down, and sixteen suits one Prometheus; an HA pair, a federating parent, a remote_write shard, an alertmanager sidecar and one engineer's curl reach it without anything unusual happening. A refused scrape leaves a hole in the series that reads as a capture that died rather than as a busy endpoint, so raise it where several collectors share one sipnab. --metrics-max-conn overrides it. 0 fails validation and names the key: the gate would then refuse every scrape
max_tracked_peers integer 4096 Distinct peers one rate-limit window holds, across every surface sipnab meters: HEP source addresses and MCP callers. Past it sipnab REFUSES a peer it has not already seen this second rather than waving it through, so on a collector aggregating from more agents than this the surplus never enters the capture. Raise it there. The floor is 2, and sipnab refuses a smaller value by name: at 1 the first peer to send in a window takes the only slot and sipnab turns every other peer away for the rest of it
max_capture_sources integer 65536 Distinct capture sources sipnab remembers by name: each input file, the device, every HEP sender (capture_id@address) and every traced process. The table holds a name so a packet can point back at the bytes it came from: the frame field of --json, which --show-frame follows and --mcp-evidence-ring keys on. Past the limit a packet from a NEW source is still analyzed, but carries no frame pointer, and sipnab counts it in sipnab_capture_sources_refused_total and warns once. sipnab refuses to start when the limit cannot hold every source the run can have: the input files, or the device, plus max_tracked_peers senders on a HEP listener. Raise it, or lower max_tracked_peers. The floor is 1. Flag: --max-capture-sources
[limits]
dialog_limit = 50000
max_streams = 25000
max_reassembly = 5000
hep_rate_limit = 25000
max_header_line = 8192
max_headers_per_message = 200
max_messages_per_dialog = 500
idle_compact_after_secs = 600
keep_messages_per_idle_dialog = 20
max_audio_bytes = 1073741824

How the limits behave when they fill:

  • The compaction pair is idle_compact_after_secs and keep_messages_per_idle_dialog.
    • This is where a limit discards a ladder sipnab already holds.
    • So a call that went quiet shows fewer messages than crossed the wire.
    • sipnab warns once per run when this first happens.
  • The retention logs (max_audio_frames when set, max_audio_bytes, max_lost_sequences) drop their oldest entries as they fill.
  • Every other key here refuses to take something in.

Raise both when the ladder matters more than the footprint. These all go quiet for longer than ten minutes while still being the thing under investigation:

  • a call parked on hold;
  • a dialog waiting on a slow PSTN leg;
  • a capture you paused.

For example:

[limits]
idle_compact_after_secs = 3600
keep_messages_per_idle_dialog = 500

Audio retention budget

The terminal UI, and any run with --retain-audio, keeps each RTP stream's G.711, G.722 and Opus payload. Then sipnab can write it to a WAV file or a vCon.

  • By default sipnab keeps the whole call, from the first frame.
  • max_audio_bytes bounds the memory this uses, across every stream at once.

sipnab charges each retained frame against the budget:

  • the payload, plus a quarter of its length, plus 32 bytes: an upper bound on what the memory allocator spends on it;
  • 32 bytes for each slot of the stream's frame buffer, spare capacity included.

For 20 ms G.711 (160 bytes a frame) that is 264 bytes a frame:

  • 13,200 bytes a second for each direction;
  • 26,400 bytes a second for a call with media both ways.

The default of 1 GiB (1,073,741,824 bytes) therefore holds 40,672 call-seconds, which is:

Calls held at once Each lasting
1 11.3 hours
67 10 minutes
225 3 minutes

The charge is an upper bound.

  • Measured on aarch64 Linux with the allocator the sipnab binary ships with (mimalloc), a 20 ms G.711 frame used 192.6 bytes.
  • So at the budget, the heap the audio really holds is about 0.73 GiB.
  • With --cores N, each worker gets 1/N of the budget. So the run as a whole stays inside it.

When retained audio reaches the budget, sipnab releases frames:

  • It releases the earliest frames of the oldest stream that still holds audio.
  • It releases one frame at a time, until the total is back inside it.
  • On a live capture the oldest stream is normally a call that has already ended.

sipnab counts the frames released on the stream.

  • That call's WAV export, its vCon media_note, and the note inside the WAV then say PARTIAL: the [limits] max_audio_bytes retention budget was reached and released N earlier frame(s).
  • Its vCon wraps the recording in a recording-set that carries the call's own start and duration.
  • sipnab never drops audio without counting it.

A live capture that writes vCon containers (--export-vcon-when or --export-vcon with a device) releases each call's audio once it writes the call's container. The container carries it. An export of that call made later says how many frames sipnab released and why.

Raise max_audio_bytes for a host that keeps more or longer calls in memory at once.

  • In the source, the default is DEFAULT_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES (1073741824).
  • The minimum is MIN_MAX_AUDIO_BYTES (1048576).
  • Set max_audio_frames to cap each stream as well. For example, 1500 frames is the last 30 seconds of a 20 ms stream.

[mcp]

Which tools the MCP server registers, and whether it sends their output schemas.

  • Every tool sipnab offers a client costs its context window before the agent asks anything.
  • So give a client that needs a few tools only those few.
  • See Choosing which tools load for what each bundle holds.
Key Type Default Description
tools list of strings ["full"] Bundles (core, signaling, captures, security, media, relay, tfps, server, vcon, tls), single tool names, names from [mcp.bundles], or full. sipnab refuses to start, naming the entry, when a name is unknown or empty. Names are case-sensitive. --mcp-tools replaces the list
output_schemas boolean false Send each tool's output schema on tools/list. MCP makes them optional, and they are more than half of what the tools cost a client. Responses carry the same JSON either way. --mcp-output-schemas overrides it
bundles table -- [mcp.bundles]: your own bundles, each a name for a list of tool names and built-in bundles. A custom bundle cannot reuse a built-in bundle or tool name, cannot be empty, and cannot hold full or another custom bundle; sipnab refuses to start, naming the bundle, when one breaks a rule, even when nothing uses it
tls_cert string -- PEM certificate chain MCP over HTTP serves HTTPS with, the server's certificate first. Needs tls_key. Used only with --mcp --mcp-transport http. See MCP TLS. An empty string fails validation and names the key. --mcp-tls-cert overrides it
tls_key string -- PEM private key for tls_cert. sipnab refuses a key any other user on the host can read. An empty string fails validation and names the key. --mcp-tls-key overrides it
[mcp]
tools = ["core", "voice"]

[mcp.bundles]
voice = ["media", "get_sdp_timeline", "check_codec_negotiation"]

[api]

Which Host names the REST API answers, beyond localhost, 127.0.0.1, ::1 and the address --api binds (any IP address on a 0.0.0.0 or :: bind).

  • The check stops a web page from reaching the API through your browser by pointing its own name at 127.0.0.1 (DNS rebinding).
  • See Which Host names the API answers.
Key Type Default Description
allowed_hosts list of strings [] Extra Host values to serve, such as a reverse proxy's public name. name:port accepts that port only. "*" turns the check off. --api-allowed-host replaces the list
tls_cert string -- PEM certificate chain the REST API serves HTTPS with, the server's certificate first. Needs tls_key. Used only when --api starts the API. See API TLS. An empty string fails validation and names the key. --api-tls-cert overrides it
tls_key string -- PEM private key for tls_cert. sipnab refuses a key any other user on the host can read. An empty string fails validation and names the key. --api-tls-key overrides it
[api]
allowed_hosts = ["sipnab.example.com"]
tls_cert = "/etc/sipnab/api.pem"
tls_key = "/etc/sipnab/api.key"

TLS files in the config file

[api], [mcp] and [metrics] each take a tls_cert and tls_key. [hep] takes the HEP sender's and listener's TLS files.

  • The listener itself still starts on the command line (--api, --mcp --mcp-transport http, --metrics, --hep-send, --hep-listen).
  • The keys say what it serves with when it starts.

How the flags and keys combine:

  • Each flag replaces its own key. A certificate from the command line and its key from the file make a pair.
  • Once sipnab combines the flags and the file, a certificate without a key, or a key without a certificate, stops it at startup.
    • The message names the half you set.
    • It also names both the flag and the key that would set the other.
    • This check covers every listener's keys, whether or not this run starts it.
  • Each of these stops sipnab at startup when the listener starts, naming the file:
    • a file sipnab cannot read;
    • a file with no certificate or no private key;
    • a key any other user can read;
    • a key that is not the certificate's.

[metrics]

How the metrics endpoint serves when --metrics starts it.

Key Type Default Description
tls_cert string -- PEM certificate chain the metrics endpoint serves HTTPS with, the server's certificate first. Needs tls_key. See Metrics TLS. An empty string fails validation and names the key. --metrics-tls-cert overrides it
tls_key string -- PEM private key for tls_cert. sipnab refuses a key any other user on the host can read. An empty string fails validation and names the key. --metrics-tls-key overrides it
[metrics]
tls_cert = "/etc/sipnab/metrics.pem"
tls_key = "/etc/sipnab/metrics.key"

[hep]

TLS for HEP:

  • the CA the sender (--hep-send-transport tls) checks the collector's certificate against;
  • the certificate a TLS listener (--hep-listen-transport tls) presents.
Key Type Default Description
tls_ca path -- CA (PEM) the sender checks the collector's certificate against. It replaces the host's CA bundle: the sender accepts only certificates this file issued. Set this or tls_extra_ca, not both. An empty string fails validation and names the key. On a run without --hep-send it does nothing, and sipnab says so in a startup warning naming the key. --hep-tls-ca overrides it
tls_extra_ca path -- CA (PEM) the sender trusts in addition to the host's CA bundle. Set this or tls_ca, not both. The host must have a CA bundle; without one sipnab refuses at startup. An empty string fails validation and names the key. On a run without --hep-send it does nothing, and sipnab says so in a startup warning naming the key. --hep-tls-extra-ca overrides it
tls_cert path -- PEM certificate chain a TLS HEP listener presents, the server's certificate first. A TLS listener needs this and tls_key, from here or from the flags. An empty string fails validation and names the key. On a run without --hep-listen it does nothing, and sipnab says so in a startup warning naming the key. --hep-tls-cert overrides it
tls_key path -- PEM private key for tls_cert. sipnab refuses a key any other user on the host can read. An empty string fails validation and names the key. On a run without --hep-listen it does nothing, and sipnab says so in a startup warning naming the key. --hep-tls-key overrides it

The sender's trust is one setting.

  • When the command line names --hep-tls-ca or --hep-tls-extra-ca, it replaces both tls_ca and tls_extra_ca.
  • So a tls_ca in the file cannot combine with an --hep-tls-extra-ca on the command line.
[hep]
tls_extra_ca = "/etc/sipnab/collector-ca.pem"

[vcon_forward]

The vCon forwarder's settings (sipnab --vcon-forward <SPOOL_DIR>, see Deliver the spool to a store).

  • The spool and --vcon-forward-once stay on the command line.
  • The credential's value has no key.
    • auth_file names the file that holds it.
    • --vcon-forward-auth or the SIPNAB_VCON_FORWARD_AUTH environment variable carries it without a file.
  • A flag replaces its key.
  • With neither, a kind other than generic supplies the value. Then the default applies.
Key Type Default Description
kind string "generic" The kind of store: generic, vcon-store or conserver. A kind supplies the ingest path when url names no path and the header when the credential is a bare key; no kind changes the container sent. generic supplies nothing. --vcon-forward-kind overrides it
url string -- Where the forwarder POSTs each container, http:// or https://. With a kind other than generic and no path, the store's base URL. Checked when the forwarder starts, by the rule --vcon-forward-url follows: sipnab refuses a URL with a user name or password in it, and the message shows that part as [redacted]. A URL refused from this key exits 1, as every refused config value does; the same URL from --vcon-forward-url exits 2. --vcon-forward-url overrides it
replace_url string -- URL template the forwarder PUTs a container to when the POST answers 409, with {uuid} replaced by the container's uuid. Checked when the forwarder starts. A template refused from this key exits 1; from --vcon-forward-replace-url, 2. --vcon-forward-replace-url overrides it
auth_file path -- File holding the credential: one Header-Name: value line, or the bare key with a kind other than generic. Refused when other users can read it, and beside --vcon-forward-auth or SIPNAB_VCON_FORWARD_AUTH. A file sipnab cannot read, or one that holds no credential, stops the forwarder with exit 1, as any refused key does. --vcon-forward-auth-file overrides it
ca path host bundle The only CA (PEM) trusted for an https:// store. --vcon-forward-ca overrides it
extra_ca path -- A CA (PEM) trusted for an https:// store in addition to the host's CA bundle. Refused beside ca. --vcon-forward-ca and --vcon-forward-extra-ca each replace both keys
done path <SPOOL_DIR>/delivered Where a delivered container goes. Must be on the spool's file system. --vcon-forward-done overrides it
failed path <SPOOL_DIR>/failed Where a refused container goes, beside <name>.error.json. Must be on the spool's file system. --vcon-forward-failed overrides it
interval integer 5 Seconds between passes over the spool, 1 to 3600. --vcon-forward-interval overrides it
timeout integer 30 Seconds to wait to connect, and for each read and write, 1 to 600. --vcon-forward-timeout overrides it
backoff_first integer 2 Seconds a container waits after its first failed try, 1 to 4294967295; each failed try doubles the wait. No longer than backoff_cap. --vcon-forward-backoff-first overrides it
backoff_cap integer 300 The longest wait between tries, in seconds, 1 to 4294967295. --vcon-forward-backoff-cap overrides it
max_response_head integer 65536 The most bytes of a store's status line and headers read, 1 to 4294967295. The forwarder treats an answer with more as no answer and retries the container. --vcon-forward-max-response-head overrides it
max_error_body integer 8192 The most bytes of a refusal's body a <name>.error.json record keeps, 1 to 4294967295. --vcon-forward-max-error-body overrides it
scitt_url string -- The SCITT transparency service the forwarder registers lifecycle statements with, vcon_created and vcon_sent, by POSTing each to <scitt_url>/entries. Unset, it registers nothing. Needs scitt_sign_key, scitt_sign_cert and scitt_issuer. --vcon-forward-scitt-url overrides it
scitt_auth_file path -- File holding one Header-Name: value line sent with each registration. Refused when other users can read it. --vcon-forward-scitt-auth-file overrides it
scitt_ca path host bundle The only CA (PEM) trusted for an https:// transparency service. --vcon-forward-scitt-ca overrides it
scitt_sign_key path -- The PEM RSA private key that signs the statements (RS256). Refused when other users can read it: a refusal from this key exits 1, from the flag 2. --vcon-forward-scitt-sign-key overrides it
scitt_sign_cert path -- The PEM certificate chain of scitt_sign_key, leaf first, carried in each statement's x5chain. --vcon-forward-scitt-sign-cert overrides it
scitt_issuer string -- The issuer each statement names (iss): a URI of 1 to 8192 characters. --vcon-forward-scitt-issuer overrides it
content_type string "application/json" The Content-Type of a JSON container: application/json, application/vcon+json or application/vcon. A gzip format container always goes as application/vcon+gzip. --vcon-forward-content-type overrides it
[vcon_forward]
kind = "vcon-store"
url = "https://api.vcon.store"
auth_file = "/etc/sipnab/vcon-store.key"
done = "/var/spool/sipnab-vcon-sent"
failed = "/var/spool/sipnab-vcon-held"
interval = 10

[vcon_fetch]

The vCon fetcher's settings (sipnab --vcon-fetch <UUID>..., see Fetch a stored vCon).

  • The uuids, --vcon-fetch-out and --vcon-fetch-overwrite stay on the command line.
  • The credential's value has no key. auth_file names the file that holds it.
  • A flag replaces its key.
  • With neither, a kind other than generic supplies the value. Then the default applies.
Key Type Default Description
kind string "generic" The kind of store: generic, vcon-store, conserver or vcon-mcp. A kind supplies the read path after the path the URL names, the header when the credential is a bare key, and the removal of what the store wraps around the container. generic supplies nothing. --vcon-fetch-kind overrides it
url string -- The store's base URL, or, for the generic kind, a URL template holding {uuid}. Checked when the fetcher starts, by the rule --vcon-fetch-url follows. A URL refused from this key exits 1; the same URL from --vcon-fetch-url exits 2. --vcon-fetch-url overrides it
auth_file path -- File holding the credential: one Header-Name: value line, or the bare key with a kind other than generic. Refused when other users can read it. A file sipnab cannot read, or one that holds no credential, stops the fetcher with exit 1, as any refused key does. --vcon-fetch-auth-file overrides it
ca path host bundle The only CA (PEM) trusted for an https:// store. --vcon-fetch-ca overrides it
extra_ca path -- A CA (PEM) trusted for an https:// store in addition to the host's CA bundle. Refused beside ca. --vcon-fetch-ca and --vcon-fetch-extra-ca each replace both keys
decrypt_key path -- The RSA private key (PEM, readable by its owner only) that decrypts an encrypted container. --vcon-fetch-decrypt-key overrides it
signer_ca path -- The CA (PEM) a decrypted container's signing certificate must chain to, through the intermediates in its x5c, every certificate within its validity period; system for the host's CA bundle. Needs decrypt_key. --vcon-fetch-signer-ca overrides it
signer_sha256 string -- The SHA-256 fingerprint the signing certificate of a decrypted container must have: 64 hex digits, plain or colon-separated, either case. Needs decrypt_key. --vcon-fetch-signer-sha256 overrides it
timeout integer 30 Seconds to wait to connect, and for each read and write, 1 to 600. --vcon-fetch-timeout overrides it
max_size integer 67108864 The largest answer read for one container, in bytes, 1 to 4294967295. --vcon-fetch-max-size overrides it
max_response_head integer 65536 The most bytes of a store's status line and headers read, 1 to 4294967295. --vcon-fetch-max-response-head overrides it
[vcon_fetch]
kind = "vcon-store"
url = "https://api.vcon.store"
auth_file = "/etc/sipnab/vcon-store.key"
timeout = 60

[vcon_input]

How the vCon readers open a signed or encrypted container (see A signed, encrypted or compressed container).

  • The readers are -I, the MCP analyze_vcon and validate_vcon tools, and POST /v1/vcon/analyze and POST /v1/vcon/validate.
  • A flag replaces its key.
  • sipnab reads the files when it reads the first container.
Key Type Default Description
key path -- The RSA private key (PEM, readable by its owner only) that decrypts an encrypted container. Without it sipnab refuses an encrypted container. --vcon-key overrides it
signer_ca path -- The CA (PEM) a signed or encrypted container's signing certificate must chain to, through the intermediates in its x5c, every certificate within its validity period; system for the host's CA bundle. sipnab then refuses an unsigned container. --vcon-signer-ca overrides it
signer_sha256 string -- The SHA-256 fingerprint the signing certificate must have: 64 hex digits, plain or colon-separated, either case. sipnab then refuses an unsigned container. --vcon-signer-sha256 overrides it
x5u_ca path -- The CA (PEM) the HTTPS server of an x5u URL must chain to, or system for the host's CA bundle. Set, sipnab fetches the chain of a signature that names it only by x5u, within 256 KiB and 10 seconds. --vcon-x5u-ca overrides it
[vcon_input]
key = "/etc/sipnab/vcon-recipient.key"
signer_ca = "/etc/sipnab/vcon-signer-ca.pem"

[privilege]

Privilege separation settings (Linux only).

Key Type Default Description
user string "nobody" User to drop privileges to after opening capture devices. --user overrides it
no_priv_drop boolean false Disable privilege dropping. --no-priv-drop turns it on. --priv-drop forces it off
chroot string -- Chroot directory after initialization. --chroot overrides it
[privilege]
user = "sipnab"
no_priv_drop = false
chroot = "/var/lib/sipnab"

[names]

Address name-resolution settings (display host:port instead of ip:port).

Key Type Default Description
enabled boolean false Start with name resolution on (offline sources). --resolve turns it on. --no-resolve forces it off
reverse_dns boolean false Also use reverse DNS (PTR) lookups. --reverse-dns turns it on. --no-reverse-dns forces it off
hosts_file string -- /etc/hosts-format file of IP → name mappings to preload. --names adds to it
persist_to_config boolean false When set, in-TUI N edits are also written into the [names.manual] table below, in the file this run loaded, preserving the rest of it. With no file loaded they go to the user config file ($XDG_CONFIG_HOME/sipnab/sipnab.toml, by default ~/.config/sipnab/sipnab.toml); when the settings came from /etc/sipnab/sipnab.toml they are not written and the status line says so when the session opens
dns_cache_entries integer 4096 Reverse-DNS results (positive and negative) held at once (default MAX_DNS_CACHE_ENTRIES). Past the cap sipnab drops the oldest entry, so a capture touching more hosts than this -- a carrier edge, a peering point, or any long --reverse-dns window -- keeps re-looking-up addresses it already resolved. Nothing reports that: a dropped lookup only shows as an address displayed unresolved, so the symptom is names that flicker. The worker queue's depth follows this figure; sipnab derives it rather than taking a second number. --dns-cache-entries overrides it
manual table -- Inline "IP" = "name" mappings, loaded at startup (highest-priority manual layer)
[names]
enabled = true
reverse_dns = false
hosts_file = "/etc/sipnab/hosts"
persist_to_config = true

# Inline mappings (also written here when persist_to_config = true):
[names.manual]
"192.0.2.1" = "sbc-edge"
"2001:db8::1" = "core6"

[crash]

What happens when sipnab panics. The panic hook:

  • restores the terminal (release builds abort without unwinding, so raw mode / mouse capture would otherwise stay on);
  • writes a crash report;
  • then either exits cleanly or aborts so the OS can produce a core dump.
Key Type Default Description
reports boolean true Write a crash-report file on panic (message, location, thread, version, backtrace)
backtrace boolean true Capture a full backtrace in the report (independent of RUST_BACKTRACE)
report_dir string ~/.local/state/sipnab Directory crash reports (sipnab-crash-<timestamp>-<pid>.log) land in. An empty string fails validation and names the key
core boolean false true: abort after the report so the kernel can dump core (subject to ulimit -c / core_pattern); false: exit cleanly with status 101, suppressing the core
[crash]
reports = true
backtrace = true
report_dir = "/var/log/sipnab"
core = false

[theme]

TUI color theme with 11 semantic color slots (plus highlight, a legacy alias for selected).

  • Each field accepts a color name or a hex RGB value.
  • Unset fields use built-in defaults.
  • See theme-guide.md for the full customization guide and its preset themes.
Key Type Default Description
background string "reset" (terminal default) Terminal background
foreground string "reset" Default text color (reset is the terminal's own)
highlight string -- Legacy alias for selected (backward compat)
header string "cyan" Status bar, column headers, endpoint labels
selected string "yellow" Selected/highlighted row, cursor, focused item
accent string "magenta" Correlation info, PDD, extended flow labels
good string "green" Positive quality, success states (InCall, Registered)
warning string "yellow" Medium quality, caution states (Ringing, CANCEL)
bad string "red" Poor quality, failures, errors
muted string "dark_gray" Separators, pipes, disabled text, timestamps
border string "white" Widget borders, panel frames
status_bg string "#303040" Status bar background band, kept distinct from the terminal background so the status line stays visible

Supported color values:

  • Named: black, white, red, green, yellow, blue, magenta, cyan, gray, dark_gray, reset
  • Hex RGB: "#RRGGBB" (e.g., "#ff8800")
[theme]
background = "#1a1a2e"
foreground = "#e0e0e0"
header = "cyan"
selected = "#e94560"
accent = "magenta"
good = "green"
warning = "yellow"
bad = "red"
muted = "dark_gray"
border = "#444466"

[keybindings]

TUI key binding overrides. The 12 configurable actions appear below. Unset fields use built-in defaults.

Accepted key formats:

  • Single characters: "q", "/", "A"
  • Function keys: "F1" through "F12"
  • Special names: "Esc", "Space", "Enter", "Tab", "Backspace"
Key Type Default Description
quit string "q" Quit the application
help string "F1" Show help overlay
filter string "F7" Open filter dialog
save string "F2" Open save capture dialog
search string "/" Activate search
settings string "F8" Open settings popup
pause string "p" Pause/resume capture
autoscroll string "A" Toggle autoscroll
extended_flow string "F4" Toggle extended multi-leg flow
clear_calls string "F5" Clear all calls
column_selector string "F10" Open column selector
filter_detail string "F" Show the filter the F7 dialog built as a summary or in full on status line 3. Works in every view, ahead of the view's own keys; sipnab warns at startup when it takes a key a view uses

See keybindings.md for the full shortcut reference, including the keys that are not remappable.

[keybindings]
quit = "q"
help = "F1"
filter = "F7"
save = "F2"
search = "/"
settings = "F8"
pause = "p"
autoscroll = "A"
extended_flow = "F4"
clear_calls = "F5"
column_selector = "F10"
filter_detail = "F"

Full example

A configuration for a SIP monitoring server:

# /etc/sipnab/sipnab.toml
# Production SIP monitoring configuration

# -- Packet capture --
[capture]
device = "eth0"                    # Primary SIP-facing interface
portrange = "5060-5080"            # Cover SIP, SIP-TLS, and alternate ports
snaplen = 65535                    # Full packet capture (no truncation)
buffer = 32                        # 32 MiB kernel buffer for burst tolerance
buffer_budget_mb = 128             # Cap on the in-flight capture->processing queue
no_rtp = false                     # RTP analysis enabled

# -- Display settings --
[display]
color = "always"                   # Force color even when piped
payload_limit = 8192               # Show up to 8K of SIP body (large SDP)
delta_time = true                  # Show timing between messages by default
from_to = "host-port"              # From/To columns show host:port
# visible_columns = ["method", "from", "to", "state", "msgs", "pdd"]  # Persistent column prefs

# -- Default filter (optional) --
[filter]
from = "^1001@"
to = "^1002@"
expression = "method == 'INVITE' OR method == 'REGISTER'"

# -- Security detection --
[security]
kill_scanner = true                # Detect SIP scanners (sipvicious, etc.)
kill_response = 403                # Reply to scanners with 403
fraud_detect = true                # Heuristic fraud detection
alert = ["syslog", "json"]        # Send alerts to syslog and JSON log
alert_exec = "/usr/local/bin/sipnab-alert.sh"  # Custom alert handler
reg_flood_threshold = 10           # Refused credentialed REGISTERs per window that is a flood
reg_flood_window_secs = 1          # The counting window, in seconds of capture time
reg_flood_transaction_timeout_ms = 32000  # RFC 3261 Timer F: 64 x T1 (500 ms)
kill_rate_limit = 10               # Kill responses/sec sipnab may transmit
business_hours = "8-18"            # Enables off-hours fraud detection (UTC hours)
scanner_window_secs = 60           # Wide enough to hold a sweep paced at one probe/10s
scanner_behavioral_probes = 40     # Raised: this site aggregates behind one SBC address
fraud_wangiri_window_secs = 900    # A lure paced over fifteen minutes is still one lure

# -- Diagnosis thresholds --
[diagnosis]
post_dial_delay_secs = 8.0         # Toll-call target; the default 11.0 is international
ack_timeout_secs = 32.0            # RFC 3261 Timer H
late_media_ms = 500                # Media allowed to start this late after the 200 OK

# -- Resource limits --
[limits]
dialog_limit = 50000               # Max tracked dialogs (tune for RAM)
max_streams = 25000                # Max RTP streams
max_reassembly = 5000              # Max TCP reassembly sessions
hep_rate_limit = 25000             # Max HEP packets/sec
lint_max_per_rule = 25             # Repeats of one lint finding per dialog
exec_queue_depth = 20              # Hook commands allowed to run at once

# -- Privilege separation (Linux) --
[privilege]
user = "sipnab"                    # Drop to unprivileged user after device open
no_priv_drop = false               # Keep privilege dropping enabled
chroot = "/var/lib/sipnab"         # Chroot after initialization

# -- Address naming --
[names]
enabled = true                     # Resolve addresses to names at startup
hosts_file = "/etc/sipnab/hosts"   # Preloaded IP -> name mappings

[names.manual]
"192.0.2.1" = "sbc-edge"

# -- Crash handling --
[crash]
reports = true                     # Write a crash report on panic
backtrace = true                   # Include a full backtrace
core = false                       # Exit 101 rather than dumping core

# -- Theme: Catppuccin Mocha --
[theme]
background = "#1e1e2e"
foreground = "#cdd6f4"
header = "#89b4fa"
selected = "#f9e2af"
accent = "#cba6f7"
good = "#a6e3a1"
warning = "#fab387"
bad = "#f38ba8"
muted = "#585b70"
border = "#6c7086"

# -- Keybindings (defaults shown) --
[keybindings]
quit = "q"
help = "F1"
filter = "F7"
save = "F2"
search = "/"
settings = "F8"
pause = "p"
autoscroll = "A"
extended_flow = "F4"
clear_calls = "F5"
column_selector = "F10"

Tip: Use sipnab --dump-config to see which file sipnab actually loaded and what that file set.

  • It prints the path it came from.
  • It then prints every section header with the keys that file supplied under each.

Read the omissions carefully, because -D shows less than "effective configuration" suggests:

  • Built-in defaults do not appear.
    • A key you did not set prints nothing, not its default.
    • sipnab -F --dump-config therefore prints a list of empty section headers. That is correct output and not a fault.
    • The defaults are the ones in the tables on this page.
  • CLI flags do not appear.
    • They arrive later in startup, so -D cannot show what a flag would override.
    • Compare against the CLI reference for that.
  • There is no environment-variable override layer. SIPNAB_CONFIG only selects which file to read.

So -D answers "did sipnab read the file I meant, and did it accept my keys?". That is the question behind most configuration surprises. It does not answer "what value is this setting running with?".

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