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NIST Special Publication 800-
Revision 2

Risk Management Framework for

Information Systems and Organizations

A System Life Cycle Approach for Security and Privacy

JOINT TASK FORCE

This publication is available free of charge from:
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-37r

This publication contains comprehensive updates to the
Risk Management Framework. The updates include an
alignment with the constructs in the NIST Cybersecurity
Framework; the integration of privacy risk management
processes; an alignment with system life cycle security
engineering processes; and the incorporation of supply
chain risk management processes. Organizations can
use the frameworks and processes in a complementary
manner within the RMF to effectively manage security
and privacy risks to organizational operations and
assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.
Revision 2 includes a set of organization-wide RMF tasks
that are designed to prepare information system owners
to conduct system-level risk management activities. The
intent is to increase the effectiveness, efficiency, and
cost-effectiveness of the RMF by establishing a closer
connection to the organization’s missions and business
functions and improving the communications among
senior leaders, managers, and operational personnel.

NIST Special Publication 800-
Revision 2

Risk Management Framework for

Information Systems and Organizations

A System Life Cycle Approach for Security a nd Privacy

JOINT TASK FORCE

This publication is available free of charge from:
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-37r

December 2018

U.S. Department of Commerce
Wilbur L. Ross, Jr., Secretary

National Institute of Standards and Technology
Walter Copan, NIST Director and Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology

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Authority

This publication has been developed by NIST to further its statutory responsibilities under the
Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA), 44 U.S.C. § 3551 et seq. , Public Law
(P.L.) 113-283. NIST is responsible for developing information security standards and guidelines,
including minimum requirements for federal information systems, but such standards and
guidelines shall not apply to national security systems without the express approval of the
appropriate federal officials exercising policy authority over such systems. This guideline is
consistent with requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130.

Nothing in this publication should be taken to contradict the standards and guidelines made
mandatory and binding on federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory
authority. Nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing
authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, OMB Director, or any other federal official. This
publication may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not
subject to copyright in the United States. Attribution would, however, be appreciated by NIST.

National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-37, Revision 2
Natl. Inst. Stand. Technol. Spec. Publ. 800-37, Rev. 2, 183 pages (December 2018)
CODEN: NSPUE
This publication is available free of charge from:
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-37r

Comments on this publication may be submitted to:
National Institute of Standards and Technology
Attn: Computer Security Division, Information Technology Laboratory
100 Bureau Drive (Mail Stop 8930) Gaithersburg, MD 20899-
Email: [email protected]

All comments are subject to release under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) [FOIA96].

Certain commercial entities, equipment, or materials may be identified in this document to describe
an experimental procedure or concept adequately. Such identification is not intended to imply
recommendation or endorsement by NIST, nor is it intended to imply that the entities, materials, or
equipment are necessarily the best available for the purpose.
There may be references in this publication to other publications currently under development by
NIST in accordance with its assigned statutory responsibilities. The information in this publication,
including concepts, practices, and methodologies, may be used by federal agencies even before the
completion of such companion publications. Thus, until each publication is completed, current
requirements, guidelines, and procedures, where they exist, remain operative. For planning and
transition purposes, federal agencies may wish to closely follow the development of these new
publications by NIST.
Organizations are encouraged to review draft publications during the designated public comment
periods and provide feedback to NIST. Many NIST publications, other than the ones noted above,
are available at https://csrc.nist.gov/publications.

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Reports on Computer Systems Technology

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Information Technology Laboratory
(ITL) promotes the U.S. economy and public welfare by providing technical leadership for the
Nation’s measurement and standards infrastructure. ITL develops tests, test methods, reference
data, proof of concept implementations, and technical analyses to advance the development
and productive use of information technology (IT). ITL’s responsibilities include the development
of management, administrative, technical, and physical standards and guidelines for the cost-
effective security of other than national security-related information in federal information
systems. The Special Publication 800-series reports on ITL’s research, guidelines, and outreach
efforts in information systems security and privacy and its collaborative activities with industry,
government, and academic organizations.

Abstract

This publication describes the Risk Management Framework (RMF) and provides guidelines for
applying the RMF to information systems and organizations. The RMF provides a disciplined,
structured, and flexible process for managing security and privacy risk that includes information
security categorization; control selection, implementation, and assessment; system and
common control authorizations; and continuous monitoring. The RMF includes activities to
prepare organizations to execute the framework at appropriate risk management levels. The
RMF also promotes near real-time risk management and ongoing information system and
common control authorization through the implementation of continuous monitoring
processes; provides senior leaders and executives with the necessary information to make
efficient, cost-effective, risk management decisions about the systems supporting their missions
and business functions; and incorporates security and privacy into the system development life
cycle. Executing the RMF tasks links essential risk management processes at the system level to
risk management processes at the organization level. In addition, it establishes responsibility
and accountability for the controls implemented within an organization’s information systems
and inherited by those systems.

Keywords

assess; authorization to operate; authorization to use; authorizing official; categorize; common
control; common control authorization; common control provider; continuous monitoring;
control assessor; control baseline; cybersecurity framework profile; hybrid control; information
owner or steward; information security; monitor; ongoing authorization; plan of action and
milestones; privacy; privacy assessment report; privacy control; privacy plan; privacy risk; risk
assessment; risk executive function; risk management; risk management framework; security;
security assessment report; security control; security engineering; security plan; security risk;
senior agency information security officer; senior agency official for privacy; supply chain risk
management; system development life cycle; system owner; system privacy officer; system
security officer; system-specific control.

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Acknowledgements

This publication was developed by the Joint Task Force Interagency Working Group. The group
includes representatives from the Civil, Defense, and Intelligence Communities. The National
Institute of Standards and Technology wishes to acknowledge and thank the senior leaders from
the Departments of Commerce and Defense, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
the Committee on National Security Systems, and the members of the interagency working
group whose dedicated efforts contributed significantly to the publication.

Department of Defense Office of the Director of National
Intelligence
Dana Deasy John Sherman
Chief Information Officer Chief Information Officer
Essye B. Miller Vacant
Principal Deputy CIO and DoD Senior Information Deputy Chief Information Officer
Security Officer
Thomas P. Michelli Susan Dorr
Acting Deputy Chief Information Officer for Cybersecurity Director, Cybersecurity Division and Chief
Information Security Officer
Vicki Michetti Wallace Coggins
Director, Cybersecurity Policy, Strategy, International, Director, Security Coordination Center
and Defense Industrial Base Directorate

National Institute of Standards and Technology Committee on National Security
Systems
Charles H. Romine Thomas Michelli
Director, Information Technology Laboratory Chair—Defense Community
Donna Dodson Susan Dorr—Intelligence Community
Cybersecurity Advisor, Information Technology Laboratory Co-Chair
Matt Scholl Vicki Michetti
Chief, Computer Security Division Tri-Chair—Defense Community
Kevin Stine Chris Johnson
Chief, Applied Cybersecurity Division Tri-Chair—Intelligence Community
Ron Ross Paul Cunningham
FISMA Implementation Project Leader Tri-Chair—Civil Agencies

Joint Task Force Working Group

Ron Ross Kevin Dulany Peter Duspiva Kelley Dempsey
NIST, JTF Leader DoD Intelligence Community NIST
Taylor Roberts Ellen Nadeau Victoria Pillitteri Naomi Lefkovitz
OMB NIST NIST NIST
Jordan Burris Charles Cutshall Kevin Herms Carol Bales
OMB OMB OMB OMB
Jeff Marron Kaitlin Boeckl Kirsten Moncada Jon Boyens
NIST NIST OMB NIST
Dorian Pappas Dominic Cussatt Esten Porter Celia Paulsen
CNSS Veterans Affairs The MITRE Corporation NIST
Daniel Faigin Christina Sames Julie Snyder Martin Stanley
The Aerospace Corporation The MITRE Corporation The MITRE Corporation Homeland Security

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The authors also wish to recognize Matt Barrett, Kathleen Coupe, Jeff Eisensmith, Chris Enloe,
Ned Goren, Matthew Halstead, Jody Jacobs, Ralph Jones, Martin Kihiko, Raquel Leone, and the
scientists, engineers, and research staff from the Computer Security Division and the Applied
Cybersecurity Division for their exceptional contributions in helping to improve the content of
the publication. A special note of thanks to Jim Foti and the NIST web team for their outstanding
administrative support.

In addition, the authors wish to acknowledge the United States Air Force and the “RMF Next”
initiative, facilitated by Air Force CyberWorx, that provided the inspiration for some of the new
ideas in this update to the RMF. The working group, led by Lauren Knausenberger, Bill Bryant,
and Venice Goodwine, included government and industry representatives Jake Ames, Chris
Bailey, James Barnett, Steve Bogue, Wes Chiu, Kurt Danis, Shane Deichman; Joe Erskine, Terence
Goodman, Jason Howe, Brandon Howell, Todd Jacobs, Peter Klabe, William Kramer, Bryon
Kroger, Kevin LaSalle, Dinh Le, Noam Liran, Sam Miles, Michael Morrison, Raymond Tom Nagley,
Wendy Nather, Jasmine Neal, Ryan Perry, Eugene Peterson, Lawrence Rampaul, Jessica
Rheinschmidt, Greg Roman, Susanna Scarveles, Justin Schoenthal, Christian Sorenson, Stacy
Studstill, Charles Wade, Shawn Whitney, David Wilcox, and Thomas Woodring.

Finally, the authors also gratefully acknowledge the significant contributions from individuals
and organizations in both the public and private sectors, nationally and internationally, whose
thoughtful and constructive comments improved the overall quality, thoroughness, and
usefulness of this publication.

HISTORICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO NIST SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-

The authors acknowledge the many individuals who contributed to previous versions of Special
Publication 800-37 since its inception in 2005. They include Marshall Abrams, William Barker,
Beckie Koonge, Roger Caslow, John Gilligan, Peter Gouldmann, Richard Graubart, John Grimes,
Gus Guissanie, Priscilla Guthrie, Jennifer Fabius, Cita Furlani, Richard Hale, Peggy Himes, William
Hunteman, Arnold Johnson, Donald Jones, Stuart Katzke, Eustace King, Mark Morrison, Sherrill
Nicely, Karen Quigg, George Rogers, Cheryl Roby, Gary Stoneburner, Marianne Swanson, Glenda
Turner, and Peter Williams.

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Executive Summary

As we push computers to “the edge,” building a complex world of interconnected information
systems and devices, security and privacy risks (including supply chain risks) continue to be a
large part of the national conversation and topics of great importance. The significant increase
in the complexity of the hardware, software, firmware, and systems within the public and
private sectors (including the U.S. critical infrastructure) represents a significant increase in
attack surface that can be exploited by adversaries. Moreover, adversaries are using the supply
chain as an attack vector and effective means of penetrating our systems, compromising the
integrity of system elements, and gaining access to critical assets.

The Defense Science Board Report, Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat
[DSB 2013], provides a sobering assessment of the vulnerabilities in the United States
Government, the U.S. critical infrastructure, and the systems supporting the mission-essential
operations and assets in the public and private sectors.
“...The Task Force notes that the cyber threat to U.S. critical infrastructure is outpacing
efforts to reduce pervasive vulnerabilities, so that for the next decade at least the United States
must lean significantly on deterrence to address the cyber threat posed by the most capable
U.S. adversaries. It is clear that a more proactive and systematic approach to U.S. cyber
deterrence is urgently needed...”

There is an urgent need to further strengthen the underlying information systems, component
products, and services that we depend on in every sector of the critical infrastructure—ensuring
that the systems, products, and services are sufficiently trustworthy throughout the system
development life cycle (SDLC) and can provide the necessary resilience to support the economic
and national security interests of the United States. System modernization, the increased use of
automation, and the consolidation, standardization, and optimization of federal systems and
networks to strengthen the protection for high value assets [OMB M-19- 03 ], are key objectives
for the federal government.

Executive Order (E.O.) 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical
Infrastructure [EO 13800] recognizes the increasing interconnectedness of Federal information
systems and requires heads of agencies to ensure appropriate risk management not only for the
Federal agency’s enterprise, but also for the Executive Branch as a whole. The E.O. states:
“...The executive branch operates its information technology (IT) on behalf of the American people.
Its IT and data should be secured responsibly using all United States Government capabilities...”
“...Cybersecurity risk management comprises the full range of activities undertaken to protect IT
and data from unauthorized access and other cyber threats, to maintain awareness of cyber
threats, to detect anomalies and incidents adversely affecting IT and data, and to mitigate the
impact of, respond to, and recover from incidents...”

OMB Memorandum M-17-25, Reporting Guidance for Executive Order on Strengthening the
Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure [OMB M-17-25] provides
implementation guidance to Federal agencies for E.O. 13800. The memorandum states:
“... An effective enterprise risk management program promotes a common understanding for
recognizing and describing potential risks that can impact an agency’s mission and the delivery of
services to the public. Such risks include, but are not limited to, strategic, market, cyber, legal,

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reputational, political, and a broad range of operational risks such as information security, human
capital, business continuity, and related risks...”
“... Effective management of cybersecurity risk requires that agencies align information security
management processes with strategic, operational, and budgetary planning processes...”

OMB Circular A-130, Managing Information as a Strategic Resource [OMB A-130], addresses
responsibilities for protecting federal information resources and for managing personally
identifiable information (PII). Circular A-130 requires agencies to implement the RMF that is
described in this guideline and requires agencies to integrate privacy into the RMF process. In
establishing requirements for information security programs and privacy programs, the OMB
circular emphasizes the need for both programs to collaborate on shared objectives:
“While security and privacy are independent and separate disciplines, they are closely related, and it is
essential for agencies to take a coordinated approach to identifying and managing security and privacy
risks and complying with applicable requirements....”

This update to NIST Special Publication 800-37 (Revision 2) responds to the call by the Defense
Science Board, the Executive Order, and the OMB policy memorandum to develop the next-
generation Risk Management Framework (RMF) for information systems, organizations, and
individuals.

There are seven major objectives for this update:

To provide closer linkage and communication between the risk management processes and activities at the C-suite or governance level of the organization and the individuals, processes, and activities at the system and operational level of the organization;
To institutionalize critical risk management preparatory activities at all risk management levels to facilitate a more effective, efficient, and cost-effective execution of the RMF;
To demonstrate how the NIST Cybersecurity Framework [NIST CSF] can be aligned with the RMF and implemented using established NIST risk management processes;
To integrate privacy risk management processes into the RMF to better support the privacy protection needs for which privacy programs are responsible;
To promote the development of trustworthy secure software and systems by aligning life cycle-based systems engineering processes in NIST Special Publication 800-160, Volume 1 [SP 800 -160 v1], with the relevant tasks in the RMF;
To integrate security-related, supply chain risk management (SCRM) concepts into the RMF to address untrustworthy suppliers, insertion of counterfeits, tampering, unauthorized production, theft, insertion of malicious code, and poor manufacturing and development practices throughout the SDLC; and
To allow for an organization-generated control selection approach to complement the traditional baseline control selection approach and support the use of the consolidated control catalog in NIST Special Publication 800-53, Revision 5.

The addition of the Prepare step is one of the key changes to the RMF—incorporated to achieve
more effective, efficient, and cost-effective security and privacy risk management processes.
The primary objectives for institutionalizing organization-level and system-level preparation are:

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- To facilitate effective communication between senior leaders and executives at the organization and mission/business process levels and system owners at the operational level;
- To facilitate organization-wide identification of common controls and the development of organizationally-tailored control baselines, reducing the workload on individual system owners and the cost of system development and asset protection;
- To reduce the complexity of the information technology (IT) and operations technology (OT) infrastructure using Enterprise Architecture concepts and models to consolidate, optimize, and standardize organizational systems, applications, and services;
- To reduce the complexity of systems by eliminating unnecessary functions and security and privacy capabilities that do not address security and privacy risk; and
- To identify, prioritize, and focus resources on the organization’s high value assets (HVA) that require increased levels of protection—taking measures commensurate with the risk to such assets.

By achieving the above objectives, organizations can simplify RMF execution, employ innovative
approaches for managing risk, and increase the level of automation when carrying out specific
tasks. Organizations implementing the RMF will be able to:

Use the tasks and outputs of the Organization-Level and System-Level Prepare step to promote a consistent starting point within organizations to execute the RMF;
Maximize the use of common controls at the organization level to promote standardized, consistent, and cost-effective security and privacy capability inheritance;
Maximize the use of shared or cloud-based systems, services, and applications to reduce the number of authorizations needed across the organization;
Employ organizationally-tailored control baselines to increase the speed of security and privacy plan development and the consistency of security and privacy plan content;
Employ organization-defined controls based on security and privacy requirements generated from a systems security engineering process;
Maximize the use of automated tools to manage security categorization; control selection, assessment, and monitoring; and the authorization process;
Decrease the level of effort and resource expenditures for low-impact systems if those systems cannot adversely affect higher-impact systems through system connections;
Maximize the reuse of RMF artifacts (e.g., security and privacy assessment results) for standardized hardware/software deployments, including configuration settings;
Reduce the complexity of the IT/OT infrastructure by eliminating unnecessary systems, system components, and services — employing the least functionality principle; and
Make the transition to ongoing authorization a priority and use continuous monitoring approaches to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of security and privacy programs.

Recognizing that the preparation for RMF execution may vary from organization to organization,
achieving the above objectives can reduce the overall IT/OT footprint and attack surface of

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organizations, promote IT modernization objectives, conserve resources, prioritize security
activities to focus protection strategies on the most critical assets and systems, and promote
privacy protections for individuals.

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COMMON SECURITY AND PRIVACY RISK FOUNDATIONS

In developing standards and guidelines, NIST consults with federal agencies, state, local, and
tribal governments, and private sector organizations; avoids unnecessary and costly duplication
of effort; and ensures that its publications are complementary with the standards and guidelines
used for the protection of national security systems. In addition to implementing a transparent
public review process for its publications, NIST collaborates with the Office of Management and
Budget, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and the
Committee on National Security Systems, and has established a unified risk management
framework for the federal government. This common foundation provides the Civil, Defense,
and Intelligence Communities of the federal government and their contractors, cost-effective,
flexible, and consistent methods and techniques to manage security and privacy risks to
organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. The
unified framework also provides a strong basis for reciprocal acceptance of assessment results
and authorization decisions and facilitates information sharing and collaboration. NIST
continues to work with public and private sector entities to establish mappings and relationships
between its security and privacy standards and guidelines and those developed by external
organizations.

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ACCEPTANCE OF SECURITY AND PRIVACY RISK

The Risk Management Framework addresses security and privacy risk from two perspectives—
an information system perspective and a common controls perspective. For an information
system, authorizing officials issue an authorization to operate or authorization to use for the
system, accepting the security and privacy risks to the organization’s operations and assets,
individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. For common controls, authorizing officials issue
a common control authorization for a specific set of controls that can be inherited by designated
organizational systems, accepting the security and privacy risks to the organization’s operations
and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Authorizing officials also consider
the risk of inheriting common controls as part of their system authorizations. The different types
of authorizations are described in Appendix F.

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THE RMF IS TECHNOLOGY NEUTRAL

The RMF is purposefully designed to be technology neutral so that the methodology can be
applied to any type of information system* without modification. While the specific controls
selected, control implementation details, and control assessment methods and objects may vary
with different types of IT resources, there is no need to adjust the RMF process to accommodate
specific technologies.
All information systems process, store, or transmit some type of information. For example,
information about the temperature in a remote facility collected and transmitted by a sensor to
a monitoring station, location coordinates transmitted by radio to a controller on a weapons
system, photographic images transmitted by a remote camera (land/satellite-based) to a server,
or health IT devices transmitting patient information via a hospital network, require protection.
This in formation can be protected by: categorizing the information to determine the impact of
loss; assessing whether the processing of the information could impact individuals’ privacy; and
selecting and implementing controls that are applicable to the IT resources in use. Therefore,
cloud-based systems, industrial/process control systems, weapons systems, cyber-physical
systems, applications, IoT devices, or mobile devices/systems, do not require a separate risk
management process but rather a tailored set of controls and specific implementation details
determined by applying the existing RMF process.
The RMF is applied iteratively, as applicable, during the system development life cycle for any
type of system development approach (including Agile and DevOps approaches). The security
and privacy requirements and controls are implemented, verified, and validated as development
progresses throughout the life cycle. This flexibility allows the RMF to support rapid technology
cycles, innovation, and the use of current best practices in system and system component
development.

* Note: The publication pertains to information systems, which are discrete sets of information resources
organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of
information, whether such information is in digital or non-digital form. Information resources include
information and related resources, such as personnel, equipment, funds, and information technology.
Therefore, information systems may or may not include hardware, firmware, and software.

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USE OF AUTOMATION IN THE EXECUTION OF THE RMF

Organizations should maximize the use of automation , wherever possible, to increase the speed,
effectiveness, and efficiency of executing the steps in the Risk Management Framework (RMF).
Automation is particularly useful in the assessment and continuous monitoring of controls, the
preparation of authorization packages for timely decision-making, and the implementation of
ongoing authorization approaches—together facilitating a real-time or near real-time risk-based
decision-making process for senior leaders. Organizations have significant flexibility in deciding
when, where, and how to use automation or automated support tools for their security and
privacy programs. In some situations, automated assessments and monitoring of controls may
not be possible or feasible.

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SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY

This publication is intended to help organizations manage security and privacy risk, and to satisfy
the requirements in the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA), the
Privacy Act of 1974, OMB policies, and Federal Information Processing Standards, among other
laws, regulations, and policies. The scope of this publication pertains to federal information
systems, which are discrete sets of information resources organized for the collection,
processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information, whether
such information is in digital or non-digital form. Information resources include information and
related resources, such as personnel, equipment, funds, and information technology.
While mandatory for federal government use, the RMF can be applied to any type of nonfederal
organization (e.g., business, industry, academia). As such, State, local, and tribal governments,
as well as private sector organizations are encouraged to use these guidelines on a voluntary
basis, as appropriate. In addition, nonfederal organizations that have adopted and implemented
the Cybersecurity Framework might find value in using the RMF as a risk management process
for execution of the Framework—providing the essential tasks for control implementation,
assessment, and monitoring, as well as system authorizations (for risk-based decision making).

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MANAGING RISK

Using the Cybersecurity Framework
Executive Order (E.O.) 13800 requires federal agencies to modernize their IT infrastructure and
systems and recognizes the increasing interconnectedness of federal information systems and
networks. The E.O. also requires heads of agencies to manage risk at the agency level and across
the Executive Branch using the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
(i.e., Cybersecurity Framework). And finally, the E.O. reinforces the Federal Information Security
Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014 by holding heads of agencies responsible and accountable
for managing the cybersecurity risk to their organizations.

The Cybersecurity Framework is adaptive to provide a flexible and risk-based implementation
that can be used with a broad array of cybersecurity risk management processes. Therefore,
consistent with OMB Memorandum M-17-25, the federal implementation of the Cybersecurity
Framework fully supports the use of and is consistent with the risk management processes and
approaches defined in [SP 800-39] and NIST Special Publication 800-37. This allows agencies to
meet their concurrent obligations to comply with the requirements of FISMA and E.O. 13800.

Each task in the RMF includes references to specific sections in the Cybersecurity Framework.
For example, Task P-2, Risk Management Strategy , aligns with the Cybersecurity Framework
Core [Identify Function]; Task P-4, Organizationally-Tailored Control Baselines and Cybersecurity
Framework Profiles , aligns with the Cybersecurity Framework Profile construct; and Task R-5,
Authorization Reporting , and Task M-5, Security and Privacy Reporting , support OMB reporting
and risk management requirements organization-wide by using the Cybersecurity Framework
constructs of Functions, Categories, and Subcategories. The Subcategory mappings to the [SP
800- 53 ] controls are available at: https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/federal-resources.

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SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN THE RMF

Organizations are encouraged to collaborate on the plans, assessments, and plans of action and
milestones (POAM) for security and privacy issues to maximize efficiency and reduce duplication
of effort. The objective is to ensure that security and privacy requirements derived from laws,
executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, or missions and business functions
are adequately addressed, and the appropriate controls are selected, implemented, assessed,
and monitored on an ongoing basis. The authorization decision, a key step in the RMF, depends
on the development of credible and actionable security and privacy evidence generated for the
authorization package. Creating such evidence in a cost-effective and efficient manner is
important.
The unified and collaborative approach to bring security and privacy evidence together in a
single authorization package will support authorizing officials with critical information from
security and privacy professionals to help inform the authorization decision. In the end, it is not
about generating additional paperwork, artifacts, or documentation. Rather, it is about ensuring
greater visibility into the implementation of security and privacy controls which will promote
more informed, risk-based authorization decisions.

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- CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION Table of Contents
  - 1.1 BACKGROUND
  - 1.2 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY
  - 1.3 TARGET AUDIENCE
  - 1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THIS PUBLICATION
- CHAPTER TWO THE FUNDAMENTALS
  - 2.1 ORGANIZATION-WIDE RISK MANAGEMENT
  - 2.2 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK STEPS AND STRUCTURE
  - 2.3 INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN THE RMF
  - 2.4 SYSTEM AND SYSTEM ELEMENTS......................................................................................................
  - 2.5 AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARIES
  - 2.6 REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLS
  - 2.7 SECURITY AND PRIVACY POSTURE
  - 2.8 SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT
- CHAPTER THREE THE PROCESS
  - 3.1 PREPARE
  - 3.2 CATEGORIZE......................................................................................................................................
  - 3.3 SELECT
  - 3.4 IMPLEMENT
  - 3.5 ASSESS
  - 3.6 AUTHORIZE
  - 3.7 MONITOR
- APPENDIX A REFERENCES
- APPENDIX B GLOSSARY
- APPENDIX C ACRONYMS
- APPENDIX D ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
- APPENDIX E SUMMARY OF RMF TASKS
- APPENDIX F SYSTEM AND COMMON CONTROL AUTHORIZATIONS
- APPENDIX G AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARY CONSIDERATIONS
- APPENDIX H SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE CONSIDERATIONS

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Errata

This table contains changes that have been incorporated into Special Publication 800-37. Errata
updates can include corrections, clarifications, or other minor changes in the publication that
are either editorial or substantive in nature.

DATE TYPE CHANGE PAGE

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION
THE NEED TO MANAGE SECURITY AND PRIVACY RISK

rganizations depend on information systems^1 to carry out their missions and business
functions. The success of the missions and business functions depends on protecting the
confidentiality, integrity, availability of information processed, stored, and transmitted
by those systems and the privacy of individuals. The threats to information systems include
equipment failure, environmental disruptions, human or machine errors, and purposeful attacks
that are often sophisticated, disciplined, well-organized, and well-funded.^2 When successful,
attacks on information systems can result in serious or catastrophic damage to organizational
operations^3 and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.^4 Therefore, it is
imperative that organizations remain vigilant and that senior executives, leaders, and managers
throughout the organization understand their responsibilities and are accountable for
protecting organizational assets and for managing risk.^5

In addition to the responsibility to protect organizational assets from the threats that exist in
today’s environment, organizations have a responsibility to consider and manage the risks to
individuals when information systems process personally identifiable information (PII).6 7 The
information security and privacy programs implemented by organizations have complementary
objectives with respect to managing the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PII. While
many privacy risks arise from unauthorized activities that lead to the loss of confidentiality,
integrity, or availability of PII, other privacy risks result from authorized activities involving the
creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance, dissemination, disclosure, or
disposal of PII that enables an organization to meet its mission or business objectives. For
example, organizations could fail to provide appropriate notice of PII processing depriving an
individual of knowledge of such processing or an individual could be embarrassed or stigmatized

(^1) An information system is a discrete set of information resources organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition of information [44 USC 3502]. The term information system in cludes, for example, general-purpose computing systems; industrial/process control systems; cyber-physical systems; weapons systems; super computers; command, control, and communications systems; devices such as smart phones and tablets; environmental control systems; embedded devices/sensors; and paper-based systems. (^2) Defense Science Board Task Force Report, Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat [DSB 2013]. (^3) Organizational operations include mission, functions, image, and reputation. (^4) Adverse impacts include, for example, compromises to systems supporting critical infrastructure applications or that are paramount to government continuity of operations as defined by the Department of Homeland Security. (^5) Risk is a measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event. Risk is also a function of the adverse impacts that arise if the circumstance or event occurs, and the likelihood of occurrence. Types of risk include program risk; compliance/regulatory risk; financial risk; legal risk; mission/business risk; political risk; security and privacy risk (including supply chain risk); project risk; reputational risk; safety risk; strategic planning risk. (^6) [OMB A-130] defines PII as “information that can be used to distinguish or trace an individual’s identity, either alone or when combined with other information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual.” (^7) Organizations may also choose to consider risks to individuals that may arise from interactions with information systems, where the processing of PII may be less impactful than the effect the system has on individuals’ behavior or activities. Such effects would constitute risks to individual autonomy and organizations may need to take steps to manage those risks in addition to information security and privacy risks. O

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by the authorized disclosure of PII. While managing privacy risk requires close coordination
between information security and privacy programs due to the complementary nature of the
programs’ objectives around the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PII, privacy risks
also raise distinct concerns that require specialized expertise and approaches. Therefore, it is
critical that organizations also establish and maintain robust privacy programs to ensure
compliance with applicable privacy requirements and to manage the risk to individuals
associated with the processing of PII.

Closely related to, and a part of security and privacy risks, supply chain risk^8 is also of growing
concern to organizations. Because of the increased reliance on third-party or external providers
and commercial-off-the-shelf products, systems, and services, attacks or disruptions in the
supply chain which impact an organization’s systems are increasing. Such attacks can be difficult
to trace or manage and can result in serious, severe, or catastrophic consequences for an
organization’s systems. Supply chain risk management (SCRM) overlaps and works in harmony
with security and privacy risk management. This publication integrates security and privacy risk
management practices associated with SCRM into the RMF to help promote a comprehensive
approach to managing security and privacy risk. While the publication is principally focused on
managing information security and privacy risk, SCRM concepts that support security and
privacy risk management are specifically called out in several areas to add emphasis and to
clarify how they can be addressed using the RMF.

1.1 BACKGROUND

NIST in its partnership with the Department of Defense, the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, and the Committee on National Security Systems, developed a Risk Management
Framework (RMF) to improve information security, strengthen risk management processes, and
encourage reciprocity^9 among organizations. In July 2016, the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) revised Circular A-130 to include responsibilities for privacy programs under the
RMF.

The RMF emphasizes risk management by promoting the development of security and privacy
capabilities into information systems throughout the system development life cycle (SDLC);^10 by
maintaining situational awareness of the security and privacy posture of those systems on an
ongoing basis through continuous monitoring processes; and by providing information to senior
leaders and executives to facilitate decisions regarding the acceptance of risk to organizational
operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation arising from the use and
operation of their systems. The RMF:

Provides a repeatable process designed to promote the protection of information and information systems commensurate with risk;
Emphasizes organization-wide preparation necessary to manage security and privacy risks;

(^8) SCRM requirements are promulgated in [OMB A-130], [DODI 5200.44], and for national security systems in [CNSSD 505 ]. SCRM requirements have also been addressed by the Federal SCRM Policy Coordinating Committee. (^9) Reciprocity is an agreement between organizations to accept one another’s security assessment results in order to reuse system resources or to accept each other’s assessed security posture in order to share information. (^10) [SP 800-64] and [SP 800- 160 v1] provide guidance on security considerations in the SDLC.

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- Facilitates the categorization of information and systems, the selection, implementation, assessment, and monitoring of controls, and the authorization of information systems and common controls;^11
- Promotes the use of automation for near real-time risk management and ongoing system and control authorization through the implementation of continuous monitoring processes;
- Encourages the use of correct and timely metrics to provide senior leaders and managers with the necessary information to make cost-effective, risk-based decisions for information systems supporting their missions and business functions;
- Facilitates the integration of security and privacy requirements^12 and controls into enterprise architecture,^13 SDLC, acquisition processes, and systems engineering processes;
- Connects risk management processes at the organization and mission/business process levels to risk management processes at the information system level through a senior accountable official for risk management and risk executive (function);^14 and
- Establishes responsibility and accountability for controls implemented within information systems and inherited by those systems.

The RMF provides a dynamic and flexible approach to effectively manage security and privacy
risks in diverse environments with complex and sophisticated threats, evolving missions and
business functions, and changing system and organizational vulnerabilities. The framework is
policy and technology neutral, which facilitates ongoing upgrades to IT resources^15 and to IT
modernization efforts—to support and help ensure essential missions and services are provided
during such transition periods.

1.2 PURPOSE AND APPLICABILITY

This publication describes the RMF and provides guidelines for managing security and privacy
risks and applying the RMF to information systems and organizations. The guidelines have been
developed:

To ensure that managing system-related security and privacy risk is consistent with the mission and business objectives of the organization and risk management strategy established by the senior leadership through the risk executive (function);
To achieve privacy protections for individuals and security protections for information and information systems through the implementation of appropriate risk response strategies;
To support consistent, informed, and ongoing authorization decisions,^16 reciprocity, and the transparency and traceability of security and privacy information;

(^11) Chapter 3 describes the seven steps and associated tasks in the RMF. (^12) Section 2.6 describes the relationship between requirements and controls with respect to RMF execution. (^13) [OMB FEA] provides guidance on the Federal Enterprise Architecture. (^14) [OMB M-17- 25 ] provides guidance on risk management roles and responsibilities. (^15) IT resources refer to the information technology component of information resources defined in [OMB A-130]. (^16) [SP 800- 137 ] provides guidance on information security continuous monitoring supporting ongoing authorization. Future publications will address privacy continuous monitoring.

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- To facilitate the integration of security and privacy requirements and controls into the enterprise architecture, SDLC processes, acquisition processes, and systems engineering processes;^17 and
- To facilitate the implementation of the Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity [NIST CSF] within federal agencies.^18

This publication is intended to help organizations^19 manage security and privacy risk and to
satisfy the requirements in the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 [FISMA],
the Privacy Act of 1974 [PRIVACT], OMB policies, and designated Federal Information Processing
Standards, among other laws, regulations, and policies.

The scope of this publication pertains to federal information systems, which are discrete sets of
information resources organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing,
dissemination, or disposition of information, whether such information is in digital or non-digital
form. Information resources include information and related resources, such as personnel,
equipment, funds, and information technology. The guidelines have been developed from a
technical perspective to complement guidelines for national security systems and may be used
for such systems with the approval of appropriate federal officials with policy authority over
such systems. State, local, and tribal governments, as well as private sector organizations are
encouraged to use these guidelines, as appropriate.

1.3 TARGET AUDIENCE

This publication serves individuals associated with the design, development, implementation,
assessment, operation, maintenance, and disposition of information systems including:

Individuals with mission or business ownership responsibilities or fiduciary responsibilities (e.g., and heads of federal agencies);
Individuals with information system, information security, or privacy management, oversight, or governance responsibilities (e.g., senior leaders, risk executives, authorizing officials, chief information officers, senior agency information security officers, and senior agency officials for privacy);
Individuals responsible for conducting security or privacy assessments and for monitoring information systems, for example, control assessors, auditors, and system owners;
Individuals with security or privacy implementation and operational responsibilities, for example, system owners, common control providers, information owners/stewards, mission or business owners, security or privacy architects, and systems security or privacy engineers;
Individuals with information system development and acquisition responsibilities (e.g., program managers, procurement officials, component product and system developers, systems integrators, and enterprise architects); and

(^17) [SP 800-160 v1] provides guidance on systems security engineering and building trustworthy, secure systems. (^18) [EO 13800] directs federal agencies to use the [NIST CSF] to manage cybersecurity risk. (^19) The term organization is used in this publication to describe an entity of any size, complexity, or positioning within an organizational structure (e.g., a federal agency or, as appropriate, any of its operational elements).

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- Individuals with logistical or disposition-related responsibilities (e.g., program managers, procurement officials, system integrators, and property managers).

For a comprehensive list and description of roles and responsibilities associated with the RMF,
see Appendix D.

1.4 ORGANIZATION OF THIS PUBLICATION

The remainder of this special publication is organized as follows:

Chapter Two describes the concepts associated with managing information system-related security and privacy risk. This includes an organization-wide view of risk management; the RMF steps and task structure; the relationship between information security and privacy programs and how these programs are addressed in the RMF; information resources as system and system elements; authorization boundaries; security and privacy posture; and security and privacy considerations related to supply chain risk management.
Chapter Three describes the tasks required to implement the steps in the RMF including: organization-level and information system-level preparation; categorization of information and information systems; control selection, tailoring, and implementation; assessment of control effectiveness; information system and common control authorization; the ongoing monitoring of controls; and maintaining awareness of the security and privacy posture of information systems and the organization.
Supporting Appendices provide additional information and guidance for the application of the RMF including:
- References;
- Glossary of Terms;
- Acronyms;
- Roles and Responsibilities;
- Summary of RMF Tasks;
- System and Common Control Authorizations;
- Authorization Boundary Considerations; and
- System Life Cycle Considerations.

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CHAPTER TWO

THE FUNDAMENTALS
HOW TO MANAGE SECURITY AND PRIVACY RISK

his chapter describes the basic concepts associated with managing information system-
related security and privacy risk in organizations. These concepts include the RMF steps
and task structure; information security and privacy programs in the RMF; information
system, system elements, and how authorization boundaries are established; security and
privacy posture; and security and privacy risk management practices associated with the supply
chain.

2.1 ORGANIZATION-WIDE RISK MANAGEMENT

Managing information system-related security and privacy risk is a complex undertaking that
requires the involvement of the entire organization—from senior leaders providing the strategic
vi sion and top-level goals and objectives for the organization, to mid-level leaders planning,
executing, and managing projects, to individuals developing, implementing, operating, and
maintaining the systems supporting the organization’s missions and business functions. Risk
management is a holistic activity that affects every aspect of the organization including the
mission and business planning activities, the enterprise architecture, the SDLC processes, and
the systems engineering activities that are integral to those system life cycle processes. Figure 1
illustrates a multi-level approach to risk management described in [SP 800-39] that addresses
security and privacy risk at the organization level, the mission/business process level, and the
information system level. Communication and reporting are bi-directional information flows
across the three levels to ensure that risk is addressed throughout the organization.

FIGURE 1: ORGANIZATION-WIDE RISK MANAGEMENT APPROACH

T

LEVEL ONE

ORGANIZATION

LEVEL TWO

MISSION/BUSINESS PROCESS

LEVEL THREE

INFORMATION SYSTEM

COMMUNICATION
AND REPORTING

RISK MANAGEMENT
ACROSS LEVELS

More detailed and granular risk perspective.

Broad-based risk perspective.

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The activities conducted at Levels 1 and 2 are critical to preparing the organization to execute
the RMF. Such preparation involves a wide range of activities that go beyond simply managing
the security and privacy risk associated with operating or using specific systems and includes
activities that are essential to managing security and privacy risk appropriately throughout the
organization. Decisions about how to manage such risk at the system level cannot be made in
isolation. Such decisions are closely linked to the:

Mission or business objectives of organizations;
Modernization initiatives for systems, components, and services;
Enterprise architecture and the need to manage and reduce the complexity^20 of systems through consolidation, optimization, and standardization;^21 and
Allocation of resources to ensure the organization can conduct its missions and business operations effectively, efficiently, and in a cost-effective manner.

Preparing the organization to execute the RMF can include:

Assigning roles and responsibilities for organizational risk management processes;
Establishing a risk management strategy and organizational risk tolerance;
Identifying the missions, business functions, and mission/business processes the information system is intended to support;
Identifying key stakeholders (internal and external to the organization) that have an interest in the information system;
Identifying and prioritizing assets (including information assets);
Understanding threats to information systems and organizations;
Understanding the potential adverse effects on indi viduals;
Conducting organization- and system-level risk assessments;
Identifying and prioritizing security and privacy requirements;^22
Determining authorization boundaries for information systems and common controls;^23
Defining information systems in terms of the enterprise architecture;
Developing the security and privacy architectures that include controls suitable for inheritance by information systems;

(^20) Managing complexity of systems through consolidation, optimization, and standardization reduces the attack surface and technology footprint exploitable by adversaries. (^21) Enterprise architecture defines the mission, information, and the technologies necessary to perform the mission, and transitional processes for implementing new technologies in response to changing mission needs. It also includes a baseline architecture, a target architecture, and a sequencing plan. [OMB FEA] provides guidance for implementing enterprise architectures. (^22) Security and privacy requirements can be obtained from many sources (e.g., laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, and mission/business/operational requirements). (^23) Authorization boundaries determine the scope of authorizations for information systems and common controls (i.e., the system elements that define the system or the set of common controls available for inheritance).

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- Identifying, aligning, and deconflicting security and privacy requirements; and
- Allocating security and privacy requirements to information systems, system elements, and organizations.

In contrast to the Level 1 and 2 activities that prepare the organization for the execution of the
RMF, Level 3 addresses risk from an information system perspective and is guided and informed
by the risk decisions at the organization and mission/business process levels. The risk decisions
at Levels 1 and 2 can impact the selection and implementation of controls at the system level.
Controls are designated by the organization as system-specific, hybrid, or common (inherited)
controls in accordance with the enterprise architecture, security or privacy architecture, and any
tailored control baselines or overlays that have been developed by the organization.^24

Organizations establish traceability of controls to the security and privacy requirements that the
controls are intended to satisfy. Establishing such traceability ensures that all requirements are
addressed during system design, development, implementation, operations, maintenance, and
disposition.^25 Each level of the risk management hierarchy is a beneficiary of a successful RMF
execution—reinforcing the iterative nature of the risk management process where security and
privacy risks are framed, assessed, responded to, and monitored at various organizational levels.

Without adequate risk management preparation at the organizational level, security and privacy
activities can become too costly, demand too many skilled security and privacy professionals,
and produce ineffective solutions. For example, organizations that fail to implement an effective
enterprise architecture will have difficulty in consolidating, optimizing, and standardizing their
information technology infrastructures. Additionally, the effect of architectural and design
decisions can adversely affect the ability of organizations to implement effective security and
privacy solutions. A lack of adequate preparation by organizations could result in unnecessary
redundancy as well as inefficient, costly and vulnerable systems, services, and applications.

2.2 RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK STEPS AND STRUCTURE

There are seven steps in the RMF; a preparatory step to ensure that organizations are ready to
execute the process and six main steps. All seven steps are essential for the successful execution
of the RMF. The steps are:

Prepare to execute the RMF from an organization- and a system-level perspective by establishing a context and priorities for managing security and privacy risk.
Categorize the system and the information processed, stored, and transmitted by the system based on an analysis of the impact of loss.^26

(^24) Controls can be allocated at all three levels in the risk management hierarchy. For example, common controls may be allocated at the organization, mission/business process, or information system level. (^25) [SP 800-160 v1] provides guidance on requirements engineering and traceability. (^26) Impact of loss is one of four risk factors considered during risk assessment activities—the other three factors being threats, vulnerabilities, and likelihood of occurrence [SP 800- 30 ]. Organizations leverage risk assessment results when categorizing information and systems. For national security systems, it may be important to consider specific issues affecting risk factors as part of categorization, such as, whether the system processes, stores, or transmits classified or intelligence information; whether the system will be accessed directly or indirectly by non-U.S. personnel; and whether the information processed, stored, or transmitted by the system will cross security domains. [CNSSI 1253] provides additional information on categorizing national security systems.

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- Select an initial set of controls for the system and tailor the controls as needed to reduce risk to an acceptable level based on an assessment of risk.
- Implement the controls and describe how the controls are employed within the system and its environment of operation.
- Assess the controls to determine if the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcomes with respect to satisfying the security and privacy requirements.^
- Authorize the system or common controls based on a determination that the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation is acceptable.
- Monitor the system and the associated controls on an ongoing basis to include assessing control effectiveness, documenting changes to the system and environment of operation, conducting risk assessments and impact analyses, and reporting the security and privacy posture of the system.

Figure 2 illustrates the steps in the RMF. The RMF operates at all levels in the risk management
hierarchy illustrated in Figure 1. Chapter Three provides a detailed description of each of the
tasks necessary to carry out the steps in the RMF.

FIGURE 2: RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

While the RMF steps are listed in sequential order above and in Chapter Three, the steps
following the Prepare step can be carried out in a nonsequential order. After completing the
tasks in the Prepare step, organizations executing the RMF for the first time for a system or set

CATEGORIZE

AUTHORIZE

MONITOR

IMPLEMENT

SELECT

ASSESS

PREPARE

Process Initiation

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of common controls typically carry out the remaining steps in sequential order. However, there
could be many points in the risk management process where there is a need to diverge from the
sequential order due to the type of system, risk decisions made by senior leadership, or to allow
for iterative cycles between tasks or revisiting of tasks (e.g., during agile development). Once the
organization is in the Monitor step, events may dictate a nonsequential execution of steps. For
example, changes in risk or in system functionality may necessitate revisiting one or more of the
steps in the RMF to address the change.

Although the risk management approach in Figure 1 is conveyed as hierarchical, project and
organization dynamics are typically more complex. The risk management approach selected by
an organization may vary on a continuum from top-down command to decentralized consensus
among peers. However, in all cases, organizations use a consistent approach that is applied to
risk management processes organization-wide from the organization level to the information
system level. Organizational officials identify and secure the needed resources to complete the
risk management tasks described in this publication and ensure that those resources are made
available to the appropriate personnel. Resource allocation includes funding to conduct risk
management tasks and assigning qualified personnel that are needed to accomplish the tasks.

Each step in the RMF has a purpose statement, a defined set of outcomes , and a set of tasks that
are carried out to achieve those outcomes. The outcomes can be achieved by different risk

FLEXIBILITY IN RMF IMPLEMENTATION

Organizations are expected to execute all steps and tasks in the RMF (apart from tasks labeled
as optional). However, organizations have significant flexibility in how each of the RMF steps
and tasks are carried out, as long as organizations are meeting all applicable requirements and
effectively managing security and privacy risk. The intent is to allow organizations to implement
the RMF in the most efficient, effective, and cost-effective manner to support mission and
business needs in a way that promotes effective security and privacy. Flexible implementation
may include executing tasks in a different (potentially nonsequential) order, emphasizing certain
tasks over other tasks, or combining certain tasks where appropriate. It can also include the use
of the Cybersecurity Framework to enhance RMF task execution.
Flexibility of implementation can also be applied to control selection , control tailoring to meet
organizational security and privacy needs, or conducting control assessments throughout the
SDLC. For example, the selection, tailoring, implementation, and assessments of controls can be
done incrementally as a system is being developed. The implementation of control tailoring
helps to ensure that security and privacy solutions are customized for the specific missions,
business functions, risks, and operating environments of the organization. In the end, the
flexibility inherent in RMF execution promotes effective security and privacy that helps to
protect the systems that organizations depend on for mission and business success and the
individuals whose information is processed by those systems.
Note: Since the RMF is an SDLC process that emphasizes ongoing authorization, organizations have the flexibility
to determine which RMF step to enter (or reenter) based on an assessment of risk and the tasks described in the
Prepare—System Level step. Determination of the appropriate RMF step requires an assessment of the current
state of the system, a review of the activities that have already been completed for the system, identification of
a proposed step and task entry into the RMF, a gap analysis to ensure that the risk is acceptable, documenting
decisions, notifying stakeholders, and approval from the Authorizing Official (or other relevant decision maker).

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management levels—that is, some of the outcomes are universal to the entire organization,
while others are system-focused or mission/business unit-focused. Figure 3 provides an example
of the purpose statement and outcomes for the RMF Prepare step—Organization-Level.

FIGURE 3: RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK TASK STRUCTURE

3.1 PREPARE

PREPARE TASKS—ORGANIZATION LEVEL
Table 1 provides a summary of tasks and expected outcomes for the RMF Prepare
step at the organization level. Applicable Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also
provided.
TABLE 1: PREPARE TASKS AND OUTCOMES—ORGANIZATION LEVEL

Tasks Outcomes
TASK P-1
RISK MANAGEMENT ROLES

Individuals are identified and assigned key roles for executing the Risk Management Framework. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.AM-6 ; ID.GV-2 ] TASK P-2 RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
A risk management strategy for the organization that includes a determination and expression of organizational risk tolerance is established. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.RM; ID.SC ] TASK P-3 RISK ASSESSMENT—ORGANIZATION
An organization-wide risk assessment is completed or an existing risk assessment is updated. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.RA; ID.SC-2 ] TASK P-4 ORGANIZATIONALLY-TAILORED CONTROL BASELINES AND CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK PROFILES (OPTIONAL)
Organizationally-tailored control baselines and/or Cybersecurity Framework Profiles are established and made available. [ Cybersecurity Framework : Profile ] TASK P-5 COMMON CONTROL IDENTIFICATION
Common controls that are available for inheritance by organizational systems are identified, documented, and published. TASK P-6 IMPACT-LEVEL PRIORITIZATION (OPTIONAL)
A prioritization of organizational systems with the same impact level is conducted. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.AM-5 ] TASK P-7 CONTINUOUS MONITORING STRATEGY— ORGANIZATION
An organization-wide strategy for monitoring control effectiveness is developed and implemented. [ C ybersecurity Framework : DE.CM; ID.SC-4 ]

Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

Purpose
The purpose of the Prepare step is to carry out essential activities at the organization,
mission and business process, and information system levels of the organization to
help prepare the organization to manage its security and privacy risks using the Risk
Management Framework.

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Each task contains a set of potential inputs needed to execute the task and a set of expected
outputs generated from task execution.^27 In addition, each task describes the risk management
roles and responsibilities associated with the task and the phase of the SDLC where task
execution occurs.^28 A discussion section provides information related to the task to facilitate
understanding and to promote effective task execution. Finally, completing the RMF task
description, there is a list of references to provide organizations with supplemental information
for each task. Where applicable, the references also identify systems security engineering tasks
that correlate with the RMF task.^29 Figure 4 illustrates the structure of a typical RMF task.

FIGURE 4: RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK TASK STRUCTURE

(^27) The potential inputs for a task may not always be derived from the expected outputs from the previous task. This can occur because the RMF steps are not always executed in sequential order, breaking the sequential dependencies. (^28) Appendix D provides a description of each of the roles and responsibilities identified in the tasks. (^29) [SP 800- 160 v1] describes life cycle-based systems security engineering processes.

RISK ASSESSMENT—ORGANIZATION

TASK P-3 Assess organization-wide security and privacy risk and update the risk assessment
results on an ongoing basis.
Potential Inputs: Risk management strategy; mission or business objectives; current threat
information; system-level security and privacy risk assessment results; supply chain risk
assessment results; previous organization-level security and privacy risk assessment results;
information sharing agreements or memoranda of understanding; security and privacy
information from continuous monitoring.
Expected Outputs: Organization-level risk assessment results.
Primary Responsibility: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive
(Function); Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.
Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Mission or Business Owner; Authorizing Official or
Authorizing Official Designated Representative.
Discussion: Risk assessment at the organizational level leverages aggregated information from
system-level risk assessment results, continuous monitoring, and any strategic risk considerations
relevant to the organization. The organization considers the totality of risk from the operation and
use of its information systems, from information exchange and connections with other internally
and externally owned systems, and from the use of external providers. For example, the
organization may review the risk related to its enterprise architecture and information systems of
varying impact levels residing on the same network and whether higher impact systems are
segregated from lower impact systems or systems operated and maintained by external providers.
The organization may also consider the variability of environments that may exist within the
organization (e.g., different locations serving different missions/business processes) and the need
to account for such variability in risk assessments. Risk assessments of the organization’s supply
chain may be conducted as well. Risk assessment results may be used to help organizations
establish a Cybersecurity Framework Profile.
References: [ SP 800- 30 ]; [SP 800- 39 ] (Organization Level, Mission/Business Process Level); [SP
800- 161 ]; [IR 8062].

Task
Abbreviation
Prepare Step
Task 3

Explanatory
information to
facilitate
understanding

Artifacts, results, or conditions
after task execution

NIST publication sources for additional information to support task execution

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2.3 INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN THE RMF

Executing the RMF requires close collaboration between information security programs and
privacy programs. While information security programs and privacy programs have different
objectives, those objectives are overlapping and complementary. Information security programs
are responsible for protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access,
use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction (i.e., unauthorized system activity or
behavior) in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Privacy programs are
responsible for ensuring compliance with applicable privacy requirements and for managing the
risks to individuals associated with the creation, collection, use, processing, dissemination,
storage, maintenance, disclosure, or disposal (collectively referred to as “processing”) of PII.^30
When preparing to execute the steps of the RMF, organizations consider how to best promote
and institutionalize collaboration between the two programs to ensure that the objectives of
both disciplines are met at every step of the process.

(^30) Privacy programs may also choose to consider the risks to individuals that may arise from their interactions with information systems, where the processing of PII may be less impactful than the effect the system has on individuals’ behavior or activities. Such effects would constitute risks to individual autonomy and organizations may need to take steps to manage those risks in addition to information security and privacy risks.

OMB CIRCULAR A-130: INTEGRATION OF INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY

In 2016, OMB revised Circular A-130, the circular establishing general policy for the planning,
budgeting, governance, acquisition, and management of federal information, personnel,
equipment, funds, information technology resources, and supporting infrastructure and
services. The circular addresses responsibilities for protecting federal information resources and
managing personally identifiable information (PII). In establishing requirements for information
security programs and privacy programs, the circular emphasizes the need for both programs to
collaborate on shared objectives:
While security and privacy are independent and separate disciplines, they are closely related,
and it is essential for agencies to take a coordinated approach to identifying and managing
security and privacy risks and complying with applicable requirements.
[OMB A-130] requires organizations to implement the RMF that is described in this guideline.
With the 2016 revision to the circular, OMB also requires organizations to integrate privacy into
the RMF process:
The RMF provides a disciplined and structured process that integrates information security,
privacy, and risk management activities into the SDLC. This Circular requires organizations to
use the RMF to manage privacy risks beyond those that are typically included under the
“confidentiality” objective of the term “information security.” While many privacy risks relate
to the unauthorized access or disclosure of PII, privacy risks may also result from other
activities, including the creation, collection, use, and retention of PII; the inadequate quality
or integrity of PII; and the lack of appropriate notice, transparency, or participation.
This section of the guideline describes the relationship between information security programs
and privacy programs under the RMF. However, subject to OMB policy, organizations retain the
flexibility to undertake the integration of privacy into the RMF in the most effective manner,
considering the organization’s mission and circumstances.

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When an information system processes PII, the organization’s information security program and
privacy program have a shared responsibility for managing the risks to individuals that may arise
from unauthorized system activity or behavior. This requires the two programs to collaborate
when selecting, implementing, assessing, and monitoring security controls.^31 However, while
information security programs and privacy programs have complementary objectives with
respect to managing the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PII, protecting individuals’
privacy cannot be achieved solely by securing PII.

Not all privacy risks arise from unauthorized system activity or behavior, such as unauthorized
access or disclosure of PII. Some privacy risks may result from authorized activity that is beyond
the scope of information security. For example, privacy programs are responsible for managing
the risks to individuals that may result from the creation, collection, use, and retention of PII;
the inadequate quality or integrity of PII; and the lack of appropriate notice, transparency, or
participation. Therefore, to help ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and to
manage privacy risks from authorized and unauthorized processing of PII, organizations’ privacy
programs also select, implement, assess, and monitor privacy controls.^32

[OMB A-130] defines a privacy control as an administrative, technical, or physical safeguard
employed within an agency to ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and to
manage privacy risks. A privacy control is different from a security control , which the Circular
defines as a safeguard or countermeasure prescribed for an information system or an
organization to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its
information. Due to the shared responsibility that organizations’ information security programs
and privacy programs have to manage the risks to individuals arising from unauthorized system
activity or behavior, controls that achieve both security and privacy objectives are both privacy
and security controls. This guideline refers to such controls that achieve both sets of objectives
simply as “controls.” When this guideline uses the descriptors “privacy” and “security” with the
term control , it is referring to those controls in circumstances where the controls are selected,
implemented, and assessed for particular objectives.

The risk management processes described in this publication are equally applicable to security
and privacy programs. However, the risks that security and privacy programs are required to
manage are overlapping in some areas, but not in others. Consequently, it is important that
organizations understand the interplay between privacy and security to promote effective
collaboration between privacy and security officials at every level of the organization.

(^31) For example, in Task C-2 of the Categorize step, privacy and security programs work together to consider potential adverse impacts to organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of PII in order to determine the impact level for the information system. The resulting impact level drives the selection of a security control baseline in Task S-1 of the Select step. (^32) Different controls may need to be selected to mitigate the privacy risks associated with authorized processing of PII. For example, there may be a risk that individuals would be embarrassed or stigmatized if certain information is disclosed about them. While encryption could prevent unauthorized disclosure of PII, it would not address any privacy risks related to disclosures to parties that are authorized to decrypt and access the PII. To mitigate this privacy risk, organizations would need to assess the risk of allowing authorized parties to decrypt the information and potentially select controls that would mitigate that risk. In such an example, an organization might select controls to enable individuals to understand the organization’s disclosure practices and exercise choices about this access or use differential privacy or privacy-enhancing cryptographic techniques to disassociate the information from an individual.

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2.4 SYSTEM AND SYSTEM ELEMENTS

This publication uses the statutory definition of information system for RMF execution. It is
important, however, to describe information systems in the context of the SDLC process and
how security and privacy capabilities are implemented within the components of those systems.
Therefore, organizations executing the RMF take a broad view of the life cycle of information
system development to provide a contextual relationship and linkage to architectural and
engineering concepts that allow security and privacy risks (including supply chain risks) to be
addressed throughout the life cycle and at the appropriate level of detail to help ensure that
such capabilities are achieved. [ISO 15288] provides an engineering view of an information
system and the entities with which the system interacts in its environment of operation.^33

Similar to how federal law defines information system as a discrete set of information resources
organized for the collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination, or disposition
of information. [ISO 15288] defines a system as a set of interacting elements that are organized
to achieve one or more stated purposes. Just as the information resources that comprise an
information system include information and other resources (e.g., personnel, equipment, funds,
and information technology), system elements include technology or machine elements, human
elements, and physical or environmental elements. Each of the system elements^34 within the
system fulfills specified requirements and may be implemented via hardware, software, or
firmware;^35 physical structures or devices; or people, processes, policies, and procedures.
Individual system elements or a combination of system elements may satisfy stated system
requirements. Interconnections between system elements allow those elements to interact as
necessary to produce a capability as specified by the system requirements. Finally, every system
operates within an environment that influences the system and its operation.

The authorization boundary defines the system^36 for RMF execution to facilitate risk
management and accountability. The system may be supported by one or more enabling
systems that provide support during the system life cycle. Enabling systems are not contained
within the authorization boundary of the system and do not necessarily exist in the system’s
environment of operation. An enabling system may provide common (i.e., inherited) controls for
the system or may include any type of service or functionality used by the system such as
identification and authentication services, network services, or monitoring functionality. Finally,
there are other systems the system interacts with in the operational environment. The other
systems are also outside of the authorization boundary and may be the beneficiaries of services
provided by the system or may simply have some general interaction.^37

(^33) [SP 800- 160 v1] addresses system security engineering as part of the SDLC. (^34) The terms system element and information resource are used interchangeably in this publication. Information resources as defined in 44 U.S.C. Sec. 3502 include information and related resources, such as personnel, equipment, funds, and information technology. By law, a system is composed of a discrete set of information resources. (^35) The term system component refers to a system element that is implemented via hardware, software, or firmware. (^36) Historically, NIST has used the terms authorization boundary and system boundary interchangeably. In the interest of clarity, accuracy, and use of standardized terminology, the term authorization boundary is now used exclusively to refer to the set of system elements comprising the system to be authorized for operation or authorized for use by an authorizing official (i.e., the scope of the authorization). Authorization boundary can also refer to the set of common controls to be authorized for inheritance purposes. (^37) Risk management and accountability for enabling systems and other systems are addressed within their respective authorization boundaries.

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Figure 5 illustrates the conceptual view of the system and the relationships among the system,
system elements, enabling systems, other systems, and the environment of operation.^38

FIGURE 5: CONCEPTUAL VIEW OF THE SYSTEM

Certain parts of the environment of operation may be included in the authorization boundary
(i.e., determined to be “in scope” for the authorization) while other parts may be excluded. For
example, if the facility (i.e., environment of operation) that provides protection for the system
elements is determined to be in scope for the authorization of the system, the physical and
environmental protection controls (e.g., physical access controls at entry points, perimeter
protection devices) are included in the authorization boundary and therefore, are included in
the system security plan. If the facility provides physical and environmental protections as
common controls to be inherited by the system, the environment of operation is out of scope
for the system and is not included in the authorization boundary for the system.^39

The system may also communicate or have other interactions with enabling systems and other
systems that are part of the extended environment of operation but are outside of the scope of
authorization for the system.^40 Organizations determine which parts of the environment of
operation are within the authorization boundary. These determinations are typically specific to
the system and are context-driven.

(^38) The terms system , system element , enabling system , other systems , and the environment of operation are agnostic with respect to information technology (IT) and operations technology (OT). (^39) Common controls are referenced in the security and privacy plans for the system inheriting the controls. (^40) For connections and information exchange between the system and the enabling or other systems outside of the authorization boundary, organizations consider the risks introduced by such connections and information exchange. ENVIRONMENT OF OPERATION Enabling System Enabling System Enabling System Enabling System System Element System Element System Element SYSTEM ( AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARY ) Other System Other System Other System

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2.5 AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARIES

The authorization boundary establishes the scope of protection for an information system (i.e.,
what the organization agrees to protect under its direct management or within the scope of its
responsibilities).^41 The authorization boundary includes the people, processes, and information
technologies (i.e., system elements) that are part of each system supporting the organization’s
missions and business functions. Authorization boundaries that are too expansive (i.e., include
too many system elements or components) make the risk management process unnecessarily
complex. Conversely, authorization boundaries that are too limited (i.e., include too few system
elements or components) increase the number of systems that must be separately managed
and therefore, may unnecessarily inflate the information security and privacy costs for the
organization.

The authorization boundary for a system is established during the RMF Prepare Task – System
level , Task P-11. Organizations have flexibility in determining what constitutes the authorization
boundary for a system. The set of system elements included within an authorization boundary
defines the system (i.e., the scope of the authorization). When a set of system elements is
identified as an authorization boundary for a system, the elements are generally under the same
direct management.^42 Other considerations for determining the authorization boundary include
identifying system elements that:

Support the same mission or business functions;
Have similar operating characteristics and security and privacy requirements;
Process, store, and transmit similar types of information (e.g., categorized at the same impact level);^43 or
Reside in the same environment of operation (or in the case of a distributed system, reside in various locations with similar operating environments).

The scope of the authorization boundary is revisited periodically as part of the continuous
monitoring process carried out by the organization. While the above considerations may be
useful to organizations in determining authorization boundaries for purposes of managing risk,
the considerations are not intended to limit the organization’s flexibility in establishing
authorization boundaries that promote effective security and privacy with the available
resources of the organization.

The process of establishing authorization boundaries carries significant risk management
implications and is therefore an organization-wide activity that requires coordination among key
participants. The process considers mission and business requirements, security and privacy

(^41) Information systems are discrete sets of information resources organized for the collection, processing, use, sharing, maintenance, dissemination, or disposition of information, whether such information is in digital or non- digital form. Information resources include information and related resources, such as personnel, equipment, funds, and information technology. Information systems may or may not include hardware, firmware, and software. (^42) For information systems, direct management control involves budgetary, programmatic, or operational authority and associated responsibility and accountability. Direct management control does not necessarily imply that there is no intervening management. (^43) If a system contains information at multiple impact levels, the system is categorized at the highest impact level. See [FIPS 199] and [FIPS 200].

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requirements, and the costs to the organization. Appendix G provides additional information
and considerations for determining authorization boundaries, including boundaries for complex
systems and software applications.

2.6 REQUIREMENTS AND CONTROLS

Before executing the RMF, it is important to understand the concept of security and privacy
requirements and the relationship between requirements and controls. The term requirements
can be used in different contexts. In the context of federal information security and privacy
policies, the term is generally used to refer to information security and privacy obligations
imposed on organizations. For example, OMB Circular A-130 imposes a series of information
security and privacy requirements with which federal agencies must comply when managing
information resources. In addition to the use of the term requirements in the context of federal
policy, the term requirements is used in this guideline in a broader sense to refer to an
expression of the set of stakeholder protection needs for a particular system or organization.
Stakeholder protection needs and corresponding security and privacy requirements may be
derived from many sources (e.g., laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies,
standards, mission and business needs, or risk assessments). The term requirements , as used in
this guideline, includes both legal and policy requirements, as well as an expression of the
broader set of stakeholder protection needs that may be derived from other sources. All of
these requirements, when applied to a system, help determine the required characteristics of
the system—encompassing security, privacy, and assurance.

Organizations may choose to divide security and privacy requirements into more granular
categories depending on where the requirements are employed in the SDLC and for what
purpose. Organizations may use the term capability requirement to describe a capability that
the system or organization must provide to satisfy a stakeholder protection need. In addition,
organizations may refer to system requirements that pertain to particular hardware, software,
and firmware components of a system as specification requirements —that is, capabilities that
implement all or part of a control and that may be assessed (i.e., as part of the verification,
validation, testing, and evaluation processes). Finally, organizations may use the term statement
of work requirements to refer to actions that must be performed operationally or during system
development.

Controls can be viewed as descriptions of the safeguards and protection capabilities appropriate
for achieving the particular security and privacy objectives of the organization and reflecting the

EFFECTIVE AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARIES

Establishing meaningful authorization boundaries for systems and common controls is one of
the most important risk management activities carried out by an organization. The authorization
boundary defines the specific scope of an authorizing official’s responsibility and accountability
for protecting information resources and individuals’ privacy—including the use of systems,
components, and services from external providers. Establishment of meaningful authorization
boundaries is a foundation for assuring mission and business success for the organization.

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protection needs of organizational stakeholders. Controls are selected and implemented by the
organization in order to satisfy the system requirements. Controls can include technical aspects,
administrative aspects, and physical aspects. In some cases, the selection and implementation of
a control may necessitate additional specification by the organization in the form of derived
requirements or instantiated control parameter values. The derived requirements and control
parameter values may be necessary to provide the appropriate level of implementation detail
for particular controls within the SDLC.

2.7 SECURITY AND PRIVACY POSTURE

The purpose of the RMF is to help ensure that, throughout the SDLC, information systems,
organizations, and individuals are adequately protected, and that authorizing officials have the
information needed to make credible, risk-based decisions regarding the operation or use of
systems or the provision of common controls. A key aspect of risk-based decision making for
authorizing officials is understanding the security and privacy posture of information systems
and the common controls that are available for inheritance by those systems. The security and
privacy posture represents the status of information systems and information resources (e.g.,
personnel, equipment, funds, and information technology) within an organization based on
information assurance resources (e.g., people, hardware, software, policies, procedures) and
the capabilities in place to manage the defense of the organization in its operation or use of
systems; comply with applicable privacy requirements and manage privacy risks; and react as
the situation changes.

The security and privacy posture of information systems and organizations is determined on an
ongoing basis by assessing and continuously monitoring system-specific, hybrid, and common
controls.^44 The control assessments and monitoring activities provide evidence that the controls
selected by the organization are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and satisfying
the security and privacy requirements in response to laws, executive orders, regulations,
directives, policies, standards, or mission and business requirements. Authorizing officials use
the security and privacy posture to determine if the risk to organizational operations and assets,

(^44) Monitoring of controls is part of an organization-wide risk management approach defined in [SP 800-39].

CONTEXT-DEPENDENT REQUIREMENTS

Security and privacy requirements and risks identified by the organization, lead to the need for
security and privacy controls to respond to the risk. The controls selected by the organization
subsequently lead to both specification requirements and statement of work requirements in
the systems engineering context. This is an important aspect of how systems engineers develop,
derive, and decompose requirements as part of the SDLC process. Thus, organizations manage
security and privacy requirements at various levels of granularity and specificity during the life
cycle of the system. Controls play an important part in the life cycle by providing high-level
statements of protection capability that can be refined and expanded upon by the organization.

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individuals, other organizations, or the Nation are acceptable based on the organization’s risk
management strategy and organizational risk tolerance.^45

2.8 SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT

Organizations are becoming increasingly reliant on products, systems, and services provided by
external providers to carry out missions and business functions. Organizations are responsible
and accountable for the risk incurred when using such component products, systems, and
services.^46 Relationships with external providers can be established in a variety of ways, for
example, through joint ventures, business partnerships, various types of formal agreements
(e.g., contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements),
or outsourcing arrangements.

The growing dependence on products, systems, and services from external providers, along with
the nature of the relationships with those providers, present an increasing amount of risk to an
organization. Risk may increase based on the likelihood of occurrence and adverse impact from
threat events such as the insertion of counterfeits, unauthorized production, tampering, theft,
insertion of malicious software and hardware, as well as poor manufacturing and development
practices in the supply chain, including the failure to build in security or privacy capabilities that
enable an organization to better manage risk in its environment.

Supply chain risks can be endemic or systemic within a system element, system, organization,
sector, or nation. While the singular use of a system element or service within a system may
present an acceptable risk to an organization, its common or extended use throughout a system,
organization, sector or nation can raise the risk to an unacceptable level. These risks are often
associated with the global and distributed nature of product and service supply chains and an
organization’s decreased visibility into, and understanding of, how the technology that they
acquire is developed, integrated, and deployed. This includes the processes, procedures, and
practices used to assure the integrity, security, resilience, privacy capabilities, and quality of the
acquired products, systems, and services.

To address supply chain risks, organizations develop an SCRM policy, which is an important
vehicle for directing SCRM activities. Guided and informed by applicable laws, executive orders,
directives, policies, and regulations, the SCRM policy supports applicable organizational policies
(e.g., acquisition and procurement, information security and privacy, logistics, quality, and
supply chain). The policy addresses the goals and objectives in the organization’s strategic plan,
missions and business functions, and the internal and external customer requirements. It also
defines the integration points for SCRM with the risk management and the SDLC processes for
the organization. Finally, the SCRM policy defines the SCRM roles and responsibilities within the
organization, any dependencies among those roles, and the interaction among the roles. SCRM
roles specify the responsibilities for procurement, conducting risk assessments, collecting supply
chain threat intelligence, identifying and implementing risk-based mitigations, and performing
monitoring functions.

(^45) See RMF Prepare-Organization Level step, Task P-2. (^46) [OMB A-130] defines supply chain risk and requires federal agencies to consider supply chain security issues for all resource planning and management activities throughout the SDLC so that risks are appropriately managed.

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[FISMA] and [OMB A-130] require external providers handling federal information or operating
systems on behalf of the federal government to meet the same security and privacy
requirements as federal agencies. Security and privacy requirements for external providers
including the controls for systems processing, storing, or transmitting federal information are
expressed in contracts or other formal agreements. The RMF can be effectively used to manage
supply chain risk.^47 The conceptual view of the system in Figure 5 can guide and inform security,
privacy, and risk management activities for all elements of the supply chain. Every step in the
RMF can be executed by nonfederal external providers except for the Authorize step—that is,
the acceptance of risk is an inherent federal responsibility for which senior executives are held
responsible and accountable. The authorization decision is directly linked to the management of
risk related to the acquisition and use of component products, systems, and services from
external providers.^48 [OMB A-130] also requires organizations to develop and implement SCRM
plans.^49

Managing supply chain risk is a complex, multifaceted undertaking requiring a coordinated
effort across an organization—building trust relationships and communicating with both internal
and external stakeholders. SCRM activities involve identifying and assessing applicable risks,
determining appropriate mitigating actions, developing appropriate SCRM plans to document
selected mitigating actions, and monitoring performance against SCRM plans. Because supply
chains differ across and within organizations, SCRM plans are tailored to the individual program,
organizational, and operational contexts. Tailored plans provide the basis for determining
whether a system is “fit for purpose” and as such, the controls need to be tailored accordingly.
Tailored SCRM plans help organizations to focus their resources on the most critical missions
and business functions based on mission and business requirements and their risk environment.

The determination that the risk from acquiring products, systems, or services from external
providers is acceptable depends on the level of assurance^50 that the organization can gain from
the providers. The level of assurance is based on the degree of control the organization can
exert on the external provider regarding the controls needed for the protection of the product,
system, or service and the evidence brought forth by the provider as to the effectiveness of
those controls.

The degree of control is established by the specific terms and conditions of the contract or
service-level agreement. Some organizations have extensive control through contract vehicles or
other agreements that specify the security and privacy requirements for the external provider.
Other organizations, in contrast, have limited control because they are purchasing commodity

(^47) Supply chain risk means risks that arise from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information or information systems and reflect the potential adverse impacts to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation [OMB A-130]. When system elements process PII, SCRM practices address both information security and privacy risk. (^48) While authorization (i.e., the acceptance of risk) of federal information systems is an inherent federal responsibility, it is a foundational concept that can be used by senior executives in nonfederal organizations at all levels in the supply chain to manage security and privacy risk. (^49) [SP 800- 161 ] provides guidance on SCRM plans. (^50) The level of assurance provided by an external provider can vary, ranging from those who provide high assurance (e.g., business partners in a joint venture that share a common business model and goals) to those who provide less assurance and represent greater sources of risk (e.g., business partners in one endeavor who are also competitors in another market sector).

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services or commercial off-the-shelf products. The level of assurance can also be based on many
other factors that convince the organization that the requisite controls have been implemented
and that a credible determination of control effectiveness exists. For example, an authorized
external cloud service provided to an organization through a well-established line-of -business
relationship may provide a level of trust in the service that is within the risk tolerance of the
organization. Ultimately, the responsibility for responding to risks from the use of component
products, systems, and services from external providers remains with the organization and the
authorizing official. Organizations require that an appropriate chain of trust be established with
external providers when dealing with the issues associated with system security or privacy risks.

(^) SUPPLY CHAIN RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES AND PLANS (^) Organizations have flexibility on how the details of SCRM strategies and plans are documented. SCRM strategy details for Levels 1 and 2 (organization and mission/business process levels), can be documented in the information security program plan for the organization or in a separate organization-level and/or mission/business process-level SCRM strategy. SCRM plan details for Level 3 (information system level) can be documented in the information system security plan or in a separate system-level SCRM plan. An SCRM strategy template is provided in [SP 800-161].

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CHAPTER THREE

THE PROCESS
EXECUTING THE RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK TASKS

his chapter describes the steps and associated tasks that comprise the RMF and the
selected individuals or groups (defined organizational roles) that carry out such tasks.^51
Organizations align their risk management roles with complementary or similar roles
defined for the SDLC whenever possible, and consistent with missions and business functions.
RMF tasks are executed concurrently with, or as part of, the SDLC processes in the organization.
Executing RMF tasks concurrently with SDLC processes helps to ensure that organizations are
effectively integrating the process of managing information security and privacy risks into SDLC
processes. Moreover, the expected outputs required by the RMF (e.g., security and privacy
plans, assessment reports, plans of action and milestones), can be routinely obtained from the
SDLC processes in place within organizations and may not need to be developed solely for RMF
implementation.

The process of implementing RMF tasks may vary from organization to organization. While the
tasks appear in sequential order, there can be many points in the risk management process that
require divergence from the sequential order, including the need for iterative cycles between
initial task execution and revisiting tasks. For example, control assessment results can trigger a
set of remediation actions by system owners and common control providers, which can in turn
require the reassessment of selected controls. Monitoring controls can generate a cycle of
tracking changes to the system and its environment of operation; assessing the information
security and privacy impact; reassessing controls, taking remediation actions, and reporting the
security and privacy posture of the system and the organization.

There may be other opportunities to diverge from the sequential nature of the tasks when it is
more effective, efficient, or cost-effective to do so. For example, while the control assessment
tasks are listed after the control implementation tasks, organizations may begin the assessment
of controls as soon as they are implemented but prior to the complete implementation of all

(^51) Appendix D describes the roles and responsibilities of key participants involved in organizational risk management and the execution of the RMF. Many risk management roles defined in this publication have counterpart roles defined in the SDLC process.

T

RMF ALIGNMENT WITH THE SDLC

The best RMF implementation is one that is indistinguishable from the routine SDLC processes
carried out by organizations. That is, RMF tasks are closely aligned with the ongoing activities in
the SDLC processes, ensuring the seamless integration of security and privacy protections into
organizational systems—and taking maximum advantage of the artifacts generated by the SDLC
processes to produce the necessary evidence in authorization packages to facilitate credible,
risk-based decision making by senior leaders in organizations.

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controls described in the system security plans and privacy plans. Assessing controls as soon as
they are implemented may result in organizations assessing the physical and environmental
protection controls within a facility prior to assessing the controls implemented in the hardware,
firmware, or software components of the system (which may be implemented later). Regardless
of the task ordering, the final action before a system is placed into operation is the explicit
acceptance of risk by the authorizing official.

The RMF steps and associated tasks can be applied to new development systems and existing
systems at appropriate phases in the SDLC. For new and existing systems, organizations ensure
that the designated tasks have been completed to prepare for the execution of the RMF. For
existing systems, organizations confirm that the security categorization and (for information
systems processing PII) a privacy risk assessment have been completed and are appropriate; and
that the needed controls have been selected, tailored, and implemented.

Applying the RMF steps and associated tasks to existing systems can serve as a gap analysis to
determine if the organization’s security and privacy risks have been effectively managed.
Deficiencies in controls can be addressed in the RMF steps for implementation, assessment,
authorization, and monitoring in the same manner as in new development systems. If no
deficiencies are discovered during the gap analysis and there is a current authorization in effect,
the organization can move directly to the continuous monitoring step in the RMF. If a current
authorization is not in effect, the organization continues in the usual sequence with the
assessment, authorization, and monitoring steps.

TASK DELEGATION

The roles specified in the Primary Responsibility section for each RMF task are responsible for
ensuring that the task is completed. The roles with primary responsibility may complete a task
or may delegate completion of a task to one or more supporting roles except where delegation
is specifically prohibited or disallowed in the task Discussion section or Appendix D. If completion
of a task is delegated, the role with primary responsibility for that task remains accountable for
task completion.

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TIPS FOR STREAMLINING RMF IMPLEMENTATION

Use the tasks and outputs of the Organization-Level and System-Level Prepare Step to promote a consistent starting point within organizations to execute the RMF.
Maximize the use of common controls to promote standardized, consistent, and cost- effective security and privacy capability inheritance.
Maximize the use of shared or cloud-based systems, services, and applications where applicable, to reduce the number of organizational authorizations.
Employ organizationally-tailored control baselines to increase the speed of security and privacy plan development, promote consistency of security and privacy plan content, and address organization-wide threats.
Employ organization-defined controls based on security and privacy requirements generated from a systems security engineering process.
Maximize the use of automated tools to manage security categorization; control selection, assessment, and monitoring; and the authorization process.
Decrease the level of effort and resource expenditures for low-impact systems if those systems cannot adversely affect higher-impact systems through system connections.
Maximize the reuse of RMF artifacts (e.g., security and privacy assessment results) for standardized hardware/software deployments, including configuration settings.
Reduce the complexity of the IT/OT infrastructure by eliminating unnecessary systems, system elements, and services — employ least functionality principle.
Make the transition to ongoing authorization and use continuous monitoring approaches to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of security and privacy programs.

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DEVELOPING WELL-DEFINED SECURITY AND PRIVACY REQUIREMENTS

The RMF is an SDLC-based process that can be effectively used to help ensure that security and
privacy requirements are satisfied for information systems or organizations. Defining clear,
consistent, and unambiguous security and privacy requirements is an important element in the
successful execution of the RMF. The requirements are defined early in the SDLC in collaboration
with the senior leaders and are integrated into the acquisition and procurement processes. For
example, organizations can use the [SP 800-160 v1] life cycle-based systems engineering process
to define an initial set of security and privacy requirements, which in turn, can be used to select
a set of controls* to satisfy the requirements. The requirements or the controls can be stated in
the Request for Proposal or other contractual agreement when organizations acquire systems,
system components, or services. Requirements can also be added throughout the life cycle, such
as with the agile development methodology where new features are continuously deployed.
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework [NIST CSF] (i.e., Core, Profiles) can also be used to identify,
align, and deconflict security requirements and to subsequently inform the selection of security
controls for an organization. Cybersecurity Framework Profiles can provide a link between
cybersecurity activities and organizational mission/business objectives, which supports risk-
based decision-making throughout the RMF. While Profiles may be used as a starting point to
inform control selection and tailoring activities, further evaluation is needed to ensure the
appropriate controls are selected. Some organizations may choose to use the Cybersecurity
Framework in concert with the NIST Systems Security Engineering publications—identifying,
aligning, and deconflicting requirements across a sector, an industry, or an organization—and
subsequently employing a systems engineering approach to further refine the requirements and
obtain trustworthy secure solutions to help protect the organization’s operations, assets,
individuals.
* See Section 2.3 for specific guidance on privacy control selection and managing privacy risk.

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ORGANIZATION AND SYSTEM PREPARATION

Preparation can achieve effective, efficient, and cost-effective execution of risk management
processes. The primary objectives of the Prepare step include:

Facilitate better communication between senior leaders and executives in the C-suite and system owners and operators—
- aligning organizational priorities with resource allocation and prioritization at the system level; and
- conveying acceptable limits regarding the selection and implementation of controls within the established organizational risk tolerance.
Promote organization-wide identification of common controls and the development of organizationally-tailored control baselines, to reduce the workload on individual system owners and the cost of system development and protection.
Reduce the complexity of the IT infrastructure by consolidating, standardizing, and optimizing systems, applications, and services through the application of enterprise architecture concepts and models.
Identify, prioritize, and focus resources on high value assets (as defined in [OMB M-19- 03 ]), that require increased levels of protection.
Facilitate system readiness for system-specific tasks. These objectives, if achieved, significantly reduce the information technology footprint and the attack surface of organizations, promote IT modernization objectives, and prioritize security and privacy activities to focus protection strategies on the most critical assets and systems. Finally, certain tasks in the Prepare step at the organization level are designated as optional. These tasks are included to provide organizations additional options to help make their RMF implementations more effective, efficient, and cost-effective.

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3.1 PREPARE^^52

PREPARE TASKS—ORGANIZATION LEVEL^^53

Table 1 provides a summary of tasks and expected outcomes for the RMF Prepare step at the
organization level. Applicable Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also provided.

TABLE 1: PREPARE TASKS AND OUTCOMES—ORGANIZATION LEVEL

Tasks Outcomes
TASK P-1
RISK MANAGEMENT ROLES

Individuals are identified and assigned key roles for executing the Risk Management Framework. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.AM-6 ; ID.GV-2 ] TASK P-2 RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY
A risk management strategy for the organization that includes a determination and expression of organizational risk tolerance is established. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.RM; ID.SC ] TASK P-3 RISK ASSESSMENT—ORGANIZATION
An organization-wide risk assessment is completed or an existing risk assessment is updated. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.RA; ID.SC-2 ] TASK P-4 ORGANIZATIONALLY-TAILORED CONTROL BASELINES AND CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK PROFILES (OPTIONAL)
Organizationally-tailored control baselines and/or Cybersecurity Framework Profiles are established and made available. [ Cybersecurity Framework : Profile ]

TASK P-5
COMMON CONTROL IDENTIFICATION

Common controls that are available for inheritance by organizational systems are identified, documented, and published. TASK P-6 IMPACT-LEVEL PRIORITIZATION (OPTIONAL)
A prioritization of organizational systems with the same impact level is conducted. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.AM-5 ] TASK P-7 CONTINUOUS MONITORING STRATEGY— ORGANIZATION
An organization-wide strategy for monitoring control effectiveness is developed and implemented. [ Cybersecurity Framework : DE.CM; ID.SC-4 ]

Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

(^52) The Prepare step is intended to leverage activities already being conducted within security, privacy, and supply chain programs to emphasize the importance of having organization-wide governance and the appropriate resources in place to enable the execution of cost-effective and consistent risk management processes across the organization. (^53) For ease of use, the preparatory activities are grouped into organization-level preparation and information system- level preparation. Purpose The purpose of the Prepare step is to carry out essential activities at the organization, mission and business process, and information system levels of the organization to help prepare the organization to manage its security and privacy risks using the Risk Management Framework.

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RISK MANAGEMENT ROLES

TASK P-1 Identify and assign individuals to specific roles associated with security and privacy risk
management.
Potential Inputs: Organizational security and privacy policies and procedures; organizational charts.
Expected Outputs: Documented Risk Management Framework role assignments.
Primary Responsibility: Head of Agency; Chief Information Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.
Supporting Roles: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Senior
Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Senior Agency Information
Security Officer.
Discussion: The roles and responsibilities of key participants in risk management processes are described
in Appendix D. The roles and responsibilities may include personnel that are internal or external to the
organization, as appropriate. Since organizations have different missions, functions, and organizational
structures, there may be differences in naming conventions for risk management roles and how specific
responsibilities are allocated among organizational personnel (e.g., multiple individuals filling a single role
or one individual filling multiple roles). In either situation, the basic risk management functions remain
the same. Organizations ensure that there are no conflicts of interest when assigning the same individual
to multiple risk management roles. For example, authorizing officials cannot occupy the role of system
owner or common control provider for systems or common controls they are authorizing. In addition,
combining multiple roles for security and privacy requires care because the two disciplines may require
different expertise, and in some circumstances, the priorities may be competing. Some roles may be
allocated to a group or an office rather than to an individual, for example, control assessor, risk executive
(function), or system administrator.
References: [ SP 800- 160 v1] (Human Resource Management Process); [SP 800-181]; [NIST CSF] (Core
[Identify Function]).

RISK MANAGEMENT STRATEGY

TASK P-2 Establish a risk management strategy for the organization that includes a determination of risk
tolerance.
Potential Inputs: Organizational mission statement; organizational policies; organizational risk
assumptions, constraints, priorities and trade-offs.
Expected Outputs: Risk management strategy and statement of risk tolerance inclusive of information
security and privacy risk.
Primary Responsibility: Head of Agency.
Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Chief
Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.
Discussion: Risk tolerance is the degree of risk or uncertainty that is acceptable to an organization. Risk
tolerance affects all parts of the organization’s risk management process, having a direct impact on the
risk management decisions made by senior leaders or executives throughout the organization and
providing important constraints on those decisions. The risk management strategy guides and informs
risk-based decisions including how security and privacy risk is framed, assessed, responded to, and
monitored. The risk management strategy may be composed of a single document, or separate security
and privacy risk management documents.^54 The risk management strategy makes explicit the threats,
assumptions, constraints, priorities, trade-offs, and risk tolerance used for making investment and

(^54) A separate supply chain risk management strategy document is called a supply chain risk management plan.

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operational decisions. This strategy includes the strategic-level decisions and considerations for how
senior leaders and executives are to manage security and privacy risks (including supply chain risks) to
organizational operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. The ri sk
management strategy includes an expression of organizational risk tolerance; acceptable risk assessment
methodologies and risk response strategies; a process for consistently evaluating security and privacy
risks organization-wide; and approaches for monitoring risk over time. As organizations define and
implement the risk management strategies, policies, procedures, and processes, it is important that they
include SCRM considerations. The risk management strategy for security and privacy connects security
and privacy programs with the management control systems established in the organization’s Enterprise
Risk Management strategy.^55
References: [ SP 800- 30 ]; [SP 800- 39 ] (Organization Level); [SP 800-160 v1] (Risk Management, Decision
Management, Quality Assurance, Quality Management, Project Assessment and Control Processes); [SP
800- 161 ]; [IR 8062]; [IR 8179] (Criticality Analysis Process B); [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]).

RISK ASSESSMENT—ORGANIZATION

TASK P-3 Assess organization-wide security and privacy risk and update the risk assessment results on an
ongoing basis.
Potential Inputs: Risk management strategy; mission or business objectives; current threat information;
system-level security and privacy risk assessment results; supply chain risk assessment results; previous
organization-level security and privacy risk assessment results; information sharing agreements or
memoranda of understanding; security and privacy information from continuous monitoring.
Expected Outputs: Organization-level risk assessment results.
Primary Responsibility: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function);
Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.
Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Mission or Business Owner; Authorizing Official or
Authorizing Official Designated Representative.
Discussion: Risk assessment at the organizational level leverages aggregated information from system-
le vel risk assessment results, continuous monitoring, and any strategic risk considerations relevant to the
organization. The organization considers the totality of risk from the operation and use of its information
systems, from information exchange and connections with other internally and externally owned systems,
and from the use of external providers. For example, the organization may review the risk related to its
enterprise architecture and information systems of varying impact levels residing on the same network
and whether higher impact systems are segregated from lower impact systems or systems operated and
maintained by external providers. The organization may also consider the variability of environments that
may exist within the organization (e.g., different locations serving different missions/business processes)
and the need to account for such variability in risk assessments. Risk assessments of the organization’s
supply chain may be conducted as well. Risk assessment results may be used to help organizations
establish a Cybersecurity Framework Profile.
References: [ SP 800- 30 ]; [SP 800- 39 ] (Organization Level, Mission/Business Process Level); [SP 800-161];
[IR 8062].

(^55) See [OMB A-123].

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ORGANIZATIONALLY-TAILORED CONTROL BASELINES AND CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK

PROFILES (Optional)
TASK P-4 Establish, document, and publish organizationally-tailored control baselines and/or
Cybersecurity Framework Profiles.
Potential Inputs: Documented security and privacy requirements directing the use of organizationally-
tailored control baselines; mission or business objectives; enterprise architecture; security architecture;
privacy architecture; organization- and system-level risk assessment results; list of common control
providers and common controls available for inheritance; NIST Special Publication 800- 53 B control
baselines.^56
Expected Outputs: List of approved or directed organizationally-tailored control baselines; [NIST CSF]
Profiles.
Primary Responsibility: Mission or Business Owner; Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or
Risk Executive (Function).
Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated
Representative; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.
Discussion: To address the organizational mission or business need for specialized sets of controls to
reduce risk, organizationally-tailored control baselines may be developed for organization-wide use.^57 An
organizationally-tailored baseline provides a fully specified set of controls, control enhancements, and
supplemental guidance derived from established control baselines described in [SP 800 -53B]. The tailoring
process can also be guided and informed by the requirements engineering process described in [SP 800-
160 v1]. Organizations can use the tailored control baseline concept when there is divergence from the
specific assumptions used to create the initial control baselines in [SP 800-53B]. This would include, for
example, situations when the organization has specific security or privacy risks, has specific mission or
business needs, or plans to operate in environments that are not addressed in the initial baselines.
Organizationally-tailored baselines and overlays complement the NIST control baselines by providing an
opportunity to add or eliminate controls to accommodate organizational requirements while continuing
to protect information commensurate with risk. Organizations can use tailored baselines and overlays to
customize control baselines by describing control applicability and by providing interpretations for specific
technologies; types of missions or business functions, operations, systems, environments of operation,
and operating modes; and statutory or regulatory requirements. Multiple customized baselines may be
useful for organizations with heterogeneous systems (e.g., organizations that maintain systems with
different operating or processing characteristics, or mission or business characteristics).
Organizationally-tailored baselines can establish organization-defined control parameter values for
assignment or selection statements in controls and control enhancements that are agreeable to specific
communities of interest and can also extend the supplemental guidance where necessary. Tailored
baselines may be more stringent or less stringent than the baselines identified in [SP 800 -53B] and are
applied to multiple systems.
Tailored baselines developed outside the organization may also be mandated for use by certain laws,
executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, or standards. In some situations, tailoring actions may

(^56) NIST Special Publication 800-53 (Revision 5), separates the control catalog from the control baselines that have been included historically in that publication. A new companion publication, NIST Special Publication 800-53B, Control Baselines and Tailoring Guidance for Federal Information Systems and Organizations defines the recommended baselines. NIST Special Publication 800-53B is referenced throughout the RMF in the relevant tasks. (^57) Tailored control baselines may also be referred to as overlays. An organizationally-tailored control baseline is analogous to an organization-wide overlay since an overlay is a tailored baseline that services a community of interest, in this case, the organization.

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be restricted or limited by the developer of the tailored baseline or by the issuing authority for the
tailored baseline. Tailored baselines (or overlays) have been developed by communities of interest for
cloud and shared systems, services, and applications; industrial control systems; privacy; national security
systems; weapons and space-based systems; high value assets;^58 mobile device management; federal
public key infrastructure; and privacy risks.
Organizations may also benefit from developing one or more Cybersecurity Framework Profiles. A
Cybersecurity Framework Profile uses the Subcategories in the Framework Core to align cybersecurity
outcomes with mission or business requirements, risk tolerance, and resources of the organization.^59 The
prioritized list of cybersecurity outcomes developed at the organization and mission/business process
levels can be helpful in facilitating consistent, risk-based decisions at the system level. The Subcategories
identified in the applicable Cybersecurity Framework Profiles can also be used to guide and inform the
development of the tailored control baselines described above.
References: [ SP 800- 53 ]; [SP 800-53B]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Business or Mission Analysis and Stakeholder
Needs and Requirements Definition Processes ); [NIST CSF] (Core, Profiles).

COMMON CONTROL IDENTIFICATION

TASK P-5 Identify, document, and publish organization-wide common controls that are available for
inheritance by organizational systems.
Potential Inputs: Documented security and privacy requirements; existing common control providers and
associated security and privacy plans; information security and privacy program plans; organization- and
system-level security and privacy risk assessment results.
Expected Outputs: List of common control providers and common controls available for inheritance;
security and privacy plans (or equivalent documents) providing a description of the common control
implementation (including inputs, expected behavior, and expected outputs).
Primary Responsibility: Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.
Supporting Roles: Mission or Business Owner; Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk
Executive (Function); Chief Information Officer; Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated
Representative; Common Control Provider; System Owner.
Discussion: Common controls are controls that can be inherited by one or more information systems.^60
Common controls can include controls from any [SP 800-53] control family, for example, physical and
environmental protection controls, system boundary and monitoring controls, personnel security
controls, policies and procedures, acquisition controls, account and identity management controls, audit
log and accountability controls, or complaint management controls for receiving privacy inquiries from
the public. Organizations identify and select the set of common controls and allocate those controls to the
organizational entities designated as common control providers. Common controls may differ based upon
a variety of factors, such as hosting location, system architecture, and the structure of the organization.
The organization-wide list of common controls takes these factors into account. Common controls can
also be identified at different levels of the organization (e.g., corporate, department, or agency level;
bureau or subcomponent level; or individual program level). Organizations may establish one or more lists
of common controls that can be inherited by information systems. A requirement may not be fully met by
a common control. In such cases, the control is considered a hybrid control and is noted as such by the
organization, including specifying which parts of the control requirement are provided for inheritance by
the common control and which parts are to be provided at the system level.

(^58) See [OMB M-19- 03 ]. (^59) See [NIST CSF], Section 2.3. (^60) Common controls are authorized by designated authorizing officials before the controls are made available for inheritance by organizational systems. See Appendix F for a description of the different types of authorizations.

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When there are multiple sources of common controls, organizations specify the common control provider
(i.e., who is providing the controls and through what venue, for example, shared services, specific
systems, or within a specific type of architecture) and which systems or types of systems can inherit the
controls. Common control listings are communicated to system owners, so they are aware of the security
and privacy capabilities that are available from the organization through inheritance. System owners are
not required to assess common controls that are inherited by their systems or document common control
implementation details; that is the responsibility of the common control providers. Likewise, common
control providers are not required to have visibility into the system-level details of those systems that are
inheriting the common controls they are providing.
Risk assessment results can be used when identifying common controls to determine if the controls
available for inheritance satisfy the security and privacy requirements for organizational systems and the
environments in which those systems operate (including the identification of potential single points of
failure). When the common controls provided by the organization are determined to be insufficient for
the information systems inheriting those controls, system owners can supplement the common controls
with system-specific or hybrid controls to achieve the required protection for their systems or accept
greater risk with the acknowledgement and approval of the organization.
Common control providers execute the RMF steps to implement, assess, and monitor the controls
designated as common controls. Common control providers may also be system owners when the
common controls are resident within an information system. Organizations select senior officials or
executives to serve as authorizing officials for common controls. The senior agency official for privacy is
responsible for designating common privacy controls and for documenting them in the organization’s
privacy program plan. Authorizing officials are responsible for accepting security and privacy risk resulting
from the use of common controls inherited by organizational systems.
Common control providers are responsible for documenting common controls in security and privacy
plans (or equivalent documents prescribed by the organization); ensuring that the common controls are
implemented and assessed for effectiveness by qualified assessors and that assessment findings are
documented in assessment reports; producing a plan of action and milestones for common controls
determined to have unacceptable deficiencies and targeted for remediation; receiving authorization for
the common controls from the designated authorizing official; and monitoring control effectiveness on an
ongoing basis. Plans, assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones for common controls (or a
summary of such information) are made available to system owners and can be used by authorizing
officials to guide and inform authorization decisions for systems inheriting common controls. For
information about the authorization of common controls, see Task R-4 and Appendix F.
References: [ SP 800- 53 ].

IMPACT-LEVEL PRIORITIZATION (Optional)^61
TASK P-6 Prioritize organizational systems with the same impact level.
Potential Inputs: Security categorization information for organizational systems; system descriptions;
organization- and system-level risk assessment results; mission or business objectives; Cybersecurity
Framework Profiles.
Expected Outputs: Organizational systems prioritized into low-, moderate-, and high-impact sub-
categories.
Primary Responsibility: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function).

(^61) Organizations can use this task in conjunction with the optional RMF Prepare-Organization Level step, Task P4, to develop organizationally-tailored baselines for the more granular impact designations, for example, organizationally- tailored baselines for low-moderate systems and high-moderate systems.

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Supporting Roles: Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; Mission
or Business Owner; System Owner; Chief Information Officer; Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official
Designated Representative.
Discussion: This task is carried out only after organizational systems have been categorized (see Task C1).
This task requires organizations to first apply the high-water mark concept to each of their information
systems categorized in accordance with [FIPS 199] and [FIPS 200].^62 The application of the high-water
mark concept results in systems designated as low impact, moderate impact, or high impact.
Organizations desiring additional granularity in their impact designations for risk-based decision making
can use this task to prioritize their systems within each impact level.^63 For example, an organization may
decide to prioritize its moderate-impact systems by assigning each moderate system to one of three new
subcategories: low-moderate systems, moderate-moderate systems, and high-moderate systems. The
high-moderate systems assume a higher priority than the moderate-moderate systems and low-moderate
systems assume a lower priority than the moderate-moderate systems. The prioritization of its moderate
systems gives organizations an opportunity to make more informed decisions regarding control selection
and the tailoring of control baselines when responding to identified risks.
Impact-level prioritization can also be used to determine those systems that are critical or essential to
organizational missions and business operations and therefore, organizations can focus on the factors of
complexity, aggregation, and system interconnections. Such systems can be identified, for example, by
prioritizing high-impact systems into low-high systems, moderate-high systems, and high-high systems.
Impact-level prioritizations can be conducted at any level of the organization and are based on security
categorization data reported by individual system owners. Impact-level prioritization may necessitate the
development of organizationally-tailored baselines to designate the appropriate set of controls for the
additional, more granular impact levels.
Cybersecurity Framework Profiles can be used by organizations to support the impact-level prioritization
task. The mission and business objectives and prioritized outcomes defined in applicable Cybersecurity
Framework Profiles can help distinguish relative priority between systems with the same impact level.
Cybersecurity Framework Profiles can be organized around the priority of mission/business objectives of
an organization, and those objectives are assigned a relative priority among them. For example, human
and environmental safety objectives may be the two most important objectives relevant to a Profile's
context. In this example, when performing Task P-6, a system that relates to a human safety objective
may be prioritized higher than a system that has the same impact levels but does not relate to the human
safety objective.
References: [ FIPS 199]; [FIPS 200]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-39] (Organization and System Levels); [SP 800-
59 ]; [SP 800-60 v1]; [SP 800-60 v2]; [SP 800-160 v1] (System Requirements Definition Process); [IR 8179]
(Criticality Analysis Process B); [CNSSI 1253]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]; Profiles).

CONTINUOUS MONITORING STRATEGY—ORGANIZATION

TASK P-7 Develop and implement an organization-wide strategy for continuously monitoring control
effectiveness.
Potential Inputs: Risk management strategy; organization- and system-level risk assessment results;
organizational security and privacy policies.
Expected Outputs: An implemented organizational continuous monitoring strategy.
Primary Responsibility: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function).

(^62) Organizations operating National Security Systems follow the categorization guidance in [CNSSI 1253] which does not apply the high-water mark concept. (^63) Organizations can also elect to use an alternative, organization-defined categorization approach to add additional granularity to the impact levels defined in [FIPS 199].

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Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency
Official for Privacy; Mission or Business Owner; System Owner; Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official
Designated Representative.
Discussion: An important aspect of risk management is the ability to monitor the security and privacy
posture across the organization and the effectiveness of controls implemented within or inherited by
organizational systems on an ongoing basis.^64 An effective organization-wide continuous monitoring
strategy is essential to efficiently and cost-effectively carry out such monitoring. Continuous monitoring
strategies can also include supply chain risk considerations, for example, regularly reviewing supplier
foreign ownership, control, or influence (FOCI), monitoring inventory forecasts, or requiring on-going
audits of suppliers. The implementation of a robust and comprehensive continuous monitoring program
helps an organization understand the security and privacy posture of its information systems. It also
facilitates ongoing authorization after the initial system or common control authorizations. This includes
the potential for changing missions or business functions, stakeholders, technologies, vulnerabilities,
threats, risks, and suppliers of systems, components, or services.
The organizational continuous monitoring strategy addresses monitoring requirements at the
organization, mission/business process, and information system levels. The continuous monitoring
strategy identifies the minimum monitoring frequency for implemented controls across the organization;
defines the ongoing control assessment approach; and describes how ongoing assessments are to be
conducted (e.g., addressing the use and management of automated tools, and instructions for ongoing
assessment of controls for which monitoring cannot be automated). The continuous monitoring strategy
may also define security and privacy reporting requirements including recipients of the reports. The
criteria for determining the minimum frequency for control monitoring is established in collaboration with
organizational officials (e.g., senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive [function)];
senior agency information security officer; senior agency official for privacy; chief information officer;
system owners; common control providers; and authorizing officials or their designated representatives).
An organizational risk assessment can be used to guide and inform the frequency of monitoring.

The use of automation facilitates a greater frequency and volume of control assessments as part of the
monitoring process. The ongoing monitoring of controls using automated tools and supporting databases
facilitates near real-time risk management for information systems and supports ongoing authorization
and efficient use of resources. The senior accountable official for risk management or the risk executive
(function) approves the continuous monitoring strategy including the minimum frequency with which
controls are to be monitored.
References: [ SP 800- 30 ]; [SP 800-39] (Organization, Mission or Business Process, System Levels); [SP 800-
53 ]; [ SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-137]; [SP 800-161]; [IR 8011 v1]; [IR 8062]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify, Detect
Functions]); [CNSSI 1253].

(^64) Monitoring for control effectiveness is a form of control assessment. [SP 800-53A], [SP 800-137], and [IR 8011 v1] provide additional information on monitoring, conducting control effectiveness assessments, and automating control effectiveness assessments respectively.

MISSION/BUSINESS PROCESS (LEVEL 2) CONSIDERATIONS

Mission/business process considerations are addressed in the RMF Prepare-Organization Level
step and the RMF Prepare-System Level step by specifying mission/business process concerns;
by identifying the mission or business owners in primary or supporting roles; and by identifying
the mission or business objectives. Task P-8 and Task P-9 from the RMF Prepare-System Level
step are mission/business process level tasks conducted with a system-level specific focus.

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PREPARE TASKS—SYSTEM LEVEL

Table 2 provides a summary of tasks and expected outcomes for the RMF Prepare step at the
system level. Applicable Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also provided.

TABLE 2: PREPARE TASKS AND OUTCOMES—SYSTEM LEVEL

Tasks Outcomes
TASK P-8
MISSION OR BUSINESS FOCUS

Missions, business functions, and mission/business processes that the system is intended to support are identified. [ Cybersecurity Framework : Profile ; Implementation Tiers ; ID.BE ] TASK P-9 SYSTEM STAKEHOLDERS
The stakeholders having an interest in the system are identified. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.AM ; ID.BE ] TASK P-10 ASSET IDENTIFICATION
Stakeholder assets are identified and prioritized. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.AM ] TASK P-11 AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARY
The authorization boundary (i.e., system) is determined.

TASK P-12
INFORMATION TYPES

The types of information processed, stored, and transmitted by the system are identified. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.AM-5 ] TASK P-13 INFORMATION LIFE CYCLE
All stages of the information life cycle are identified and understood for each information type processed, stored, or transmitted by the system. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.AM-3 ; ID.AM-4 ] TASK P-14 RISK ASSESSMENT—SYSTEM
A system-level risk assessment is completed or an existing risk assessment is updated. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.RA; ID.SC-2 ] TASK P-15 REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION
Security and privacy requirements are defined and prioritized. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.GV; PR.IP ] TASK P-16 ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE
The placement of the system within the enterprise architecture is determined. TASK P-17 REQUIREMENTS ALLOCATION
Security and privacy requirements are allocated to the system and to the environment in which the system operates. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.GV ] TASK P-18 SYSTEM REGISTRATION
The system is registered for purposes of management, accountability, coordination, and oversight. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.GV ]

Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

MISSION OR BUSINESS FOCUS

TASK P-8 Identify the missions, business functions, and mission/business processes that the system is
intended to support.
Potential Inputs: Organizational mission statement; organizational policies; mission/business process
information; system stakeholder information; Cybersecurity Framework Profiles; requests for proposal or
other acquisition documents; concept of operations.
Expected Outputs: Missions, business functions, and mission/business processes that the system will
support.
Primary Responsibility: Mission or Business Owner.

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Supporting Roles: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; System Owner;
Information Owner or Steward; Chief Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer;
Senior Agency Official for Privacy.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Organizational missions and business functions influence the design and development of the
mission or business processes that are created to carry out those missions and business functions. The
prioritization of missions and business functions drives investment strategies, funding decisions, resource
prioritization, and risk decisions—and thus affects the existing enterprise architecture and development
of the associated security and privacy architectures. Information is elicited from stakeholders to acquire a
more thorough understanding of the missions, business functions, and mission/business processes of the
organization from a system security and privacy perspective.
References: [ SP 800- 39 ] (Organization and Mission/Business Process Levels); [SP 800-64]; [SP 800-160 v1]
(Business or Mission Analysis, Portfolio Management, and Project Planning Processes); [NIST CSF] (Core
[Identify Function]); [IR 8179] (Criticality Analysis Process B).

SYSTEM STAKEHOLDERS

TASK P-9 Identify stakeholders who have an interest in the design, development, implementation,
assessment, operation, maintenance, or disposal of the system.
Potential Inputs: Organizational mission statement; mission or business objectives; missions, business
functions, and mission/business processes that the system will support; other mission/business process
information; organizational security and privacy policies and procedures; organizational charts;
information about individuals or groups (internal and external) that have an interest in and decision-
making responsibility for the system.
Expected Outputs: List of system stakeholders.
Primary Responsibility: Mission or Business Owner; System Owner.
Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated
Representative; Information Owner or Steward; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior
Agency Official for Privacy; Chief Acquisition Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Stakeholders include individuals, organizations, or representatives that have an interest in
the system throughout the system life cycle—for design, development, implementation, delivery,
operation, and sustainment of the system. It also includes all aspects of the supply chain. Stakeholders
may reside in the same organization or they may reside in different organizations in situations when there
is a common interest by those organizations in the information system. For example, this may occur
during the development, operation, and maintenance of cloud-based systems, shared service systems, or
any system where organizations may be adversely impacted by a breach or a compromise to the system
or for a variety of considerations related to the supply chain. Communication among stakeholders is
important during every step in the RMF and throughout the SDLC to ensure that security and privacy
requirements are satisfied, concerns and issues are addressed expeditiously, and risk management
processes are carried out effectively.
References: [ SP 800- 39 ] (Organization Level); [SP 800-64]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Stakeholder Needs and
Requirements Definition and Portfolio Management Processes); [SP 800-161]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify
Function]).

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ASSET IDENTIFICATION

TASK P-10 Identify assets that require protection.
Potential Inputs: Missions, business functions, and mission/business processes the information system
will support; business impact analyses; internal stakeholders; system stakeholder information; system
information; information about other systems that interact with the system.
Expected Outputs: Set of assets to be protected.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner.
Supporting Roles: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Mission or
Business Owner; Information Owner or Steward; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior
Agency Official for Privacy; System Administrator.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Assets are tangible and intangible items that are of value to achievement of mission or
business objectives. Tangible assets are physical in nature and include physical/environmental elements
(e.g., non-digital information, structures, facilities), human elements, and technology/machine elements
(e.g., hardware elements, mechanisms, and networks). In contrast, intangible assets are not physical in
nature and include mission and business processes, functions, digital information and data, firmware,
software, and services. Information assets can be tangible or intangible assets, and can include the
information needed to carry out missions or business functions, to deliver services, and for system
management/operation; controlled unclassified information and classified information; and all forms of
documentation associated with the information system. Intangible assets can also include the image or
reputation of an organization, and the privacy interests of the individuals whose information will be
processed by the system. The organization defines the scope of stakeholder assets to be considered for
protection. The assets that require protection are identified based on stakeholder concerns and the
contexts in which the assets are used. This includes the missions or business functions of the organization;
the other systems that interact with the system; and stakeholders whose assets are utilized by the
mission or business functions or by the system. Assets can be documented in the system security and
privacy plans.
References: [ SP 800- 39 ] (Organization Level); [SP 800-64]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Stakeholder Needs and
Requirements Definition Process); [IR 8179] (Criticality Analysis Process C); [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify
Function]); [NARA CUI].

AUTHORIZATION BOUNDARY

TASK P-11 Determine the authorization boundary of the system.
Potential Inputs: System design documentation; network diagrams; system stakeholder information;
asset information; network and/or enterprise architecture diagrams; organizational structure (charts,
information).
Expected Outputs: Documented authorization boundary.
Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official.
Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; System Owner; Mission or Business Owner; Senior Agency
Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; Enterprise Architect.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Authorization boundaries establish the scope of protection for information systems (i.e.,
what the organization agrees to protect under its management control or within the scope of its

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responsibilities). Authorization boundaries are determined by authorizing officials with input from the
system owner based on mission, management, or budgetary responsibility (see Appendix F). A clear
delineation of authorization boundaries is important for accountability and for security categorization,
especially in situations where lower-impact systems are connected to higher-impact systems, or when
external providers are responsible for the operation or maintenance of a system. Each system includes a
set of elements (i.e., information resources)^65 organized to achieve one or more purposes and to support
the organization’s missions and business processes. Each system element is implemented in a way that
allows the organization to satisfy specified security and privacy requirements. System elements include
human elements, technology/machine elements, and physical/environmental elements.
The term system is used to define the set of system elements, system element interconnections, and the
environment that is the focus of the RMF implementation (see Figure 5 ). The system is included in a single
authorization boundary to ensure accountability. For systems processing PII, the privacy and security
programs collaborate to develop a common understanding of authorization boundaries. To conduct
effective risk assessments and select appropriate controls, privacy and security programs provide a clear
and consistent understanding of what constitutes the authorization boundary. Understanding the
authorization boundary and what will occur beyond it may influence controls selected and how they are
implemented. For example, if a function of the system includes sharing PII externally, robust encryption
controls may be selected for PII transmitted from the system.
Similarly, for systems either partially or wholly managed, maintained, or operated by external providers,
an agreement clearly describing authorization boundaries ensures accountability. Privacy and security
programs collaborate with providers to develop a common understanding of authorization boundaries.
Formal agreements with external providers (e.g. contracts) may be used to delineate what constitutes
authorization boundaries. Understanding such boundaries facilitates the selection of appropriate controls
to manage supply chain risk.
References: [ SP 800- 18 ]; [SP 800- 39 ] (System Level); [SP 800-47]; [SP 800-64]; [SP 800-160 v1] (System
Requirements Definition Process); [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]).

INFORMATION TYPES

TASK P-12 Identify the types of information to be processed, stored, and transmitted by the system.
Potential Inputs: System design documentation; assets to be protected; mission/business process
information; system design documentation.
Expected Outputs: A list of information types for the system.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Information Owner or Steward.
Supporting Role: Mission or Business Owner; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer.^66
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Identifying the types of information needed to support organizational missions, business
functions, and mission/business processes is an important step in developing security and privacy plans
for the system and a precondition for determining the security categorization. [NARA CUI] defines the
information types that require protection as part of its Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) program,
in accordance with laws, regulations, or governmentwide policies. Organizations may define additional
information types needed to support organizational missions, business functions, and mission/business

(^65) System elements are implemented via hardware, software, or firmware; physical structures or devices; or people, processes, and procedures. The term system component is used to indicate system elements that are implemented specifically via hardware, software, and firmware. (^66) System Privacy Officer is only a primary role when the information system processes PII.

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processes that are not defined in the CUI Registry or in [SP 800- 60 v2]. Identified information types are
confirmed by the information owners or stewards and documented in the system security and privacy
plans.
References: [ OMB A-130]; [NARA CUI]; [SP 800-39] (System Level); [SP 800-60 v1]; [SP 800-60 v2]; [NIST
CSF] (Core [Identify Function]).

INFORMATION LIFE CYCLE

TASK P-13 Identify and understand all stages of the information life cycle for each information type
processed, stored, or transmitted by the system.
Potential Inputs: Missions, business functions, and mission/business processes the system will support;
system stakeholder information; authorization boundary information; information about other systems
that interact with the system (e.g., information exchange/connection agreements); system design
documentation; system element information; list of system information types.
Expected Outputs: Documentation of the stages through which information passes in the system, such as
a data map or model illustrating how information is structured or is processed by the system throughout
its life cycle. Such documentation includes, for example, data flow diagrams, entity relationship diagrams,
database schemas, and data dictionaries.
Primary Responsibility: Senior Agency Official for Privacy; System Owner; Information Owner or Steward.
Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Mission or Business Owner; Security Architect; Privacy
Architect; Enterprise Architect; Systems Security Engineer; Privacy Engineer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: The information life cycle describes the stages through which information passes, typically
characterized as creation or collection, processing, dissemination, use, storage, and disposition, to include
destruction and deletion [OMB A-130]. Identifying and understanding how each information type is
processed during all stages of the life cycle helps organizations identify considerations for protecting the
information, informs the organization’s security and privacy risk assessments, and informs the selection
and implementation of controls. Identification and understanding of the information life cycle facilitates
the employment of practices to help ensure, for example, that organizations have the authority to collect
or create information, develop rules related to the processing of information in accordance with its
impact level, create agreements for information sharing, and follow retention schedules for the storage
and disposition of information.
Using tools such as a data map enables organizations to understand how information is being processed
so that organizations can better assess where security and privacy risks could arise and where controls
could be applied most effectively. It is important for organizations to consider the appropriate delineation
of the authorization boundary and the information system’s interaction with other systems because the
way information enters and leaves the system can affect the security and privacy risk assessments. The
elements of the system are identified with sufficient granularity to support such risk assessments.
Identifying and understanding the information life cycle is particularly relevant for the assessment of
security and privacy risks since information may be processed by a system in any of the SDLC phases. For
example, in the testing and integration phase of the SDLC, processing actual (i.e., live) data would likely
raise security and privacy risks, but using substitute (i.e., synthetic) data may allow an equivalent benefit
in terms of system testing while reducing risk.
References: [ OMB A-130]; [OMB M-13-13]; [ NARA RECM]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]); [IR 8062].

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RISK ASSESSMENT—SYSTEM

TASK P-14 Conduct a system-level risk assessment and update the risk assessment results on an ongoing
basis.
Potential Inputs: Assets to be protected; missions, business functions, and mission/business processes
the system will support; business impact analyses or criticality analyses; system stakeholder information;
information about other systems that interact with the system; provider information; threat information;
data map; system design documentation; Cybersecurity Framework Profiles; risk management strategy;
organization-level risk assessment results.
Expected Outputs: Security and privacy risk assessment reports.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer.
Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function);
Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Mission or Business Owner;
Information Owner or Steward; Control Assessor.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: This task may require that organizations conduct security and privacy risk assessments to
ensure that each type of risk is fully assessed. Assessment of security risk includes identification of threat
sources^67 and threat events affecting assets, whether and how the assets are vulnerable to the threats,
the likelihood that an asset vulnerability will be exploited by a threat, and the impact (or consequence) of
loss of the assets. As a key part of the risk assessment, assets are prioritized based on the adverse impact
or consequence of asset loss. The meaning of loss is defined for each asset type to enable a determination
of the loss consequence (i.e., the adverse impact of the loss). Loss consequences may be tangible (e.g.,
monetary, industrial casualties) or intangible (e.g., reputation) and constitute a continuum that spans
from partial loss to total loss relative to the asset. Interpretations of information loss may include, for
example, loss of possession, destruction, or loss of precision or accuracy. The loss of a function or service
may be interpreted as a loss of control, loss of accessibility, loss of the ability to deliver normal function,
performance, or behavior, or a limited loss of capability resulting in a level of degradation of function,
performance, or behavior. Physical consequences of compromise can include unscheduled production
downtime, industrial equipment damage, casualties at the site, environmental disasters and public safety
threats. Prioritization of assets is based on asset value, physical consequences, cost of replacement,
criticality, impact on image or reputation, or trust by users, by collaborating organizations, or by mission
or business partners. The asset priority translates to precedence in allocating resources, determining
strength of mechanisms, and defining levels of assurance.
Privacy risk assessments are conducted to determine the likelihood that a given operation the system is
taking when processing PII could create an adverse effect on individuals—and the potential impact on
individuals.^68 These adverse effects can arise from unauthorized activities that lead to the loss of
confidentiality, integrity, or availability in information systems processing PII, or may arise as a byproduct
of authorized activities. Privacy risk assessments are influenced by contextual factors. Contextual factors
can include, but are not limited to, the sensitivity level of the PII, including specific elements or in
aggregate; the types of organizations using or interacting with the system and individuals’ perceptions
about the organizations with respect to privacy; individuals’ understanding about the nature and purpose
of the processing; and the privacy interests of individuals, technological expertise or demographic
characteristics that influence their understanding or behavior. The privacy risks to individuals may affect

(^67) In addition, the use of threat intelligence, threat analysis, and threat modelling can help organizations develop the security capabilities necessary to reduce organizational susceptibility to a variety of threats including hostile cyber- attacks, equipment failures, natural disasters, and errors of omission and commission. (^68) [IR 8062] introduces privacy risk management and a privacy risk model for conducting privacy risk assessments.

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individuals’ decisions to engage with the system thereby impacting mission or business objectives, or
create legal liability, reputational risks, or other types of risks for the organization. Impacts to the
organization are not privacy risks. However, these impacts can guide and inform organizational decision-
making and influence prioritization and resource allocation for risk response.
Risk assessments are also conducted to determine the potential that the use of an external provider for
the development, implementation, maintenance, management, operation, or disposition of a system,
system element, or service could create a loss, and the potential impact of that loss. The impact may be
immediate (e.g., physical theft) or on-going (e.g., the ability of adversaries to replicate critical equipment
because of theft). The impact may be endemic (e.g., limited to a single system) or systemic (e.g., including
any system that uses a specific type of system component). Supply chain risk assessments consider
vulnerabilities which may arise related to the disposition of a system or system element and from the use
of external providers. Vulnerabilities in the supply chain may include a lack of traceability or accountability
leading to the potential use of counterfeits, insertion of malware, or poor-quality systems. The use of
external providers may result in a loss of visibility and control over how systems, system elements, and
services are developed, deployed, and maintained. A clear understanding of the threats, vulnerabilities,
and potential impacts of an adverse supply chain event can help organizations appropriately balance
supply chain risk with risk tolerance. Supply chain risk assessments can include information from supplier
audits, reviews, and supply chain intelligence. Organizations develop a strategy for collecting information,
including a strategy for collaborating with providers on supply chain risk assessments. Such collaboration
helps organizations leverage information from providers, reduce redundancy, identify potential courses of
action for risk responses, and reduce the burden on providers.
Risk assessments are conducted throughout the SDLC and support various RMF steps and tasks. Risk
assessment results are used to inform security and privacy requirements definition; categorization
decisions; the selection, tailoring, implementation, and assessment of controls; authorization decisions;
potential courses of action and prioritization for risk responses; and continuous monitoring strategy.
Organizations determine the form of risk assessment conducted (including the scope, rigor, and formality
of such assessments) and method of reporting results.
References: [ FIPS 199]; [FIPS 200]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-39] (Organization Level); [SP 800-59]; [SP 800-60
v1]; [SP 800-60 v2]; [SP 800-64]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Stakeholder Needs and Requirements Definition and
Risk Management Processes); [SP 800-161] (Assess); [IR 8062]; [IR 8179]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify
Function]); [CNSSI 1253].

REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION

TASK P-15 Define the security and privacy requirements for the system and the environment of
operation.
Potential Inputs: System design documentation; organization- and system-level risk assessment results;
known set of stakeholder assets to be protected; missions, business functions, and mission/business
processes the system will support; business impact analyses or criticality analyses; system stakeholder
information; data map of the information life cycle for PII; Cybersecurity Framework Profiles; information
about other systems that interact with the system; supply chain information; threat information; laws,
executive orders, directives, regulations, or policies that apply to the system; risk management strategy.
Expected Outputs: Documented security and privacy requirements.
Primary Responsibility: Mission or Business Owner; System Owner; Information Owner or Steward;
System Privacy Officer.^69

(^69) The system privacy officer is a primary role only when the information system processes PII.

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Supporting Roles: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; System Security
Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; Chief Acquisition
Officer; Security Architect; Privacy Architect; Enterprise Architect.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Protection needs are an expression of the protection capability required for the system in
order to reduce security and privacy risk to an acceptable level while supporting mission or business
needs. Protection needs include the security characteristics^70 of the system and the security behavior of
the system in its intended operational environment and across all system life cycle phases. The protection
needs reflect the priorities of stakeholders, results of negotiations among stakeholders in response to
conflicts, opposing priorities, contradictions, and stated objectives, and thus, are inherently subjective.
The protection needs are documented to help ensure that the reasoning, assumptions, and constraints
associated with those needs are available for future reference and to provide traceability to the security
and privacy requirements. Security and privacy requirements^71 constitute a formal, more granular
expression of protection needs across all SDLC phases, the associated life cycle processes, and protections
for the assets associated with the system. Security and privacy requirements are obtained from many
sources (e.g., laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, mission and business
needs, or risk assessments). Security and privacy requirements are an important part of the formal
expression of the required characteristics of the system.^72 The security and privacy requirements guide
and inform the selection of controls for a system and the tailoring activities associated with those
controls.
Organizations can use the Cybersecurity Framework to manage security and privacy requirements and
express those requirements in Cybersecurity Framework Profile s defined for the organization. For
instance, multiple requirements can be aligned and even deconflicted using the Function-Category-
Subcategory structure of the Framework Core. The Profiles can then be used to inform the development
of organizationally-tailored control baselines described in the RMF Prepare-Organization Level step, Task
P-4.
References: [ SP 800- 39 ] (Organization Level); [SP 800-64]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Stakeholder Needs and
Requirements Definition Process); [SP 800-161] (Multi-Tiered Risk Management); [IR 8179]; [NIST CSF]
(Core [Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover Functions]; Profiles).

ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE

TASK P-16 Determine the placement of the system within the enterprise architecture.
Potential Inputs: Security and privacy requirements; organization- and system-level risk assessment
results; enterprise architecture information; security architecture information; privacy architecture
information; asset information.
Expected Outputs: Updated enterprise architecture; updated security architecture; updated privacy
architecture; plans to use cloud-based systems and shared systems, services, or applications.

(^70) For example, a fundamental security characteristic is that the system exhibits only specified behaviors, interactions, and outcomes. (^71) The term requirements can have discrete meanings. For example, legal and policy requirements impose obligations to which organizations must adhere. Security and privacy requirements, however, are derived from the protection needs for the system and those protection needs can derive from legal or policy requirements, mission or business needs, risk assessments, or other sources. (^72) Security and privacy requirements can also include assurance requirements. Assurance is having confidence about the ability of the system to remain trustworthy with respect to security and privacy across all forms of adversity resulting from malicious or non-malicious intent.

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Primary Responsibility: Mission or Business Owner; Enterprise Architect; Security Architect; Privacy
Architect.
Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated
Representative; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; System
Owner; Information Owner or Steward.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Enterprise architecture is a management practice used to maximize the effectiveness of
mission/business processes and information resources and to achieve mission and business success. An
enterprise architecture can provide greater understanding of information and operational technologies
included in the initial design and development of information systems and is a prerequisite for achieving
resilience and survivability of those systems in an environment of increasingly sophisticated threats.
Enterprise architecture also provides an opportunity for organizations to consolidate, standardize, and
optimize information and technology assets. An effectively implemented architecture produces systems
that are more transparent and therefore, easier to understand and protect. Enterprise architecture also
establishes an unambiguous connection from investments to measurable performance improvements.
The placement of a system within the enterprise architecture is important as it provides greater visibility
and understanding about the other systems (internal and external) that are connected to the system and
can also be used to establish security domains for increased levels of protection for the system.
The security architecture and the privacy architecture are integral parts of the enterprise architecture.
These architectures represent the parts of the enterprise architecture related to the implementation of
security and privacy requirements. The primary purpose of the security and privacy architectures is to
ensure that security and privacy requirements are consistently and cost-effectively met in organizational
systems and are aligned with the risk management strategy. The security and privacy architectures
provide a roadmap that facilitates traceability from the strategic goals and objectives of organizations,
through protection needs and security and privacy requirements, to specific security and privacy solutions
provided by people, processes, and technologies.
References: [ SP 800- 39 ] (Mission/Business Process Level); [SP 800-64]; [SP 800-160 v1] (System
Requirements Definition Process); [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]; Profiles); [OMB FEA].

REQUIREMENTS ALLOCATION

TASK P-17 Allocate security and privacy requirements to the system and to the environment of
operation.
Potential Inputs: Organization- and system-level risk assessment results; documented security and
privacy requirements; organization- and system-level risk assessment results; list of common control
providers and common controls available for inheritance; system description; system element
information; system component inventory; relevant laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, and
policies.
Expected Outputs: List of security and privacy requirements allocated to the system, system elements,
and the environment of operation.
Primary Responsibility: Security Architect; Privacy Architect; System Security Officer; System Privacy
Officer.
Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated
Representative; Mission or Business Owner; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency
Official for Privacy; System Owner.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

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Discussion: Security and privacy requirements are allocated to guide and inform control selection and
implementation for the organization, system, system elements, and/or environment of operation.^73
Requirements allocation identifies where controls will be implemented. The allocation of requirements
conserves resources and helps to streamline the risk management process by ensuring that requirements
are not implemented on multiple systems or system elements when implementation of a common control
or a system-level control on a specific system element provides the needed protection capability.
References: [ SP 800- 39 ] (Organization, Mission/Business Process, and System Levels); [SP 800- 64 ]; [SP
800- 160 v1] (System Requirements Definition Process); [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]; Profiles);
[OMB FEA].

SYSTEM REGISTRATION

TASK P-18 Register the system with organizational program or management offices.
Potential Inputs: Organizational policy on system registration; system information.
Expected Outputs: Registered system in accordance with organizational policy.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner.
Supporting Role: Mission or Business Owner; Chief Information Officer; System Security Officer; System
Privacy Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: System registration, in accordance with organizational policy, serves to inform the governing
organization of plans to develop the system or the existence of the system; the key characteristics of the
system; and the expected security and privacy implications for the organization due to the operation and
use of the system. System registration provides organizations with a management and tracking tool to
facilitate bringing the system into the enterprise architecture, implementation of protections that are
commensurate with risk, and security and privacy posture reporting in accordance with applicable laws,
executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, or standards. As part of the system registration process,
organizations add the system to the organization-wide system inventory. System registration information
is updated with security categorization and system characterization information upon completion of the
Categorize step.
References: None.

(^73) The environment of operation for an information system refers to the physical surroundings in which the system processes, stores, and transmits information. For example, security requirements are allocated to the facilities where the system is located and operates. Those security requirements can be satisfied by the physical security controls in [SP 800- 53 ]

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3.2 CATEGORIZE^74

CATEGORIZE TASKS

Table 3 provides a summary of tasks and expected outcomes for the RMF Categorize step.
Applicable Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also provided.

TABLE 3: CATEGORIZE TASKS AND OUTCOMES

Tasks Outcomes^
TASK C-1
SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

The characteristics of the system are described and documented. [ Cybersecurity Framework : Profile ] TASK C-2 SECURITY CATEGORIZATION
A security categorization of the system, including the information processed by the system represented by the organization- identified information types, is completed. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.AM-1 ; ID.AM-2 ; ID.AM-3 ; ID.AM-4 ; ID.AM-5 ]
Security categorization results are documented in the security, privacy, and SCRM plans. [ Cybersecurity Framework : Profile ]
Security categorization results are consistent with the enterprise architecture and commitment to protecting organizational missions, business functions, and mission/business processes. [ Cybersecurity Framework : Profile ]
Security categorization results reflect the organization’s risk management strategy. TASK C-3 SECURITY CATEGORIZATION REVIEW AND APPROVAL
The security categorization results are reviewed and the categorization decision is approved by senior leaders in the organization.

Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

TASK C-1 Document the characteristics of the system.
Potential Inputs: System design and requirements documentation; authorization boundary information;
list of security and privacy requirements allocated to the system, system elements, and the environment

(^74) The RMF Categorize step is a precondition for the selection of security controls. However, for privacy, there are other factors considered by organizations that guide and inform the selection of privacy controls. These factors are described in the RMF Prepare-System Level step, Task P-15. Purpose The purpose of the Categorize step is to inform organizational risk management processes and tasks by determining the adverse impact to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation with respect to the loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of organizational systems and the information processed, stored, and transmitted by those systems.

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of operation; physical or other processes controlled by system elements; system element information;
system component inventory; system element supply chain information, including inventory and supplier
information; security categorization; data map of the information life cycle for information types
processed, stored, and transmitted by the system; information on system use, users, and roles.
Expected Outputs: Documented system description.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner.
Supporting Roles: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Information
Owner or Steward; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: A description of the system characteristics is documented in the security and privacy plans,
included in attachments to the plans, or referenced in other standard sources for the information
generated as part of the SDLC. Duplication of information is avoided, whenever possible. The level of
detail in the security and privacy plans is determined by the organization and is commensurate with the
security categorization and the security and privacy risk assessments of the system. Information may be
added to or updated in the system description as it becomes available during the system life cycle, during
the execution of the RMF steps, and as any system characteristics change.
Examples of different types of descriptive information that organizations can include in security and
privacy plans include: descriptive name of the system and system identifier; system version or release
number; manufacturer and supplier information; individual responsible for the system; system contact
information; organization that manages, owns, or controls the system; system location; purpose of the
system and missions/business processes supported; how the system is integrated into the enterprise
architecture; SDLC phase; results of the categorization process and privacy risk assessment; authorization
boundary; laws, directives, policies, regulations, or standards affecting individuals’ privacy and the
security of the system; architectural description of the system including network topology; information
types; hardware, firmware, and software components that are part of the system; hardware, software,
and system interfaces (internal and external); information flows within the system; network connection
rules for communicating with external systems; interconnected systems and identifiers for those systems;
physical or other processes, components and equipment controlled by system elements; system users
(including affiliations, access rights, privileges, citizenship); system provenance in the supply chain;
maintenance or other relevant agreements; potential suppliers for replacement components for the
system; alternative compatible system components; number and location in inventory of replacement
system components; ownership or operation of the system (government-owned, government-operated;
government-owned, contractor-operated; contractor-owned, contractor-operated; nonfederal [state and
local governments, grantees]); incident response points of contact; authorization date and authorization
termination date; and ongoing authorization status. System registration information is updated with the
system characterization information (see Task P-18).
References: [ SP 800- 18 ]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]).

SECURITY CATEGORIZATION

TASK C-2 Categorize the system and document the security categorization results.
Potential Inputs: Risk management strategy; organizational risk tolerance; authorization boundary (i.e.,
system) information; organization- and system-level risk assessment results; information types processed,
stored, or transmitted by the system; list of security and privacy requirements allocated to the system,
system elements, and environment of operation; organizational authority or purpose for operating the
system; business impact analyses or criticality analyses; information about missions, business functions,
and mission/business processes supported by the system.

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Expected Outputs: Impact levels determined for each information type and for each security objective
(confidentiality, integrity, availability); security categorization based on high-water mark of information
type impact levels.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Information Owner or Steward.
Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Chief
Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy;
Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; System Security Officer; System
Privacy Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Security categorization determinations consider potential adverse impacts to organizational
operations, organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting from the loss
of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information. Organizations have flexibility in conducting a
security categorization using either [FIPS 200] to establish a single impact level for a system based on the
high-water mark concept (for other than national security systems), or [CNSSI 1253] to establish three
impact values that may vary for each of the security objectives of confidentiality, integrity, and availability
(for national security systems). The security categorization process is carried out by the system owner and
the information owner or steward in cooperation and collaboration with senior leaders and executives
with mission, business function, or risk management responsibilities. Cooperation and collaboration helps
to ensure that individual systems are categorized based on the mission and business objectives of the
organization. The system owner and information owner or steward consider the results from the security
risk assessment (and the privacy risk assessment when the system processes PII) as a part of the security
categorization decision. The decision is consistent with the risk management strategy. The results of the
categorization process influence the selection of security controls for the system. Security categorization
information is documented in the system security plan or included as an attachment to the plan and can
be cross-referenced in a privacy plan when the system processes PII.
The security categorization results for the system can be further refined by the organization to facilitate
an impact-level prioritization of systems with the same impact level (see Task P-6). Results from the
impact-level prioritization conducted by the organization can be used to help system owners in control
selection and tailoring decisions.
References: [ FIPS 199]; [FIPS 200]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-39] (System Level); [SP 800-59]; [SP 800- 60 v1];
[SP 800-60 v2]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Stakeholder Needs and Requirements Definition and System
Requirements Definition Processes ); [IR 8179]; [CNSSI 1253]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]).

SECURITY CATEGORIZATION REVIEW AND APPROVAL

TASK C-3 Review and approve the security categorization results and decision.
Potential Inputs: Impact levels determined for each information type and for each security objective
(confidentiality, integrity, availability); security categorization based on high-water mark of information
type impact levels; list of high value assets for the organization.
Expected Outputs: Approval of security categorization for the system.
Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Senior
Agency Official for Privacy.^75

(^75) The senior agency official for privacy participates in determining whether the information processed by the information system is considered PII, and is involved in reviewing and approving the categorization for such systems.

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Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Chief
Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: For information systems that process PII, the senior agency official for privacy reviews and
approves the security categorization results and decision prior to the authorizing official’s review.^76
Security categorization results and decisions are reviewed by the authorizing official or a designated
representative to ensure that the security category selected for the information system is consistent with
the mission and business functions of the organization and the need to adequately protect those missions
and functions. The authorizing official or designated representative reviews the categorization results and
decision from an organization-wide perspective, including how the decision aligns with the categorization
decisions for all other organizational systems. The authorizing official collaborates with the senior
accountable official for risk management or the risk executive (function) to ensure that the categorization
decision for the system is consistent with the organizational risk management strategy and satisfies
requirements for high value assets. As part of the approval process, the authorizing official can provide
specific guidance to the system owner with respect to any limitations on baseline tailoring activities for
the system that occur at the RMF Select step (see Task S-2). If the security categorization decision is not
approved, the system owner initiates steps to repeat the categorization process and resubmits the
adjusted results to the authorizing official or designated representative. System registration information is
subsequently updated with the approved security categorization information (see Task P-18).
References: [ FIPS 199]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-39] (Organization Level); [SP 800-160 v1] (Stakeholder Needs
and Requirements Definition Process); [CNSSI 1253]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]).

(^76) The responsibilities of the senior agency official for privacy are detailed in [OMB A-130].

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3.3 SELECT

SELECT TASKS

Table 4 provides a summary of tasks and expected outcomes for the RMF Select step. Applicable
Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also provided.
TABLE 4: SELECT TASKS AND OUTCOMES

Tasks Outcomes^
TASK S-1
CONTROL SELECTION

Control baselines necessary to protect the system commensurate with risk are selected. [ Cybersecurity Framework : Profile ] TASK S-2 CONTROL TAILORING
Controls are tailored producing tailored control baselines. [ Cybersecurity Framework : Profile ] TASK S- 3 CONTROL ALLOCATION
Controls are designated as system-specific, hybrid, or common controls.
Controls are allocated to the specific system elements (i.e., machine, physical, or human elements). [ Cybersecurity Framework : Profile ; PR.IP ] TASK S- 4 DOCUMENTATION OF PLANNED CONTROL IMPLEMENTATIONS
Controls and associated tailoring actions are documented in security and privacy plans or equivalent documents. [ Cybersecurity Framework : Profile ] TASK S- 5 CONTINUOUS MONITORING STRATEGY— SYSTEM
A continuous monitoring strategy for the system that reflects the organizational risk management strategy is developed. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.GV ; DE.CM ] TASK S- 6 PLAN REVIEW AND APPROVAL
Security and privacy plans reflecting the selection of controls necessary to protect the system and the environment of operation commensurate with risk are reviewed and approved by the authorizing official.

Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

CONTROL SELECTION

TASK S-1 Select the controls for the system and the environment of operation.
Potential Inputs: Security categorization; organization- and system-level risk assessment results; system
element information; system component inventory; list of security and privacy requirements allocated to
the system, system elements, and environment of operation; list of contractual requirements allocated to
external providers of the system or system element; business impact analysis or criticality analysis; risk
management strategy; organizational security and privacy policy; federal or organization-approved or
mandated baselines or overlays; Cybersecurity Framework Profiles.

Purpose
The purpose of the Select step is to select, tailor, and document the controls necessary to protect
the information system and organization commensurate with risk to organizational operations
and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

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Expected Outputs: Controls selected for the system and the environment of operation.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Common Control Provider.
Supporting Roles: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Information
Owner or Steward; Systems Security Engineer; Privacy Engineer; System Security Officer; System Privacy
Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: There are two approaches that can be used for the initial selection of controls: a baseline
control selection approach, or an organization-generated control selection approach. The baseline control
selection approach uses control baselines, which are pre-defined sets of controls specifically assembled to
address the protection needs of a group, organization, or community of interest. Control baselines serve
as a starting point for the protection of individuals’ privacy, information, and information systems. Federal
control baselines are provided in [SP 800-53B]. The system security categorization (see Task C-2) and the
security requirements derived from stakeholder protection needs, laws, executive orders, regulations,
policies, directives, instructions, and standards (see Task P-15) can help inform the selection of security
control baselines. A privacy risk assessment (see Task P-14) and privacy requirements derived from
stakeholder protection needs, laws, executive orders, regulations, policies, directives, instructions, and
standards (see Task P-15) can help inform the selection of privacy control baselines. Privacy programs use
security and privacy control baselines to manage the privacy risks arising from both unauthorized system
activity or behavior, as well as from authorized activities. After the pre-defined control baseline is
selected, organizations tailor the baseline in accordance with the guidance provided (see Task S-2). The
baseline control selection approach can provide consistency across a broad community of interest.
The organization-generated control selection approach differs from the baseline selection approach
because the organization does not start with a pre-defined set of controls. Rather, the organization uses
its own selection process to select controls. This may be necessary when the system is highly specialized
(e.g., a weapons system or a medical device) or has limited purpose or scope (e.g., a smart meter). In
these situations, it may be more efficient and cost-effective for an organization to select a specific set of
controls for the system (i.e., a bottom-up approach) instead of starting with a pre-defined set of controls
from a broad-based control baseline and subsequently eliminating controls through the tailoring process
(i.e., top-down approach).
In both the baseline control selection approach and organization-generated control selection approach,
organizations develop a well-defined set of security and privacy requirements using a life cycle-based
systems engineering process (e.g., [ISO 15288] and [SP 800-160 v1] as described in the RMF Prepare-
System Level step, Task P-15. This process generates a set of requirements that can be used to guide and
inform the selection of a set of controls to satisfy the requirements (whether the organization starts with
a control baseline or generates the set of controls from its own selection process). Similarly, organizations
can use the [NIST CSF] to develop Cybersecurity Framework Profiles representing a set of organization-
specific security and privacy requirements—and thus, guiding and informing control selection from [SP
800- 53 ]. Tailoring may also be required in the organization-generated control selection approach (see
Task S-2). Organizations do not need to choose one approach for the selection of controls for each of their
systems, but instead, may use different approaches as circumstances dictate.
References: [ FIPS 199]; [FIPS 200]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-53]; [SP 800-53B]; [SP 800-160 v1] (System
Requirements Definition, Architecture Definition, and Design Definition Processes); [SP 800-161] (Respond
and Chapter 3); [IR 8062]; [IR 8179]; [CNSSI 1253]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond,
Recover Functions]; Profiles).

CONTROL TAILORING

TASK S-2 Tailor the controls selected for the system and the environment of operation.

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Potential Inputs: Initial control baselines; organization- and system-level risk assessment results; system
element information; system component inventory; list of security and privacy requirements allocated to
the system, system elements, and environment of operation; business impact analysis or criticality
analysis; risk management strategy; organizational security and privacy policies; federal or organization-
approved or mandated overlays.
Expected Outputs: List of tailored controls for the system and environment of operation (i.e., tailored
control baselines).
Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Common Control Provider.
Supporting Roles: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Information
Owner or Steward; Systems Security Engineer; Privacy Engineer; System Security Officer; System Privacy
Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: After selecting the applicable control baselines, organizations tailor the controls based on
various factors (e.g., missions or business functions, threats, security and privacy risks (including supply
chain risks), type of system, or risk tolerance). The tailoring process includes identifying and designating
common controls in the control baselines (see Task P-5); applying scoping considerations to the remaining
baseline controls; selecting compensating controls, if needed; assigning values to organization-defined
control parameters using either assignment or selection statements; supplementing baselines with
additional controls; and providing specification information for control implementation.^77 Organizations
determine the amount of detail to include in justifications or supporting rationale required for tailoring
decisions. For example, the justification or supporting rationale for scoping decisions related to a high-
impact system or high value asset^78 may necessitate greater specificity than similar decisions for a low-
impact system. Such determinations are consistent with the organization’s missions and business
functions; stakeholder needs; and any relevant laws, executive orders, regulations, directives, or policies.
Controls related to the SDLC and SCRM provide the basis for determining whether an information system
is fit-for-purpose^79 and need to be tailored accordingly.
Organizations use risk assessments to inform and guide the tailoring process. Threat information from
security risk assessments provides information on adversary capabilities, intent, and targeting that may
affect organizational decisions regarding the selection of security controls, including the associated costs
and benefits. Privacy risk assessments, including the contextual factors therein, will also influence
tailoring when an information system processes PII.^80 Risk assessment results are also leveraged when
identifying common controls to determine if the controls available for inheritance meet the security and
privacy requirements for the system and its environment of operation. When common controls provided
by the organization do not provide adequate protection for the systems inheriting the controls, system
owners can either supplement the common controls with system-specific or hybrid controls to achieve
the required level of protection or recommend a greater acceptance of risk to the authorizing official.
Organizations may also consider federally or organizationally directed or approved overlays, tailored
baselines, or Cybersecurity Framework Profiles when tailoring controls (see Task P-4).
References: [ FIPS 199]; [FI PS 200]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-53]; [SP 800-53B]; [SP 800-160 v1] (System
Requirements Definition, Architecture Definition, and Design Definition Processes); [SP 800-161] (Respond

(^77) The tailoring process is fully described in [SP 800-53B]. (^78) For more information on high value assets, see [OMB M-19-03] and [OCIO HVA]. (^79) [ISO 15288] describes fit -for-purpose as an outcome from the validation process in the SDLC that demonstrates, through assessment of the services presented to the stakeholders, that the "right" system has been created and satisfies the customer need. (^80) [IR 8062] provides a discussion of context and its function in a privacy risk model.

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and Chapter 3); [IR 8179]; [CNSSI 1253]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover
Functions]; Profiles).

CONTROL ALLOCATION

TASK S-3 Allocate security and privacy controls to the system and to the environment of operation.
Potential Inputs: Security categorization; organization- and system-level risk assessment results;
organizational policy on system registration; enterprise architecture; security and privacy architectures;
security and privacy requirements; list of security and privacy requirements allocated to the system,
system elements, and the environment of operation; list of common control providers and common
controls available for inheritance; system description; system element information; system component
inventory; relevant laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, and policies.
Expected Outputs: List of security and privacy controls allocated to the system, system elements, and the
environment of operation.
Primary Responsibility: Security Architect; Privacy Architect; System Security Officer; System Privacy
Officer.
Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated
Representative; Mission or Business Owner; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency
Official for Privacy; System Owner.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Initiation (concept/requirements definition).
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: The organization designates controls as system-specific, hybrid, or common, and allocates the
controls to the system elements (i.e, machine, physical, or human elements) responsible for providing a
security or privacy capability. Controls are allocated to a system or an organization consistent with the
organization’s enterprise architecture and security or privacy architecture and the allocated security and
privacy requirements. Not all controls need to be allocated to every system element. Controls providing a
specific security or privacy capability are only allocated to system elements that require that capability.
The security categorization, privacy risk assessment, security and privacy architectures, and the allocation
of controls work together to help achieve a suitable balance between security and privacy protections and
the mission-based function of the system.
Security and privacy requirements allocated to the system, system elements, and the environment of
operation (see Task P-17) guide and inform control allocation to system elements. Common controls that
are made available by the organization during the RMF Prepare-Organization Level step (see Task P-5), are
selected for inheritance; hybrid controls are also selected. Common controls satisfy security and privacy
requirements allocated to the organization and provide a protection capability that is inherited by one or
more systems. Hybrid controls satisfy security and privacy requirements allocated to the system and to
the organization and provide a protection capability that is partially inherited by one or more systems.
And finally, system-specific controls satisfy security and privacy requirements allocated to the system and
provide a protection capability for that system. Controls can be allocated to specific system elements
rather than to every element within a system. For example, system-specific controls associated with
management of audit logs may be allocated to a log management server and need not be implemented
on every system element.
References: [ SP 800- 39 ] (Organization, Mission/Business Process, and System Levels); [SP 800- 64 ]; [SP
800- 160 v1] (System Requirements Definition, Architecture Definition, and Design Definition Processes );
[NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]; Profiles); [OMB FEA].

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DOCUMENTATION OF PLANNED CONTROL IMPLEMENTATIONS

TASK S-4 Document the controls for the system and environment of operation in security and privacy
plans.
Potential Inputs: Security categorization; organization- and system-level risk assessment results (security,
privacy, and/or supply chain); system element information; system component inventory; business impact
or criticality analysis; list of security and privacy requirements allocated to the system, system elements,
and environment of operation; risk management strategy; list of selected controls for the system and
environment of operation; organizational security, privacy, and SCRM policies.
Expected Outputs: Security and privacy plans for the system.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Common Control Provider.
Supporting Roles: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Information
Owner or Steward; Systems Security Engineer; Privacy Engineer; System Security Officer; System Privacy
Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Security and privacy plans contain an overview of the security and privacy requirements for
the system and the controls selected to satisfy the requirements. The plans describe the intended
application of each selected control in the context of the system with a sufficient level of detail to
correctly implement the control and to subsequently assess the effectiveness of the control. The control
documentation describes how system-specific and hybrid controls are implemented and the plans and
expectations regarding the functionality of the system. The description includes planned inputs, expected
behavior, and expected outputs where appropriate, typically for those controls implemented in the
hardware, software, or firmware components of the system. Common controls are also identified in the
plans. There is no requirement to provide implementation details for inherited common controls. Rather,
those details are provided in the plans for common control providers and are made available to system
owners. For hybrid controls, the organization specifies in the system-level plans the parts of the control
that are provided by the common control provider and the parts of the control that are implemented at
the system level.
Organizations may develop a consolidated plan that incorporates security and privacy plans or maintain
separate plans. If developing a consolidated plan, privacy programs collaborate with security programs to
ensure that the plan reflects the selection of controls that provide protections with respect to managing
the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of PII; and delineates roles and responsibilities for control
implementation, assessment, and monitoring. For separate system security plans and privacy plans,
organizations cross-reference the controls in all plans to help maintain accountability and awareness. The
senior agency official for privacy reviews and approves the privacy plan (or integrated plan) before the
plan is provided to the authorizing official or designated representative for review (see Task S-6).
Organizations may document the control selection and tailoring information in documents equivalent to
security and privacy plans, for example, in systems engineering or system life cycle artifacts or documents.
Documentation of planned control implementations allows for traceability of decisions prior to and after
the deployment of the system. To the extent possible, organizations reference existing documentation
(either by vendors or other organizations that have employed the same or similar systems or system
elements), use automated support tools, and coordinate across the organization to reduce redundancy
and increase the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of control documentation. The documentation also
addresses platform dependencies and includes any additional information necessary to describe how the
capability required is to be achieved at the level of detail sufficient to support control implementation and
assessment. Documentation for control implementations follows best practices for hardware and
software development and for systems security and privacy engineering disciplines and is also consistent
with established policies and procedures for documenting activities in the SDLC. In certain situations,

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security controls can be implemented in ways that create privacy risks. The privacy program supports
documentation of privacy risk considerations and the implementations intended to mitigate them.
For controls that are mechanism-based, organizations take advantage of the functional specifications
provided by or obtainable from manufacturers, vendors, and systems integrators. This includes any
documentation that may assist the organization during the development, implementation, assessment,
and monitoring of controls. For certain controls, organizations obtain control implementation information
from the appropriate organizational entities (e.g., physical security offices, facilities offices, records
management offices, and human resource offices). Since the enterprise architecture and the security and
privacy architectures established by the organization guide and inform the organizational approach used
to plan for and implement controls, documenting the process helps to ensure traceability in meeting the
security and privacy requirements.
References: [ FIPS 199]; [FIPS 200]; [SP 800-18]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-53]; [SP 800-64]; [SP 800- 160 v1]
(System Requirements Definition, Architecture Definition, and Design Definition Processes); [SP 800-161]
(Respond and Chapter 3); [IR 8179]; [CNSSI 1253]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond,
Recover Functions]; Profiles).

CONTINUOUS MONITORING STRATEGY—SYSTEM

TASK S-5 Develop and implement a system-level strategy for monitoring control effectiveness that is
consistent with and supplements the organizational continuous monitoring strategy.
Potential Inputs: Organizational risk management strategy; organizational continuous monitoring
strategy; organization- and system-level risk assessment results; security and privacy plans; organizational
security and privacy policies.
Expected Outputs: Continuous monitoring strategy for the system including time-based trigger for
ongoing authorization.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Common Control Provider.
Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Chief
Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy;
Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Information Owner or Steward;
Security Architect; Privacy Architect; Systems Security Engineer; Privacy Engineer; System Security Officer;
System Privacy Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: An important aspect of risk management is the ongoing monitoring of controls implemented
within or inherited by an information system. An effective continuous monitoring strategy at the system
level is developed and implemented in coordination with the organizational continuous monitoring
strategy early in the SDLC (i.e., during initial system design or procurement decision). The system-level
continuous monitoring strategy is consistent with and supplements the continuous monitoring strategy
for the organization. The system-level strategy addresses monitoring those controls for which monitoring
is not provided as part of the continuous monitoring strategy and implementation for the organization.
The system-level strategy identifies the frequency of monitoring for controls not addressed by the
organization-level strategy and defines the approach to be used for assessing those controls. The system-
level continuous monitoring strategy, consistent with the organizational monitoring strategy, defines how
changes to the system and the environment of operation^81 are to be monitored; how risk assessments are

(^81) Changes to the operating environment (including the supply chain) may create vulnerabilities (e.g., availability of software patches, changes in supplier ownership providing services, maintenance, repair parts or other support).

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to be conducted; and the security and privacy posture reporting requirements including recipients of the
reports. The system-level continuous monitoring strategy can be included in security and privacy plans.^82
For controls that are not addressed by the organizational continuous monitoring strategy, the system-
level continuous monitoring strategy identifies the criteria for determining the frequency with which
controls are monitored post-implementation and the plan for the ongoing assessment of those controls.
The criteria are established by the system owner or common control provider in collaboration with other
organizational officials (e.g., the authorizing official or designated representative; senior accountable
official for risk management or risk executive [function]; senior agency information security officer; senior
agency official for privacy; and chief information officer). The frequency criteria at the system level reflect
organizational priorities and the importance of the system to the organization’s operations and assets,
individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. Controls that are volatile (i.e., where the control or the
control implementation is most likely to change over time),^83 critical to certain aspects of the protection
needs for the organization, or identified in plans of action and milestones, may require more frequent
assessment. The approach to control assessments during continuous monitoring may include reuse of
assessment procedures and results that supported the initial authorization decision; detection of the
status of system elements; and analysis of historical and operational data.
The authorizing official or designated representative approves the continuous monitoring strategy and
the minimum frequency with which each control is to be monitored. The approval of the strategy can be
obtained in conjunction with the security and privacy plan approval. The monitoring of controls begins at
the start of the operational phase of the SDLC and continues through the disposal phase.
References: [ SP 800- 30 ]; [SP 800- 39 ] (Organization, Mission or Business Process, System Levels); [SP 800-
53 ]; [SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-137]; [SP 800-161]; [IR 8011 v1]; [CNSSI 1253]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Detect
Function]).

PLAN REVIEW AND APPROVAL

TASK S-6 Review and approve the security and privacy plans for the system and the environment of
operation.
Potential Inputs: Security and privacy plans; organization- and system-level risk assessment results.
Expected Outputs: Security and privacy plans approved by the authorizing official.
Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative.
Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Chief
Information Officer; Chief Acquisition Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency
Official for Privacy.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

(^82) The Privacy Continuous Monitoring (PCM) strategy includes all of the available privacy controls implemented throughout the organization at all risk management levels (i.e., organization, mission/business process, and system). The strategy ensures that the controls are monitored on an ongoing basis by assigning an organization-defined assessment frequency to each control that is sufficient to ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and to manage privacy risks. If, during the development of a new system, there is a need to create or use a privacy control not included in the PCM strategy, the senior agency official for privacy is consulted to determine whether it is appropriate for the proposed use case. If there is a decision to implement a new privacy control, the organization’s PCM strategy is updated to include the new control with an organization-defined monitoring frequency. (^83) Volatility is most prevalent in those controls implemented in the hardware, software and firmware elements of the system. For example, replacing or upgrading an operating system, a database system, application, or a network router may change the security controls provided by the vendor or original equipment manufacturer. Configuration settings may also require adjustments as organizational missions, business functions, threats, risks, and risk tolerance change.

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Discussion: The security and privacy plan review by the authorizing official or designated representative
with support from the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function), chief
information officer, senior agency information security officer, and senior agency official for privacy,
determines if the plans are complete, consistent, and satisfy the stated security and privacy requirements
for the system. Based on the results from this review, the authorizing official or designated representative
may recommend changes to the security and privacy plans. If the plans are unacceptable, the system
owner or common control provider make appropriate changes to the plans. If the plans are acceptable,
the authorizing official or designated representative approves the plans.
The acceptance of the security and privacy plans represents an important milestone in the SDLC and risk
management process. The authorizing official or designated representative, by approving the plans,
agrees to the set of controls (i.e., system-specific, hybrid, or common controls) and the description of the
proposed implementation of the controls to meet the security and privacy requirements for the system
and the environment in which the system operates.^84 The approval of the plans allows the risk
management process to proceed to the RMF Implement step. The approval of the plans also establishes
the level of effort required to successfully complete the remainder of the RMF steps and provides the
basis of the security and privacy specifications for the acquisition of the system or individual system
elements.
References: [ SP 800- 30 ]; [SP 800- 53 ]; [SP 800-160 v1] (System Requirements Definition, Architecture
Definition, and Design Definition Processes).

(^84) After the initial review and approval of the system security plan by the authorizing official, any subsequent authorization-related actions (e.g., reauthorizations or ongoing authorizations) provide an inherent review and approval of the system security plan since it is included in the authorization package.

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3.4 IMPLEMENT

IMPLEMENT TASKS

Table 5 provides a summary of tasks and expected outcomes for the RMF Implement step.
Applicable Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also provided.

TABLE 5: IMPLEMENT TASKS AND OUTCOMES

Tasks Outcomes^
TASK I- 1
CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION

Controls specified in the security and privacy plans are implemented. [ Cybersecurity Framework : PR.IP-1 ]
Systems security and privacy engineering methodologies are used to implement the controls in the system security and privacy plans. [ Cybersecurity Framework : PR.IP-2 ] TASK I- 2 UPDATE CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION INFORMATION
Changes to the planned implementation of controls are documented. [ Cybersecurity Framework : PR.IP-1 ]
The security and privacy plans are updated based on information obtained during the implementation of the controls. [ Cybersecurity Framework : Profile ]

Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION

TASK I-1 Implement the controls in the security and privacy plans.
Potential Inputs: Approved security and privacy plans; system design documents; organizational security
and privacy policies and procedures; business impact or criticality analyses; enterprise architecture
information; security architecture information; privacy architecture information; list of security and
privacy requirements allocated to the system, system elements; and environment of operation; system
element information; system component inventory; organization- and system-level risk assessment
results.
Expected Outputs: I mplemented controls.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Common Control Provider.
Supporting Roles: Information Owner or Steward; Security Architect; Privacy Architect; Systems Security
Engineer; Privacy Engineer; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer; Enterprise Architect; System
Administrator.

Purpose
The purpose of the Implement step is to implement the controls in the security and privacy plans
for the system and for the organization and to document in a baseline configuration, the specific
details of the control implementation.

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System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition; Implementation/Assessment.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Organizations implement the controls as described in the security and privacy plans. The
control implementation is consistent with the organization’s enterprise architecture and associated
security and privacy architectures. Organizations use best practices when implementing controls,
including systems security and privacy engineering methodologies, concepts, and principles. Risk
assessments guide and inform decisions regarding the cost, benefit, and risk trade-offs in using different
technologies or policies for control implementation. Organizations also ensure that mandatory
configuration settings are established and implemented on system elements in accordance with federal
and organizational policies. When organizations have no direct control over what controls are
implemented in a system element, for example, in commercial off-the-shelf products, organizations
consider the use of system elements that have been tested, evaluated, or validated by approved,
independent, third -party assessment facilities (e.g., NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program
Testing Laboratories, National Information Assurance Partnership Common Criteria Testing Laboratories).
The tests, evaluations, and validations consider products in specific configurations and in isolation; control
implementation addresses how the product is integrated into the system while preserving security
functionality and assurance.
Organizations also address, where applicable, assurance requirements when implementing controls.
Assurance requirements are directed at the activities that control developers and implementers carry out
to increase the level of confidence that the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended,
and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security and privacy requirements for the
system. The assurance requirements address quality of the design, development, and implementation of
the controls.^85
For the common controls inherited by the system, systems security and privacy engineers with support
from system security and privacy officers, coordinate with the common control provider to determine the
most appropriate way to implement common controls. System owners can refer to the authorization
packages prepared by common control providers when making determinations regarding the adequacy of
common controls inherited by their systems. During implementation, it may be determined that common
controls previously selected to be inherited by the system do not meet the specified security or privacy
requirements for the system. For common controls that do not meet the requirements for the system
inheriting the controls or when common controls have unacceptable deficiencies, the system owners
identify compensating or supplementary controls to be implemented. System owners can supplement the
common controls with system-specific or hybrid controls to achieve the required protection for their
systems or they can accept greater risk with the acknowledgement and approval of the organization. Risk
assessments may determine how gaps in security or privacy requirements between systems and common
controls affect the risk associated with the system, and how to prioritize the need for compensating or
supplementary controls to mitigate specific risks.
Consistent with the flexibility allowed in applying the tasks in the RMF, organizations conduct initial
control assessments during system development and implementation. Conducting such assessments in
parallel with the development and implementation phases of the SDLC facilitates early identification of
deficiencies and provides a cost-effective method for initiating corrective actions. Issues discovered
during these assessments can be referred to authorizing officials for resolution. The results of the initial
control assessments can also be used during the authorize step to avoid delays or costly repetition of
assessments. Assessment results that are subsequently reused in other phases of the SDLC meet the
reuse requirements established by the organization.^86

(^85) [SP 800- 53 ] provides a list of assurance-related security and privacy controls. (^86) See the RMF Assess step and [SP 800-53A] for information on assessments and reuse of assessment results.

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References: [ FIPS 200]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-53]; [SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Implementation,
Integration, Verification, and Transition Processes); [SP 800-161]; [IR 8062]; [IR 8179].

UPDATE CONTROL IMPLEMENTATION INFORMATION

TASK I-2 Document changes to planned control implementations based on the “as-implemented” state
of controls.
Potential Inputs: Security and privacy plans; information from control implementation efforts.
Expected Outputs: Security and privacy plans updated with implementation detail sufficient for use by
assessors; system configuration baseline.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Common Control Provider.
Supporting Roles: Information Owner or Steward; Security Architect; Privacy Architect; Systems Security
Engineer; Privacy Engineer; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer; Enterprise Architect; System
Administrator.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition; Implementation/Assessment.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Despite the control implementation details in the security and privacy plans and the system
design documents, it is not always feasible to implement controls as planned. Therefore, as control
implementations are carried out, the security and privacy plans are updated with as-implemented control
implementation details. The updates include revised descriptions of implemented controls including
changes to planned inputs, expected behavior, and expected outputs with sufficient detail to support
control assessments. Documenting the “as implemented” control information is essential to providing the
capability to determine when there are changes to the controls, whether those changes are authorized,
and the impact of the changes on the security and privacy posture of the system and the organization.
References: [ SP 800- 53 ]; [SP 800- 128 ]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Implementation, Integration, Verification, and
Transition, Configuration Management Processes).

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3.5 ASSESS

ASSESS TASKS

Table 6 provides a summary of tasks and expected outcomes for the RMF Assess step.
Applicable Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also provided.

TABLE 6: ASSESS TASKS AND OUTCOMES

Tasks Outcomes^
TASK A-1
ASSESSOR SELECTION

An assessor or assessment team is selected to conduct the control assessments.
The appropriate level of independence is achieved for the assessor or assessment team selected. TASK A-2 ASSESSMENT PLAN
Documentation needed to conduct the assessments is provided to the assessor or assessment team.
Security and privacy assessment plans are developed and documented.
Security and privacy assessment plans are reviewed and approved to establish the expectations for the control assessments and the level of effort required. TASK A-3 CONTROL ASSESSMENTS
Control assessments are conducted in accordance with the security and privacy assessment plans.
Opportunities to reuse assessment results from previous assessments to make the risk management process timely and cost-effective are considered.
Use of automation to conduct control assessments is maximized to increase speed, effectiveness, and efficiency of assessments. TASK A-4 ASSESSMENT REPORTS
Security and privacy assessment reports that provide findings and recommendations are completed. TASK A-5 REMEDIATION ACTIONS
Remediation actions to address deficiencies in the controls implemented in the system and environment of operation are taken.
Security and privacy plans are updated to reflect control implementation changes made based on the assessments and subsequent remediation actions. [ Cybersecurity Framework : Profile ] TASK A-6 PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES
A plan of action and milestones detailing remediation plans for unacceptable risks identified in security and privacy assessment reports is developed. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.RA-6 ]

Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

Purpose
The purpose of the Assess step is to determine if the controls selected for implementation are
implemented correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect
to meeting the security and privacy requirements for the system and the organization.

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ASSESSOR SELECTION

TASK A-1 Select the appropriate assessor or assessment team for the type of control assessment to be
conducted.
Potential Inputs: Security, privacy, and SCRM plans; program management control information; common
control documentation; organizational security and privacy program plans; SCRM strategy; system design
documentation; enterprise, security, and privacy architecture information; security, privacy, and SCRM
policies and procedures applicable to the system.
Expected Outputs: Selection of assessor or assessment team responsible for conducting the control
assessment.
Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative.
Supporting Roles: Chief Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency
Official for Privacy.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition; Implementation/Assessment.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Organizations consider both the technical expertise and level of independence^87 required in
selecting control assessors.^88 Organizations ensure that control assessors possess the required skills and
technical expertise to develop effective assessment plans and to conduct assessments of program
management, system-specific, hybrid, and common controls, as appropriate. This includes general
knowledge of risk management concepts and approaches as well as comprehensive knowledge of and
experience with the hardware, software, and firmware components implemented. In organizations where
the assessment capability is centrally managed, the senior agency information security officer may have
the responsibility of selecting and managing the security control assessors or assessment teams for
organizational systems. As controls may be implemented to achieve security and privacy objectives,
organizations consider the degree of collaboration between security control and privacy control assessors
that is necessary.
Organizations can conduct self-assessments of controls or obtain the services of an independent control
assessor. An independent assessor is an individual or group that can conduct an impartial assessment.
Impartiality means that assessors are free from perceived or actual conflicts of interest with respect to
the determination of control effectiveness or the development, operation, or management of the system,
common controls, or program management controls. The authorizing official determines the level of
assessor independence based on applicable laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, or
standards. The authorizing official consults with the Office of the Inspector General, chief information
officer, senior agency official for privacy, and senior agency information security officer to help guide and
inform decisions regarding assessor independence.
The system privacy officer is responsible for identifying assessment methodologies and metrics to
determine if privacy controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and sufficient to ensure
compliance with applicable privacy requirements and manage privacy risks. The senior agency official for
privacy is responsible for conducting assessments of privacy controls and documenting the results of the
assessments. At the discretion of the organization, privacy controls may be assessed by an independent
assessor. However, in all cases, the senior agency official for privacy is responsible and accountable for

(^87) In accordance with [OMB A-130], an independent evaluation of privacy program and practices is not required. However, an organization may choose to employ independent privacy assessments at the organization’s discretion. (^88) Some organizations may select control assessors prior to the RMF Assess step to support control assessments at the earliest opportunity during the system life cycle. Early identification and selection of assessors allows organizations to plan for the assessment activities, including agreeing on the scope of the assessment. Organizations implementing a systems security engineering approach may also benefit from early selection of assessors to support verification and validation activities that occur throughout the system life cycle.

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the organization’s privacy program, including any privacy functions performed by independent assessors.
The senior agency official for privacy is responsible for providing privacy information to the authorizing
official.
References: [ FIPS 199]; [SP 800-30]; [SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-55].

ASSESSMENT PLAN

TASK A-2 Develop, review, and approve plans to assess implemented controls.
Potential Inputs: Security, privacy, and SCRM plans; program management control information; common
control documentation; organizational security and privacy program plans; SCRM strategy; system design
documentation; supply chain information; enterprise, security, and privacy architecture information;
security, privacy, and SCRM policies and procedures applicable to the system.
Expected Outputs: Security and privacy assessment plans approved by the authorizing official.
Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Control
Assessor.
Supporting Roles: Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; System
Owner; Common Control Provider; Information Owner or Steward; System Security Officer; System
Privacy Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition; Implementation/Assessment.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Security and privacy assessment plans are developed by control assessors based on the
implementation information contained in security and privacy plans, program management control
documentation, and common control documentation. Organizations may choose to develop a single,
integrated security and privacy assessment plan for the system or the organization. An integrated
assessment plan delineates roles and responsibilities for control assessment. Assessment plans also
provide the objectives for control assessments and specific assessment procedures for each control.
Assessment plans reflect the type of assessment the organization is conducting, including for example:
developmental testing and evaluation; independent verification and validation; audits, including supply
chain; assessments supporting system and common control authorization or reauthorization; program
management control assessments; continuous monitoring; and assessments conducted after remediation
actions.
Assessment plans are reviewed and approved by the authorizing official or the designated representative
of the authorizing official to help ensure that the plans are consistent with the security and privacy
objectives of the organization; employ procedures, methods, techniques, tools, and automation to
support continuous monitoring and near real-time risk management; and are cost-effective. Approved
assessment plans establish expectations for the control assessments and the level of effort for the
assessment. Approved assessment plans help to ensure that appropriate resources are applied toward
determining control effectiveness while providing the necessary level of assurance in making such
determinations. When controls are provided by an external provider through contracts, interagency
agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements, or supply chain arrangements, the
organization can request security and privacy assessment plans and assessments results or evidence from
the provider.
References: [ SP 800-53A]; [SP 800- 160 v1] (Verification and Validation Processes); [SP 800-161]; [IR 8011
v1].

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CONTROL ASSESSMENTS

TASK A-3 Assess the controls in accordance with the assessment procedures described in assessment
plans.
Potential Inputs: Security and privacy assessment plans; security and privacy plans; external assessment
or audit results (if applicable).
Expected Outputs: Completed control assessments and associated assessment evidence.
Primary Responsibility: Control Assessor.
Supporting Roles: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; System Owner;
Common Control Provider; Information Owner or Steward; Senior Agency Information Security Officer;
Senior Agency Official for Privacy; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition; Implementation/Assessment.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Control assessments determine the extent to which the selected controls are implemented
correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting security and
privacy requirements for the system and the organization. The system owner, common control provider,
and/or organization rely on the technical skills and expertise of assessors to assess implemented controls
using the assessment procedures specified in assessment plans and provide recommendations on how to
respond to control deficiencies to reduce or eliminate identified vulnerabilities or unacceptable risks. The
senior agency official for privacy serves as the control assessor for the privacy controls and is responsible
for conducting an initial assessment of the privacy controls prior to system operation, and for assessing
the controls periodically thereafter at a frequency sufficient to ensure compliance with privacy
requirements and to manage privacy risks.^89 Controls implemented to achieve both security and privacy
objectives may require a degree of collaboration between security and privacy control assessors. The
assessor findings are a factual reporting of whether the controls are operating as intended and whether
any deficiencies^90 in the controls are discovered during the assessment.
Control assessments occur as early as practicable in the SDLC, preferably during the development phase.
These types of assessments are referred to as developmental testing and evaluation, and validate that the
controls are implemented correctly and are consistent with the established information security and
privacy architectures. Developmental testing and evaluation activities include, for example, design and
code reviews, regression testing, and application scanning. Deficiencies identified early in the SDLC can be
resolved in a more cost-effective manner. Assessments may be needed prior to source selection during
the procurement process to assess potential suppliers or providers before the organization enters into
agreements or contracts to begin the development phase. The results of control assessments conducted
during the SDLC can also be used (consistent with reuse criteria established by the organization) during
the authorization process to avoid unnecessary delays or costly repetition of assessments. Organizations
can maximize the use of automation to conduct control assessments to increase the speed, effectiveness,
and efficiency of the assessments, and to support continuous monitoring of the security and privacy
posture of organizational systems.
Applying and assessing controls throughout the development process may be appropriate for iterative
development processes. When iterative development processes (e.g., agile development) are employed,
an iterative assessment may be conducted as each cycle is completed. A similar process is employed for
assessing controls in commercial IT products that are used in the system. Organizations may choose to
begin assessing controls prior to the complete implementation of all controls in the security and privacy
plans. This type of incremental assessment is appropriate if it is more efficient or cost-effective to do so.

(^89) The senior agency official for privacy can delegate the assessment functions, consistent with applicable policies. (^90) Only deficiencies in controls that can be exploited by threat agents are considered vulnerabilities.

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Common controls (i.e., controls that are inherited by the system) are assessed separately (by assessors
chosen by common control providers or the organization) and need not be assessed as part of a system-
level assessment.
Organizations ensure that assessors have access to the information system and environment of operation
where the controls are implemented and to the documentation, records, artifacts, test results, and other
materials needed to assess the controls. This includes the controls implemented by external providers
through contracts, interagency agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements, or
supply chain arrangements. Assessors have the required degree of independence as determined by the
authorizing official.^91 Assessor independence during the continuous monitoring process facilitates reuse
of assessment results to support ongoing authorization and reauthorization.
To make the risk management process more efficient and cost-effective, organizations may choose to
establish reasonable and appropriate criteria for reusing assessment results as part of organization-wide
assessment policy or in the security and privacy program plans. For example, a recent audit of a system
may have produced information about the effectiveness of selected controls. Another opportunity to
reuse previous assessment results may come from external programs that test and evaluate security and
privacy features of commercial information technology products (e.g., Common Criteria Evaluation and
Validation Program and NIST Cryptographic Module Validation Program,). If prior assessment results from
the system developer or vendor are available, the control assessor, under appropriate circumstances, may
incorporate those results into the assessment. In addition, if a control implementation was assessed
during other forms of assessment at previous stages of the SDLC (e.g., unit testing, functional testing,
acceptance testing), organizations may consider potential reuse of those results to reduce duplication of
efforts. And finally, assessment results can be reused to support reciprocity, for example, assessment
results supporting an authorization to use (see Appendix F). Additional information on assessment result
reuse is available in [SP 800-53A].
References: [ SP 800-53A]; [SP 800- 160 v1] (Verification and Validation Processes); [IR 8011 v1].

ASSESSMENT REPORTS

TASK A-4 Prepare the assessment reports documenting the findings and recommendations from the
control assessments.
Potential Inputs: Completed control assessments and associated assessment evidence.
Expected Outputs: Completed security and privacy assessment reports detailing the assessor findings and
recommendations.
Primary Responsibility: Control Assessor.
Supporting Roles: System Owner; Common Control Provider; System Security Officer; System Privacy
Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition; Implementation/Assessment.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: The results of the security and privacy control assessments, including recommendations for
correcting deficiencies in the implemented controls, are documented in the assessment reports^92 by
control assessors. Organizations may develop a single, integrated security and privacy assessment report.
Assessment reports are key documents in the system or common control authorization package that is
developed for authorizing officials. The assessment reports include information based on assessor

(^91) In accordance with [OMB A-130], an independent evaluation of privacy program and practices is not required. However, an organization may choose to employ independent privacy assessments at the organization’s discretion. (^92) If a comparable report meets the requirements of what is to be included in an assessment report, then the comparable report would itself constitute the assessment report.

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findings, necessary to determine the effectiveness of the controls implemented within or inherited by the
information system. Assessment reports are an important factor in a determining risk to organizational
operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation by the authorizing official. The
format and the level of detail provided in assessment reports are appropriate for the type of control
assessment conducted, for example, developmental testing and evaluation; independent verification and
validation; independent assessments supporting information system or common control authorizations or
reauthorizations; self-assessments; assessments after remediation actions; independent evaluations or
audits; and assessments during continuous monitoring. The reporting format may also be prescribed by
the organization.
Control assessment results obtained during the system development lifecycle are documented in an
interim report and included in the final security and privacy assessment reports. Development of interim
reports that document assessment results from relevant phases of the SDLC reinforces the concept that
assessment reports are evolving documents. Interim reports are used, as appropriate, to inform the final
assessment report. Organizations may choose to develop an executive summary from the control
assessment findings. The executive summary provides authorizing officials and other interested
individuals in the organization with an abbreviated version of the assessment reports that includes a
synopsis of the assessment, findings, and the recommendations for addressing deficiencies in the
controls.
References: [ SP 800-53A]; [SP 800- 160 v1] (Verification and Validation Processes).

REMEDIATION ACTIONS

TASK A-5 Conduct initial remediation actions on the controls and re assess remediated controls.
Potential Inputs: Completed security and privacy assessment reports with findings and
recommendations; security and privacy plans; security and privacy assessment plans; organization- and
system-level risk assessment results.
Expected Outputs: Completed initial remediation actions based on the security and privacy assessment
reports; changes to implementations reassessed by the assessment team; updated security and privacy
assessment reports; updated security and privacy plans including changes to the control implementations.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Common Control Provider; Control Assessor.
Supporting Roles: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Senior Agency
Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; Senior Accountable Official for Risk
Management or Risk Executive (Function); Information Owner or Steward; Systems Security Engineer;
Privacy Engineer; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Development/Acquisition; Implementation/Assessment.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: The security and privacy assessment reports describe deficiencies in the controls that could
not be resolved during the development of the system or that are discovered post-development. Such
control deficiencies may result in security and privacy risks (including supply chain risks). The findings
generated during control assessments, provide information that facilitates risk responses based on
organizational risk tolerance and priorities. The authorizing official, in consultation and coordination with
system owners and other organizational officials, may decide that certain findings represent significant,
unacceptable risk and require immediate remediation actions. Additionally, it may be possible and
practical to conduct initial remediation actions for assessment findings that can be quickly and easily
remediated with existing resources.
If initial remediation actions are taken, assessors reassess the controls. The control reassessments
determine the extent to which remediated controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended,
and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security and privacy requirements for the

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system and the organization. The assessors update the assessment reports with the findings from the
reassessment, but do not change the original assessment results. The security and privacy plans are
updated based on the findings of the control assessments and any remediation actions taken. The
updated plans reflect the state of the controls after the initial assessment and any modifications by the
system owner or common control provider in addressing recommendations for corrective actions. At the
completion of the control assessments, security and privacy plans contain an accurate description of
implemented controls, including compensating controls.
Organizations can prepare an addendum to the security and privacy assessment reports that provides an
opportunity for system owners and common control providers to respond to initial assessment findings.
The addendum may include, for example, information regarding initial remediation actions taken by
system owners or common control providers in response to assessor findings. The addendum can also
provide the system owner or common control provider perspective on the findings. This may include
providing additional explanatory material, rebutting certain findings, and correcting the record. The
addendum does not change or influence the initial assessor findings provided in the reports. Information
provided in the addendum is considered by authorizing officials when making risk-based authorization
decisions. Organizations implement a process to determine the initial actions to take regarding the
control deficiencies identified during the assessment. This process can address vulnerabilities and risks,
false positives, and other factors that provide useful information to authorizing officials regarding the
security and privacy posture of the system and organization including the ongoing effectiveness of
system-specific, hybrid, and common controls. The issue resolution process can also ensure that only
substantive items are identified and transferred to the plan of actions and milestones.
Findings from a system-level control assessment may necessitate an update to the system risk assessment
and the organizational risk assessment.^93 The updated risk assessments and any inputs from the senior
accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function) determines the initial remediation
actions and the prioritization of those actions. System owners and common control providers may decide,
based on a system or organizational risk assessment, that certain findings are inconsequential and present
no significant security or privacy risk. Such findings are retained in the security and privacy assessment
reports and monitored during the monitoring step. The authorizing official is responsible for reviewing
and understanding the assessor findings and for accepting the security and privacy risks (including any
supply chain risks) that result from the operation the system or the use of common controls.
In all cases, organizations review assessor findings to determine the significance of the findings and
whether the findings warrant any further investigation or remediation. Senior leadership involvement in
the mitigation process is necessary to ensure that the organization’s resources are effectively allocated in
accordance with organizational priorities—providing resources to the systems that are supporting the
most critical missions and business functions or correcting the deficiencies that pose the greatest risk.
References: [ SP 800-53A]; [SP 800- 160 v1] (Verification and Validation Processes).

PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES

TASK A-6 Prepare the plan of action and milestones based on the findings and recommendations of the
assessment reports.
Potential Inputs: Updated security and privacy assessment reports; updated security and privacy plans;
organization- and system-level risk assessment results; organizational risk management strategy and risk
tolerance.

(^93) Risk assessments are conducted as needed at the organizational level, mission/business level, and at the system level throughout the SDLC. Risk assessment is specified as part of the RMF Prepare-Organization Level step, Task P-3 and RMF Prepare-System Level step, Task P-14.

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Expected Outputs: A plan of action and milestones detailing the findings from the security and privacy
assessment reports that are to be remediated.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Common Control Provider.
Supporting Roles: Information Owner or Steward; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer; Senior
Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; Control Assessor; Chief Acquisition
Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Implementation/Assessment.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: The plan of action and milestones is included as part of the authorization package. The plan
of action and milestones describes the actions that are planned to correct deficiencies in the controls
identified during the assessment of the controls and during continuous monitoring. The plan of action and
milestones includes tasks to be accomplished with a recommendation for completion before or after
system authorization; resources required to accomplish the tasks; milestones established to meet the
tasks; and the scheduled completion dates for the milestones and tasks. The plan of action and milestones
is reviewed by the authorizing official to ensure there is agreement with the remediation actions planned
to correct the identified deficiencies. It is subsequently used to monitor progress in completing the
actions. Deficiencies are accepted by the authorizing official as residual risk or are remediated during the
assessment or prior to submission of the authorization package to the authorizing official. Plan of action
and milestones entries are not necessary when deficiencies are accepted by the authorizing official as
residual risk. However, deficiencies identified during assessment and monitoring are documented in the
assessment reports, which can be retained within an automated security/privacy management and
reporting tool to maintain an effective audit trail. Organizations develop plans of action and milestones
based on assessment results obtained from control assessments, audits, and continuous monitoring and
in accordance with applicable laws, executive orders, directives, policies, regulations, standards, or
guidance.
Organizations implement a consistent process for developing plans of action and milestones that uses a
prioritized approach to risk mitigation that is uniform across the organization. A risk assessment guides
the prioritization process for items included in the plan of action and milestones. The process ensures that
plans of action and milestones are informed by the security categorization of the system and security,
privacy, and supply chain risk assessments; the specific deficiencies in the controls; the criticality of the
identified control deficiencies (i.e., the direct or indirect effect that the deficiencies may have on the
security and privacy posture of the system, and therefore, on the risk exposure of the organization; or the
ability of the organization to perform its mission or business functions); and the proposed risk mitigation
approach to address the identified deficiencies in the controls (e.g., prioritization of risk mitigation actions
and allocation of risk mitigation resources). Risk mitigation resources include, for example, personnel,
new hardware or software, and tools.
References: [ SP 800- 30 ]; [SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Verification and Validation Processes); [IR 8062].

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3.6 AUTHORIZE

AUTHORIZE TASKS
Table 7 provides a summary of tasks and expected outcomes for the RMF Authorize step.
Applicable Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also provided.

TABLE 7: AUTHORIZE TASKS AND OUTCOMES

Tasks Outcomes
TASK R-1
AUTHORIZATION PACKAGE

An authorization package is developed for submission to the authorizing official. TASK R-2 RISK ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION
A risk determination by the authorizing official that reflects the risk management strategy including risk tolerance, is rendered. TASK R-3 RISK RESPONSE
Risk responses for determined risks are provided. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.RA-6 ] TASK R-4 AUTHORIZATION DECISION
The authorization for the system or the common controls is approved or denied. TASK R-5 AUTHORIZATION REPORTING
Authorization decisions, significant vulnerabilities, and risks are reported to organizational officials.

Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

AUTHORIZATION PACKAGE

TASK R-1 Assemble the authorization package and submit the package to the authorizing official for an
authorization decision.
Potential Inputs: Security and privacy plans; security and privacy assessment reports; plan of action and
milestones; supporting assessment evidence or other documentation, as required.
Expected Outputs: Authorization package (with an executive summary), which may be generated from a
security or privacy management tool^94 for submission to the authorizing official.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Common Control Provider; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.^95

(^94) Organizations are encouraged to maximize the use of automated tools in the preparation, assembly, and transmission of authorization packages and security and privacy information supporting the authorization process. Many commercially available governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) tools can be employed to reduce or eliminate hard copy documentation. (^95) The senior agency official for privacy is active for information systems processing PII. Purpose The purpose of the Authorize step is to provide organizational accountability by requiring a senior management official to determine if the security and privacy risk (including supply chain risk) to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation based on the operation of a system or the use of common controls, is acceptable.

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Supporting Roles: System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer; Senior Agency Information Security
Officer; Control Assessor.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Implementation/Assessment.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Authorization packages^96 include security and privacy plans, security and privacy assessment
reports, plans of action and milestones, and an executive summary. Additional information can be
included in the authorization package at the request of the authorizing official. Organizations maintain
version and change control as the information in the authorization package is updated. Providing timely
updates to the plans, assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones on an ongoing basis
supports the concept of near real-time risk management and ongoing authorization, and can be used for
reauthorization actions, if required.
The senior agency official for privacy reviews the authorization package for systems that process PII to
ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and to manage privacy risks, prior to authorizing
officials making risk determination and acceptance decisions.
The information in the authorization package is used by authorizing officials to make informed, risk-based
decisions. When controls are implemented by an external provider through contracts, interagency
agreements, lines of business arrangements, licensing agreements, or supply chain arrangements, the
organization ensures that the information needed to make risk-based decisions is made available by the
provider.
The authorization package may be provided to the authorizing official in hard copy or electronically or
may be generated using an automated security/privacy management and reporting tool. Organizations
can use automated support tools in preparing and managing the content of the authorization package.
Automated support tools provide an effective vehicle for maintaining and updating information for
authorizing officials regarding the ongoing security and privacy posture of information systems within the
organization.
When an information system is under ongoing authorization, the authorization package is presented to
the authorizing official via automated reports to provide information in the most efficient and timely
manner possible.^97 Information to be presented to the authorizing official in assessment reports is
generated in the format and with the frequency determined by the organization using information from
the information security and privacy continuous monitoring programs.
The assessment reports presented to the authorizing official include information about deficiencies in
system-specific, hybrid, and common controls (i.e., other than satisfied findings determined by assessors).
The authorizing official uses automated security/privacy management and reporting tools or other
automated methods, whenever practicable, to access the security and privacy plans and the plans of
action and milestones. The authorization documents are updated at an organization-defined frequency
using automated or manual processes in accordance with the risk management objectives of the
organization.^98

(^96) If a comparable report meets the requirements of what is to be included in an authorization package, then the comparable report would itself constitute the authorization package. (^97) While the objective is to fully automate all components of the authorization package, organizations may be in various states of transition to a fully automated state—that is, with certain sections of the authorization package available via automated means and other sections available only through manual means. (^98) Organizations decide on the level of detail and the presentation format of security and privacy information that is made available to authorizing officials through automation. Decisions about level of detail and format are based on organizational needs with the automated presentation of security and privacy information tailored to the decision- making needs of the authorizing officials. For example, detailed security and privacy information may be generated and collected at the operational level of the organization with information subsequently analyzed, distilled, and presented to authorizing officials in a summarized or highlighted format using automation.^

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References: [ OMB A-130]; [SP 800- 18 ]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Risk Management Process); [SP 800- 161 ] (SCRM
Plans).

RISK ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION

TASK R-2 Analyze and determine the risk from the operation or use of the system or the provision of
common controls.
Potential Inputs: Authorization package; supporting assessment evidence or other documentation as
required; information provided by the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive
(function); organizational risk management strategy and risk tolerance; organization- and system-level risk
assessment results.
Expected Outputs: Risk determination.
Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative.
Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Senior
Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Implementation/Assessment.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: The authorizing official or designated representative, in collaboration with the senior agency
information security officer and the senior agency official for privacy (for information systems processing
PII), analyzes the information in the authorization package provided by the control assessor, system
owner, or common control provider, and finalizes the determination of risk. Further discussion with the
control assessor, system owner, or common control provider may be necessary to help ensure a thorough
understanding of risk by the authorizing official.
Risk assessments are employed to provide information^99 that may influence the risk analysis and
determination. The senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function) may
provide additional information to the authorizing official that is considered in the final determination of
risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation resulting
from either the operation or use of the system or the provision of common controls. The additional
information may include, for example, organizational risk tolerance, dependencies among systems and
controls, mission and business requirements, the criticality of the missions or business functions
supported by the system, or the risk management strategy.
The authorizing official analyzes the information provided by the senior accountable official for risk
management or risk executive (function) and information provided by the system owner or common
control provider in the authorization package when making a risk determination. Any additional
information provided by the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function) is
documented and included, to the extent it is relevant, as part of the authorization decision (see Task R-4).
The authorizing official may also use an automated security/privacy management and reporting tool to
annotate senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function) input.
When the system is operating under an ongoing authorization, the risk determination task is effectively
unchanged. The authorizing official analyzes the relevant security and privacy information provided by the
automated security/privacy management and reporting tool to determine the current security and privacy
posture of the system.
References: [ OMB A-130]; [SP 800- 30 ]; [SP 800-39] (Organization, Mission/Business Process, and System
Levels); [SP 800-137]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Risk Management Process); [IR 8062].

(^99) [SP 800-30] provides guidance on conducting security risk assessments. [IR 8062] provides information about privacy risk assessments and associated risk factors.

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RISK RESPONSE

TASK R-3 Identify and implement a preferred course of action in response to the risk determined.
Potential Inputs: Authorization package; risk determination; organization- and system-level risk
assessment results.
Expected Outputs: Risk responses for determined risks.
Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative.
Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Senior
Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy; System Owner or Common Control
Provider; Information Owner or Steward; Systems Security Engineer; Privacy Engineer; System Security
Officer; System Privacy Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Implementation/Assessment.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: After risk is analyzed and determined, organizations can respond to risk in a variety of ways,
including acceptance of risk and mitigation of risk. Existing risk assessment results and risk assessment
techniques may be used to help determine the preferred course of action for the risk response.^100 When
the response to risk is mitigation, the planned mitigation actions are included in and tracked using the
plan of action and milestones. Once mitigated, assessors reassess the controls. Control reassessments
determine the extent to which remediated controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended,
and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the security and privacy requirements for the
system and the organization. The assessors update the assessment reports with the findings from the
reassessment, but do not change the original assessment results. The security and privacy plans are
updated based on the findings of the control assessments and any remediation actions taken. The
updated plans reflect the state of the controls after the initial assessment and any modifications by the
system owner or common control provider in addressing recommendations for corrective actions.
At the completion of the control reassessments, security and privacy plans contain an accurate
description of implemented controls, including compensating controls. When the response to risk is
acceptance, the deficiencies found during the assessment process remain documented in the security and
privacy assessment reports and are monitored for changes to the risk factors.^101 Because the authorizing
official is the only person who can accept risk, the authorizing official is responsible for reviewing the
assessment reports and plans of action and milestones and determining whether the identified risks need
to be mitigated prior to authorization. Decisions on the most appropriate course of action for responding
to risk may include some form of prioritization. Some risks may be of greater concern to organizations
than other risks. In that case, more resources may need to be directed at addressing higher-priority risks
versus lower-priority risks. Prioritizing risk response does not necessarily mean that the lower-priority
risks are ignored. Rather, it could mean that fewer resources are directed at addressing the lower-priority
risks, or that the lower-priority risks are addressed later. A key part of the risk-based decision process is
the recognition that regardless of the risk response, there remains a degree of residual risk. Organizations
determine acceptable degrees of residual risk based on organizational risk tolerance.
References: [ SP 800- 30 ]; [SP 800- 39 ] (Organization, Mission/Business Process, and System Levels); [SP
800- 160 v1] (Risk Management Process); [IR 8062]; [IR 8179]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify Function]).

(^100) [SP 800- 39 ] provides additional information on risk response. (^101) The four security risk factors are threat, vulnerability, likelihood, and impact. [SP 800-30] and [SP 800-39] provide information about security risk assessments and associated risk factors. [IR 8062] and Section 2.3 provide additional information on privacy risk factors and conducting privacy risk assessments.

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AUTHORIZATION DECISION

TASK R-4 Determine if the risk from the operation or use of the information system or the provision or
use of common controls is acceptable.
Potential Inputs: Risk responses for determined risks.
Expected Outputs: Authorization to operate, authorization to use, common control authorization; denial
of authorization to operate, denial of authorization to use, denial of common control authorization.
Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official.
Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Chief
Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy;
Authorizing Official Designated Representative.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Implementation/Assessment.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: The explicit acceptance of risk is the responsibility of the authorizing official and cannot be
delegated to other officials within the organization. The authorizing official considers many factors when
deciding if the risk to the organization’s operations (including mission, functions, image, and reputation)
and assets, individuals, other organizations, or the Nation, is acceptable. Balancing security and privacy
considerations with mission and business needs is paramount to achieving an acceptable risk-based
authorization decision.^102 The authorizing official issues an authorization decision for the system or for
organization-designated common controls after reviewing the information in the authorization package,
input from other organizational officials (see Task R-2), and other relevant information that may affect the
authorization decision. The authorization package provides the most current information on the security
and privacy posture of the system or the common controls.
The authorizing official consults with the Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or the Risk
Executive (Function) prior to making the final authorization decision for the information system or the
common controls. Because there are potentially significant dependencies among organizational systems
and with external systems, the authorization decisions for individual systems consider the current residual
risk, organizational plans of action and milestones, and the risk tolerance of the organization.
The authorization decision is conveyed by the authorizing official to the system owner or common control
provider, and other organizational officials, as appropriate.^103 The authorization decision also conveys the
terms and conditions for the authorization to operate; the authorization termination date or time-driven
authorization frequency; input from the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive
(function), if provided; and for common control authorizations, the system impact level supported by the
common controls.
For systems, the authorization decision indicates to the system owner whether the system is authorized
to operate or authorized to use, or not authorized to operate or not authorized to use. For common
controls, the authorization decision indicates to the common control provider and to the system owners
of inheriting systems, whether the common controls are authorized to be provided or not authorized to

(^102) While balancing security and privacy considerations with mission and business needs is paramount to achieving an acceptable risk-based authorization decision, there may be instances when the authorizing official and senior agency official for privacy cannot reach a final resolution regarding the appropriate protection for PII and the information systems that process PII. [OMB A-130] provides guidance on how to resolve such instances. (^103) Organizations are encouraged to employ automated security/privacy management and reporting tools whenever feasible, to develop the authorization packages for systems and common controls and to maintain those packages during ongoing authorization. Automated tools can significantly reduce documentation costs, provide increased speed and efficiency in generating important information for decision makers, and provide more effective means for updating critical risk management information. It is recognized that certain controls are not conducive to the use of automated tools and therefore, manual methods are acceptable in those situations.

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be provided. The terms and conditions for the common control authorization provide a description of any
specific limitations or restrictions placed on the operation of the system or the controls that must be
followed by the system owner or common control provider.
The authorization termination date is established by the authorizing official and indicates when the
authorization expires. Organizations may eliminate the authorization termination date if the system is
operating under an ongoing authorization—that is, the continuous monitoring program is sufficiently
robust and mature to provide the authorizing official with the needed information to conduct ongoing risk
determination and risk acceptance activities regarding the security and privacy posture of the system and
the ongoing effectiveness of the controls employed within and inherited by the system.
The authorization decision is included with the authorization package and is transmitted to the system
owner or common control provider. Upon receipt of the authorization decision and the authorization
package, the system owner or common control provider acknowledges and implements the terms and
conditions of the authorization. The organization ensures that the authorization package, including the
authorization decision for systems and common controls, is made available to organizational officials (e.g.,
system owners inheriting common controls; chief information officers; senior accountable officials for risk
management or risk executive [function]; senior agency information security officers; senior agency
officials for privacy; and system security and privacy officers). The authorizing official verifies on an
ongoing basis as part of continuous monitoring (see Task M-2) that the established terms and conditions
for authorization are being followed by the system owner or common control provider.
When the system is operating under ongoing authorization, the authorizing official continues to be
responsible and accountable for explicitly understanding and accepting the risk of continuing to operate
or use the system or continuing to provide common controls for inheritance. For ongoing authorization,
the authorization frequency is specified in lieu of an authorization termination date. The authorizing
official reviews the information with the specific time-driven authorization frequency defined by the
organization as part of the continuous monitoring strategy and determines if the risk of continued system
operation or the provision of common controls remains acceptable. If the risk remains acceptable, the
authorizing official acknowledges the acceptance in accordance with organizational processes. If not, the
authorizing official indicates that the risk is no longer acceptable and requires further risk response or a
full denial of the authorization.
The organization determines the level of formality for the process of communicating and acknowledging
continued risk acceptance by the authorizing official. The authorizing official may continue to establish
and convey the specific terms and conditions to be followed by the system owner or common control
provider for continued authorization to operate, continued common control authorization, or continued
authorization to use. The terms and conditions of the authorization may be conveyed through an
automated management and reporting tool as part of an automated authorization decision.
If control assessments are conducted by qualified assessors with the level of independence^104 required,
the assessment results support ongoing authorization and may be applied to a reauthorization.
Organizational policies regarding ongoing authorization and reauthorization are consistent with laws,
executive orders, directives, regulations, and policies.
Appendix F provides additional guidance on authorization decisions, the types of authorizations, and the
preparation of the authorization packages.
References: [ SP 800- 39 ] (Organization, Mission/Business Process, and System Levels); [SP 800- 160 v1]
(Risk Management Process).

(^104) In accordance with [OMB A-130], an independent evaluation of privacy program and practices is not required. However, an organization may choose to employ independent privacy assessments at the organization’s discretion.

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AUTHORIZATION REPORTING

TASK R-5 Report the authorization decision and any deficiencies in controls that represent significant
security or privacy risk.
Potential Inputs: Authorization decision.
Expected Outputs: A report indicating the authorization decision for a system or set of common controls;
annotation of authorization status in the organizational system registry.
Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative.
Supporting Roles: System Owner or Common Control Provider; Information Owner or Steward; System
Security Officer; System Privacy Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official
for Privacy.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Implementation/Assessment.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Authorizing officials report authorization decisions for systems and common controls to
designated organizational officials so the individual risk decisions can be viewed in the context of
organization-wide security and privacy risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other
organizations, and the Nation. Reporting occurs only in situations where organizations have delegated the
authorization functions to levels of the organization below the head of agency. Authorizing officials also
report exploitable deficiencies (i.e., vulnerabilities) in the system or controls noted during the assessment
and continuous monitoring that represent significant security or privacy ri sk. Organizations determine,
and the organizational policy reflects, what constitutes a significant security or privacy risk for reporting.
Deficiencies that represent significant vulnerabilities and risk can be reported using the Subcategories,
Categories, and Functions in the [NIST CSF]. Authorization decisions may be tracked and reflected as part
of the organization-wide system registration process at the organization’s discretion (see Task P-18).
References: [ SP 800- 39 ] (Organization, Mission/Business Process, and System Levels); [SP 800- 160 v1]
(Decision Management and Project Assessment and Control Processes); [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify,
Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover Functions]).

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3.7 MONITOR

MONITOR TASKS

Table 8 provides a summary of tasks and expected outcomes for the RMF Monitor step.
Applicable Cybersecurity Framework constructs are also provided.

TABLE 8: MONITOR TASKS AND OUTCOMES

Tasks Outcomes^
TASK M-1
SYSTEM AND ENVIRONMENT CHANGES

The information system and environment of operation are monitored in accordance with the continuous monitoring strategy. [ Cybersecurity Framework : DE.CM ; ID.GV ] TASK M-2 ONGOING ASSESSMENTS
Ongoing assessments of control effectiveness are conducted in accordance with the continuous monitoring strategy. [ Cybersecurity Framework : ID.SC-4 ] TASK M-3 ONGOING RISK RESPONSE
The output of continuous monitoring activities is analyzed and responded to appropriately. [ Cybersecurity Framework : RS.AN ] TASK M-4 AUTHORIZATION PACKAGE UPDATES
Risk management documents are updated based on continuous monitoring activities. [ Cybersecurity Framework : RS.IM ] TASK M-5 SECURITY AND PRIVACY REPORTING
A process is in place to report the security and privacy posture to the authorizing official and other senior leaders and executives. TASK M-6 ONGOING AUTHORIZATION
Authorizing officials conduct ongoing authorizations using the results of continuous monitoring activities and communicate changes in risk determination and acceptance decisions. TASK M-7 SYSTEM DISPOSAL
A system disposal strategy is developed and implemented, as needed.

Quick link to summary table for RMF tasks, responsibilities, and supporting roles.

SYSTEM AND ENVIRONMENT CHANGES

TASK M-1 Monitor the information system and its environment of operation for changes that impact the
security and privacy posture of the system.
Potential Inputs: Organizational continuous monitoring strategy; organizational configuration
management policy and procedures; organizational policy and procedures for handling unauthorized
system changes; security and privacy plans; configuration change requests/approvals; system design

Purpose
The purpose of the Monitor step is to maintain an ongoing situational awareness about the
security and privacy posture of the information system and the organization in support of risk
management decisions.

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documentation; security and privacy assessment reports; plans of action and milestones; information
from automated and manual monitoring tools.
Expected Outputs: Updated security and privacy plans; updated plans of action and milestones; updated
security and privacy assessment reports.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner or Common Control Provider; Senior Agency Information Security
Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.
Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function);
Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Information Owner or Steward;
System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Operations/Maintenance.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Systems and environments of operation are in a constant state of change with changes
occurring in the technology or machine elements, human elements, and physical or environmental
elements. Changes to the technology or machine elements include for example, upgrades to hardware,
software, or firmware; changes to the human elements include for example, staff turnover or a reduction
in force; and modifications to the surrounding physical and environmental elements include for example,
changes in the location of the facility or the physical access controls protecting the facility. Changes made
by external providers can be difficult to detect. A disciplined and structured approach to managing,
controlling, and documenting changes to systems and environments of operation, and adherence with
terms and conditions of the authorization, is an essential element of security and privacy programs.
Organizations establish configuration management and control processes to support configuration and
change management.^105
Common activities within organizations can cause changes to systems or the environments of operation
and can have a significant impact on the security and privacy posture of systems. Examples include
installing or disposing of hardware, making changes to configurations, and installing patches outside of
the established configuration change control process. Unauthorized changes may occur because of
purposeful attacks by adversaries or inadvertent errors by authorized personnel. In addition to adhering
to the established configuration management process, organizations monitor for unauthorized changes to
systems and analyze information about unauthorized changes that have occurred to determine the root
cause of the unauthorized change. In addition to monitoring for unauthorized changes, organizations
continuously monitor systems and environments of operation for any authorized changes that impact the
privacy posture of systems.^106
Once the root cause of an unauthorized change (or an authorized change that impacts the privacy posture
of the system) has been determined, organizations respond accordingly (see Task M- 3 ). For example, if
the root cause of an unauthorized change is determined to be an adversarial attack, multiple actions
could be taken such as invoking incident response processes, adjusting intrusion detection and prevention
tools and firewall configurations, or implementing additional or stronger controls to reduce the risk of
future attacks. If the root cause of an unauthorized change is determined to be a failure of staff to adhere
to established configuration management processes, remedial training for certain individuals may be
warranted.
References: [ SP 800- 30 ]; [SP 800- 128 ]; [SP 800-137]; [IR 8062].

(^105) [SP 800- 128 ] provides guidance on security-focused configuration management (SecCM). Note that the SecCM process described in [SP 800-128] includes a related monitoring step. (^106) For information about the distinction between authorized and unauthorized system behavior, see the discussion of security and privacy in Section 2.3.

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ONGOING ASSESSMENTS

Task M-2 Assess the controls implemented within and inherited by the system in accordance with the
continuous monitoring strategy.
Potential Inputs: Organizational continuous monitoring strategy and system level continuous monitoring
strategy (if applicable); security and privacy plans; security and privacy assessment plans; security and
privacy assessment reports; plans of action and milestones; information from automated and manual
monitoring tools; organization- and system-level risk assessment results; external assessment or audit
results (if applicable).
Expected Outputs: Updated security and privacy assessment reports.
Primary Responsibility: Control Assessor.
Supporting Roles: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; System Owner
or Common Control Provider; Information Owner or Steward; System Security Officer; System Privacy
Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Operations/Maintenance.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: After an initial system or common control authorization, the organization assesses all controls
on an ongoing basis. Ongoing assessment of the control effectiveness is part of the continuous monitoring
activities of the organization. The monitoring frequency for each control is based on the organizational
continuous monitoring strategy (see Task P-7) and can be supplemented by the system-level continuous
monitoring strategy (see Task S-5). Adherence to the terms and conditions specified by the authorizing
official as part of the authorization decision are also monitored (see Task M- 1 ). Ongoing control
assessment continues as the information generated as part of continuous monitoring is correlated,
analyzed, and reported to senior leaders.
For ongoing control assessments, assessors have the required degree of independence as determined by
the authorizing official.^107 Assessor independence during continuous monitoring introduces efficiencies
into the process and may allow for reuse of assessment results in support of ongoing authorization and
when reauthorization is required.
To satisfy the annual FISMA security assessment requirement, organizations can use assessment results
from control assessments that occurred during authorization, ongoing authorization, or reauthorization;
during continuous monitoring; or the during testing and evaluation of systems as part of the SDLC or an
audit (provided the assessment results are current, relevant to the determination of control effectiveness,
and obtained by assessors with the required degree of independence). Existing assessment results are
reused consistent with the reuse policy established by the organization and are supplemented with
additional assessments as needed. The reuse of assessment results is helpful in achieving a cost-effective,
security program capable of producing the evidence necessary to determine the security posture of
information systems and the organization. Finally, the use of automation to support control assessments
facilitates a greater frequency, volume, and coverage of assessments.
References: [ SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-137]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Verification, Validation, Operation, and
Maintenance Processes); [IR 8011 v1].

ONGOING RISK RESPONSE

Task M-3 Respond to risk based on the results of ongoing monitoring activities, risk assessments, and
outstanding items in plans of action and milestones.

(^107) In accordance with [OMB A-130], an independent evaluation of privacy programs and practices is not required. However, an organization may choose to employ independent privacy assessments at the organization’s discretion.

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Potential Inputs: Security and privacy assessment reports; organization- and system-level risk assessment
results; security and privacy plans; plans of action and milestones.
Expected Outputs: Mitigation actions or risk acceptance decisions; updated security and privacy
assessment reports.
Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official; System Owner; Common Control Provider.
Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Senior
Agency Official for Privacy; Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Information Owner or
Steward; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer; Systems Security Engineer; Privacy Engineer;
Security Architect; Privacy Architect.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Operations/Maintenance.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: Assessment information produced by an assessor during continuous monitoring is provided
to the system owner and the common control provider in updated assessment reports or via reports from
automated security/privacy management and reporting tools. The authorizing official determines the
appropriate risk response to the assessment findings or approves responses proposed by the system
owner and common control provider. The system owner and common control provider subsequently
implement the appropriate risk response. When the risk response is acceptance, the findings remain
documented in the security and privacy assessment reports and are monitored for changes to risk factors.
When the risk response is mitigation, the planned mitigation actions are included in and tracked using the
plans of action and milestones. If requested by the authorizing official, control assessors may provide
recommendations for remediation actions. Recommendations for remediation actions may also be
provided by an automated security/privacy management and reporting tool. An organizational
assessment of risk (Task P-3) and system-level risk assessment results (Task P-14) guide and inform the
decisions regarding ongoing risk response. Controls that are modified, enhanced, or added as part of
ongoing risk response are reassessed by assessors to ensure that the new, modified, or enhanced controls
have been implemented correctly, are operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with
respect to meeting the security and privacy requirements of the system.
References: [ SP 800- 30 ]; [SP 800- 53 ]; [SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-137]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Risk Management
Process); [IR 8011 v1]; [IR 8062]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Respond Function]).

AUTHORIZATION PACKAGE UPDATES

Task M-4 Update plans, assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones based on the results of
the continuous monitoring process.
Potential Inputs: Security and privacy assessment reports; organization- and system-level risk assessment
results; security and privacy plans; plans of action and milestones.
Expected Outputs: Updated security and privacy assessment reports;^108 updated plans of action and
milestones; updated risk assessment results; updated security and privacy plans.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Common Control Provider.
Supporting Roles: Information Owner or Steward; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer; Senior
Agency Official for Privacy; Senior Agency Information Security Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Operations/Maintenance.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

(^108) If a comparable report meets the requirements of what is to be included in an assessment report (e.g., a report generated from a security or privacy management and reporting tool), then the comparable report would constitute the assessment report.

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Discussion: To achieve near real-time risk management, the organization updates security and privacy
plans, security and privacy assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones on an ongoing basis.
Updates to the plans reflect modifications to controls based on risk mitigation activities carried out by
system owners or common control providers. Updates to control assessment reports reflect additional
assessment activities carried out to determine control effectiveness based on implementation details in
the plans. Plans of action and milestones are updated based on progress made on the current outstanding
items; address security and privacy risks discovered as part of control effectiveness monitoring; and
describe how the system owner or common control provider intends to address those risks. The updated
information raises awareness of the security and privacy posture of the system and the common controls
inherited by the system, thereby, supporting near real-time risk management and the ongoing
authorization process.
The frequency of updates to risk management information is at the discretion of the system owner,
common control provider, and authorizing officials in accordance with federal and organizational policies
and is consistent with the organizational and system-level continuous monitoring strategies. The updates
to information regarding the security and privacy posture of the system and the common controls
inherited by the system are accurate and timely since the information provided influences ongoing
actions and decisions by authorizing officials and other senior leaders within the organization. The use of
automated support tools and organization-wide security and privacy program management practices
ensure that authorizing officials can readily access the current security and privacy posture of the system.
Ready access to the current security and privacy posture supports continuous monitoring and ongoing
authorization and promotes the near real-time management of risk to organizational operations and
assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.
Organizations ensure that information needed for oversight, management, and auditing purposes is not
modified or destroyed when updating security and privacy plans, assessment reports, and plans of action
and milestones. Providing an effective method to track changes to systems through configuration
management procedures is necessary to achieve transparency and traceability in the security and privacy
activities of the organization; to obtain individual accountability for any security or privacy actions; and to
understand emerging trends in the security and privacy programs of the organization.
References: [ SP 800- 30 ]; [SP 800-53A].

SECURITY AND PRIVACY REPORTING

Task M-5 Report the security and privacy posture of the system to the authorizing official and other
organizational officials on an ongoing basis in accordance with the organizational continuous
monitoring strategy.
Potential Inputs: Security and privacy assessment reports; plans of action and milestones; organization-
and system-level risk assessment results; organization- and system-level continuous monitoring strategy;
security and privacy plans; Cybersecurity Framework Profile.
Expected Outputs: Security and privacy posture reports.^109
Primary Responsibility: System Owner; Common Control Provider; Senior Agency Information Security
Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy.
Supporting Roles: System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Operations/Maintenance.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.

(^109) If a comparable report meets the requirements of what is to be included in a security or privacy posture report (e.g., a report generated from a security or privacy management and reporting tool), then the comparable report would constitute the posture report.

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Discussion: The results of monitoring activities are documented and reported to the authorizing official
and other selected organizational officials on an ongoing basis in accordance with the organizational
continuous monitoring strategy. Other organizational officials who may receive security and privacy
posture reports include, for example, chief information officer, senior agency information security officer,
senior agency official for privacy, senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive
(function), information owner or steward, incident response roles, and contingency planning roles.
Security and privacy posture reporting can be event-driven, time-driven, or event- and time-driven.^110 The
reports provide the authorizing official and other organizational officials with information regarding the
security and privacy posture of the systems including the effectiveness of implemented controls. Security
and privacy posture reports describe the ongoing monitoring activities employed by system owners or
common control providers. The reports also include information about security and privacy risks in the
systems and environments of operation discovered during control assessments, auditing, and continuous
monitoring and how system owners or common control providers plan to address those risks.
Organizations have flexibility in the breadth, depth, formality, form, and format of security and privacy
posture reports. The goal is efficient ongoing communication with the authorizing official and other
organizational officials as necessary, conveying the current security and privacy posture of systems and
environments of operation and how the current posture affects individuals, organizational missions, and
business functions. At a minimum, security and privacy posture reports summarize changes to the security
and privacy plans, security and privacy assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones that have
occurred since the last report. The use of automated security and privacy management and reporting
tools (e.g., a dashboard) by the organization facilitates the effectiveness and timeliness of security and
privacy posture reporting.
The frequency of security and privacy posture reports is at the discretion of the organization and in
compliance with federal and organizational policies. Reports occur at appropriate intervals to transmit
security and privacy information about systems or common controls but not so frequently as to generate
unnecessary work or expense. Authorizing officials use the security and privacy posture reports and
consult with the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function), senior
agency information security officer, and senior agency official for privacy to determine if a reauthorization
action is necessary.
Security and privacy posture reports are marked, protected, and handled in accordance with federal and
organizational policies. Security and privacy posture reports can be used to satisfy FISMA reporting
requirements for documenting remediation actions for security and privacy weaknesses or deficiencies.
Reporting on security and privacy posture is intended to be ongoing and should not be interpreted as
requiring the time, expense, and formality associated with the information provided for the initial
authorization. Rather, reporting is conducted in a cost-effective manner consistent with achieving the
reporting objectives.
References: [ SP 800-53A]; [SP 800-137]; [NIST CSF] (Core [Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover
Functions]).

ONGOING AUTHORIZATION

Task M-6 Review the security and privacy posture of the system on an ongoing basis to determine
whether the risk remains acceptable.
Potential Inputs: Risk tolerance; security and privacy posture reports; plans of action and milestones;
organization- and system-level risk assessment results; security and privacy plans.
Expected Outputs: A determination of risk; ongoing authorization to operate, ongoing authorization to
use, ongoing common control authorization; denial of ongoing authorization to operate, denial of ongoing
authorization to use, denial of ongoing common control authorization.

(^110) See Appendix F for additional information about time- and event-driven authorizations and reporting.

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Primary Responsibility: Authorizing Official.
Supporting Roles: Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function); Chief
Information Officer; Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency Official for Privacy;
Authorizing Official Designated Representative.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Operations/Maintenance.
Existing – Operations/Maintenance.
Discussion: To employ an ongoing authorization approach, organizations have in place an organization-
level and system-level continuous monitoring process to assess implemented controls on an ongoing
basis.^111 The findings or results from the continuous monitoring process provides useful information to
authorizing officials to support near-real time risk-based decision making. In accordance with the
guidance in Task R-4, the authorizing official or designated representative reviews the security and privacy
posture of the system (including the effectiveness of the implemented controls) on an ongoing basis to
determine the current risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and
the Nation. The authorizing official determines whether the current risk is acceptable and provides
appropriate direction to the system owner or common control provider. The authorizing official may
determine that the risk remains at an acceptable level for continued operation or that the risk is no longer
at an acceptable level for continued operation, and may issue a denial of authorization to operate,
authorization to use, or common control authorization.
The risks may change based on the information provided in the security and privacy posture reports
because the reports may indicate changes to the security or privacy risk factors. Determining how
changing conditions affect organizational and individual risk is essential for managing privacy risk and
maintaining adequate security. By carrying out ongoing risk determination and risk acceptance,
authorizing officials can maintain system and common control authorizations over time and transition to
ongoing authorization. Reauthorization actions occur only in accordance with federal or organizational
policies. The authorizing official conveys updated risk determination and acceptance results to the senior
accountable official for risk management or the risk executive (function).
The use of automated support tools to capture, organize, quantify, visually display, and maintain security
and privacy posture information promotes near real-time risk management regarding the risk posture of
the organization. The use of metrics and dashboards increases an organization’s capability to make risk-
based decisions by consolidating data in an automated fashion and providing the data to decision makers
at different levels within the organization in an easy-to-understand format.
References: [ SP 800- 30 ]; [SP 800- 39 ] (Organization, Mission/Business Process, and System Levels); [SP
800- 55 ]; [SP 800-160 v1] (Risk Management Process); [IR 8011 v1]; [IR 8062].

SYSTEM DISPOSAL

Task M-7 Implement a system disposal strategy and execute required actions when a system is removed
from operation.
Potential Inputs: Security and privacy plans; organization- and system-level risk assessment results;
system component inventory.
Expected Outputs: Disposal strategy; updated system component inventory; updated security and
privacy plans.
Primary Responsibility: System Owner.
Supporting Roles: Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative; Information
Owner or Steward; System Security Officer; System Privacy Officer; Senior Accountable Official for Risk

(^111) See Appendix F for additional information on ongoing authorization and continuous monitoring.

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Management or Risk Executive (Function); Senior Agency Information Security Officer; Senior Agency
Official for Privacy.
System Development Life Cycle Phase: New – Not Applicable.
Existing – Disposal.
Discussion: When a system is removed from operation, several risk management actions are required.
Organizations ensure that controls addressing system disposal are implemented. Examples include media
sanitization; configuration management and control; component authenticity; and record retention.
Organizational tracking and management systems (including inventory systems) are updated to indicate
the system that is being removed from service. Security and privacy posture reports reflect the security
and privacy status of the system. Users and application owners hosted on the disposed system are
notified as appropriate, and any control inheritance relationships are reviewed and assessed for impact.
This task also applies to system elements that are removed from operation. Organizations removing a
system from operation update the inventory of information systems to reflect the removal. System
owners and security personnel ensure that disposed systems comply with relevant federal laws,
regulations, directives, policies, and standards.
References: [ SP 800- 30 ]; [SP 800- 88 ]; [IR 8062].

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APPENDIX A

REFERENCES
LAWS, POLICIES, DIRECTIVES, REGULATIONS, STANDARDS, AND GUIDELINES

LAWS AND EXECUTIVE ORDERS

[32 CFR 2002.4] (^) Title 32 Code of Federal Regulations, Sec. 2002.4, Definitions. 2018 ed. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/CFR-2018-title32-vol6/CFR-2018-title32- vol6-sec2002- 4 [40 USC 11331] (^) Title 40 U.S. Code, Sec. 11331, Responsibilities for Federal information systems standards. 2017 ed. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2017-title40/USCODE-2017-title40- subtitleIII-chap113-subchapIII-sec11331 [44 USC 3301] (^) Title 44 U.S. Code, Sec. 3301, Definition of records. 2017 ed. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2017-title44/USCODE-2017-title44- chap33-sec3301 [44 USC 3502] (^) Title 44 U.S. Code, Sec. 3502, Definitions. 2017 ed. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2017-title44/USCODE-2017-title44- chap35-subchapI-sec3502 [44 USC 3552] (^) Title 44 U.S. Code, Sec. 3552, Definitions. 2017 ed. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2017-title44/USCODE-2017-title44- chap35-subchapII-sec3552 [44 USC 3554] (^) Title 44 U.S. Code, Sec. 3554, Federal agency responsibilities. 2017 ed. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2017-title44/USCODE-2017-title44- chap35-subchapII-sec3554 [44 USC 3601] (^) Title 44 U.S. Code, Sec. 3601, Definitions. 2017 ed. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/USCODE-2017-title44/USCODE-2017-title44- chap36-sec3601 [PRIVACT] Privacy Act (P.L. 93-579), December 1974. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/STATUTE-88/STATUTE-88-Pg1896 [FOIA96] (^) Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, As Amended By Public Law No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048, Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/PLAW-104publ231 [FISMA] (^) Federal Information Security Modernization Act (P.L. 113-283), December 2014. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/PLAW-113publ283 [EO 13800] (^) Executive Order 13800, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure , May 2017. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR- 2017 -05-16/2017-10004

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POLICIES, REGULATIONS, DIRECTIVES, AND INSTRUCTIONS

[OMB A-123] (^) Office of Management and Budget Circular No. A-123, Management's Responsibility for Enterprise Risk Management and Internal Control , July 2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2016/ m-16-17.pdf [OMB A-130] (^) Office of Management and Budget Circular A-130, Managing Information as a Strategic Resource , July 2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A130/a13 0revised.pdf [OMB M-13-13] Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-13-13, Open Data Policy-Managing Information as an Asset , May 2013. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/2013 /m-13-13.pdf [OMB M-17-25] (^) Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-17-25, Reporting Guidance for Executive Order on Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure , May 2017. https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/ M- 17 -25.pdf [OMB M-19-03] Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-19-03, Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Agencies by enhancing the High Value Asset Program , December 2018. https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/M-19-03.pdf [CNSSI 1253] (^) Committee on National Security Systems Instruction 1253, Security Categorization and Control Selection for National Security Systems , March 2014. https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Instructions.cfm [CNSSI 4009] (^) Committee on National Security Systems Instruction 4009, Committee on National Security Systems (CNSS) Glossary , April 2015. https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Instructions.cfm [CNSSD 505] (^) Committee on National Security Systems Directive 505, Supply Chain Risk Management , August 2017. https://www.cnss.gov/CNSS/issuances/Directives.cfm [OCIO HVA] (^) Office of the Federal Chief Information Officer, The Agency HVA Process. https://policy.cio.gov/hva/process [DODI 5200.44] (^) Department of Defense Instruction 5200.44, Protection of Mission Critical Functions to Achieve Trusted Systems and Networks (TSN), July 2017. http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodi/520044p.pdf STANDARDS, GUIDELINES, AND REPORTS [IEEE 610.12] (^) Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std. 610.12-1990, IEEE Standard Glossary of Software Engineering Terminology , December 1990. https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel1/2238/4148/00159342.pdf

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[ISO 15026-1] International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission/Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (ISO/IEC/IEEE) 15026-1:2013, Systems and software
engineering—Systems and software assurance—Part 1: Concepts and
vocabulary , May 2015.
https://www.iso.org/standard/62526.html

[ISO 15288] International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission/Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (ISO/IEC/IEEE) 15288:2015, Systems and software engineering—
Systems life cycle processes , May 2015.
https://www.iso.org/standard/63711.html
[ISO 15408-1] International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission 15408-1:2009, Information technology—
Security techniques— Evaluation criteria for IT security—Part 1:
Introduction and general model.
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART1V3.1R5.pdf

[ISO 15408-2] International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission 15408-2:2008, Information technology—
Security techniques— Evaluation criteria for IT security—Part 2: Security
functional requirements.
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART2V3.1R5.pdf

[ISO 15408-3] International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission 15408-3:2008, Information technology—
Security techniques— Evaluation criteria for IT security—Part 3: Security
assurance requirements.
https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/files/ccfiles/CCPART3V3.1R5.pdf

[ISO 27001] International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission 27001:2013, Information Technology —
Security techniques— Information security management systems—
Requirements.
https://www.iso.org/standard/54534.html

[ISO 29148] International Organization for Standardization/International
Electrotechnical Commission/Institute of Electrical and Electronics
Engineers (ISO/IEC/IEEE) 29148:2011, Systems and software engineering—
Life cycle processes—Requirements engineering , December 2011.
https://www.iso.org/standard/45171.html

[FIPS 199] (^) National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 199, Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems , February 2004. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.199 [FIPS 200] (^) National Institute of Standards and Technology Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 200, Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems , March 2006. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.200

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[SP 800-18] National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-18,
Revision 1, Guide for Developing Security Plans for Federal Information
Systems , February 2006.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-18r1

[SP 800-30] (^) National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-30, Revision 1, Guide for Conducting Risk Assessments , September 2012. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-30r1 [SP 800-39] (^) National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-39, Managing Information Security Risk: Organization, Mission, and Information System View , March 2011. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-39 [SP 800-47] National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-47, Security Guide for Interconnecting Information Technology Systems , August 2002. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-47 [SP 800-53] (^) National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-53, Revision 4, Security and Privacy Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations , April 2013. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53r4 [SP 800-53A] National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-53A, Revision 4, Assessing Security and Privacy Controls in Federal Information Systems and Organizations: Building Effective Security Assessment Plans , July 2008. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-53Ar4 [SP 800-55] National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-55, Revision 1, Performance Measurement Guide for Information Security , December 2014. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-55r1 [SP 800-59] (^) National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-59, Guideline for Identifying an Information System as a National Security System , August 2003. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-59 [SP 800-60 v1] National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-60, Volume 1, Revision 1, Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories , August 2008. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-60v1r1 [SP 800-60 v2] National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-60, Volume 2, Revision 1, Guide for Mapping Types of Information and Information Systems to Security Categories: Appendices , August 2008. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-60v2r1 [SP 800-61] National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-61, Revision 2, Computer Security Incident Handling Guide , August 2012. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-61r2

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[SP 800-64] National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-64,
Revision 2, Security Considerations in the System Development Life Cycle ,
October 2008.
https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-64r2

[SP 800-82] (^) National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-82, Revision 2, Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security , May 2015. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-82r2 [SP 800-88] (^) National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-88, Guidelines for Media Sanitization , December 2014. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-88r1 [SP 800-128] (^) National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-128, Guide for Security-Focused Configuration Management of Information Systems , August 2011. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-128 [SP 800-137] (^) National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-137, Information Security Continuous Monitoring for Federal Information Systems and Organizations , September 2011. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-137 [SP 800-160 v1] National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-160, Volume 1, Systems Security Engineering: Considerations for a Multidisciplinary Approach in the Engineering of Trustworthy Secure Systems , November 2016. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-160v1 [SP 800-161] (^) National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-161, Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations , April 2015. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-161 [SP 800-181] National Institute of Standards and Technology Special Publication 800-181, National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Cybersecurity Workforce Framework , August 2017. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-181 [IR 8011 v1] National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report 8011, Volume 1, Automation Support for Security Control Assessments: Overview , June 2017. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8011-1 [IR 8062] National Institute of Standards and Technology Internal Report 8062, An Introduction to Privacy Engineering and Risk Management in Federal Systems , January 2017. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8062 [IR 8179] (^) National Institute of Standards and Technology Internal Report 8179, Criticality Analysis Process Model: Prioritizing Systems and Components , April 2018. https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.IR.8179

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MISCELLANEOUS PUBLICATIONS AND WEBSITES

[DSB 2013] (^) Department of Defense, Defense Science Board, Task Force Report: Resilient Military Systems and the Advanced Cyber Threat , January 2013. https://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/2010s/ResilientMilitarySystemsCyberThreat. pdf [NARA CUI] (^) National Archives and Records Administration, Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) Registry. https://www.archives.gov/cui [NARA RECM] (^) National Archives and Records Administration, NARA Records Management Guidance and Regulations. https://www.archives.gov/records-mgmt/policy/guidance-regulations.html [NIST CSF] (^) National Institute of Standards and Technology Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity (Cybersecurity Framework), Version 1.1, April 2018. https://www.nist.gov/cyberframework [OMB FEA] (^) Office of Management and Budget, Federal Enterprise Architecture (FEA). https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/e-gov/fea

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APPENDIX B

GLOSSARY
COMMON TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

ppendix B provides definitions for terminology used within Special Publication 800-37.
Sources for terms used in this publication are cited as applicable. Where no citation is
noted, the source of the definition is Special Publication 800-37.

adequate security
[OMB A-130]

Security protections commensurate with the risk resulting from
the unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption,
modification, or destruction of information. This includes
ensuring that information hosted on behalf of an agency and
information systems and applications used by the agency
operate effectively and provide appropriate confidentiality,
integrity, and availability protections through the application of
cost-effective security controls.
agency
[OMB A-130]

Any executive agency or department, military department,
Federal Government corporation, Federal Government-
controlled corporation, or other establishment in the Executive
Branch of the Federal Government, or any independent
regulatory agency.

allocation The process an organization employs to assign security or privacy
requirements to an information system or its environment of
operation; or to assign controls to specific system elements
responsible for providing a security or privacy capability (e.g.,
router, server, remote sensor).

application A software program hosted by an information system.
assessment See control assessment or risk assessment.

assessment plan The objectives for the control assessments and a detailed
roadmap of how to conduct such assessments.
assessor The individual, group, or organization responsible for conducting
a security or privacy assessment.
assignment statement A control parameter that allows an organization to assign a
specific, organization-defined value to the control or control
enhancement (e.g., assigning a list of roles to be notified or a
value for the frequency of testing).
See organization-defined control parameters and selection
statement.

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assurance
[ISO 15026, Adapted]

Grounds for justified confidence that a [security or privacy] claim
has been or will be achieved.
Note 1: Assurance is typically obtained relative to a set of specific claims. The
scope and focus of such claims may vary (e.g., security claims, safety claims)
and the claims themselves may be interrelated.
Note 2: Assurance is obtained through techniques and methods that generate
credible evidence to substantiate claims.
audit log
[CNSSI 4009]

A chronological record of system activities, including records of
system accesses and operations performed in a given period.
audit trail
A chronological record that reconstructs and examines the
sequence of activities surrounding or leading to a specific
operation, procedure, or event in a security-relevant transaction
from inception to result.

authentication
[FIPS 200]

Verifying the identity of a user, process, or device, often as a
prerequisite to allowing access to resources in a system.

authenticity The property of being genuine and being able to be verified and
trusted; confidence in the validity of a transmission, a message,
or message originator. See authentication.
authorization boundary
[OMB A-130]

All components of an information system to be authorized for
operation by an authorizing official. This excludes separately
authorized systems to which the information system is
connected.

authorization package
[OMB A-130]

The essential information that an authorizing official uses to
determine whether to authorize the operation of an information
system or the provision of a designated set of common controls.
At a minimum, the authorization package includes an executive
summary, system security plan, privacy plan, security control
assessment, privacy control assessment, and any relevant plans
of action and milestones.

authorization to operate
[OMB A-130]

The official management decision given by a senior Federal
official or officials to authorize operation of an information
system and to explicitly accept the risk to agency operations
(including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency
assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation based on
the implementation of an agreed-upon set of security and
privacy controls. Authorization also applies to common controls
inherited by agency information systems.

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authorization to use The official management decision given by an authorizing official
to authorize the use of an information system, service, or
application based on the information in an existing authorization
package generated by another organization, and to explicitly
accept the risk to agency operations (including mission,
functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, individuals,
other organizations, and the Nation based on the
implementation of an agreed-upon set of controls in the system,
service, or application.
Note: An authorization to use typically applies to cloud and shared systems,
services, and applications and is employed when an organization (referred to as
the customer organization) chooses to accept the information in an existing
authorization package generated by another organization (referred to as the
provider organization).
authorizing official
[OMB A-130]

A senior Federal official or executive with the authority to
authorize (i.e., assume responsibility for) the operation of an
information system or the use of a designated set of common
controls at an acceptable level of risk to agency operations
(including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency
assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

authorizing official
designated representative

An organizational official acting on behalf of an authorizing
official in carrying out and coordinating the required activities
associated with the authorization process.
availability
[ 44 USC 3552]

Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information.

baseline See control baseline.
baseline configuration
[SP 8 00 -128, Adapted]

A documented set of specifications for a system, or a
configuration item within a system, that has been formally
reviewed and agreed on at a given point in time, and which can
be changed only through change control procedures.

capability A combination of mutually reinforcing controls implemented by
technical means, physical means, and procedural means. Such
controls are typically selected to achieve a common information
security or privacy purpose.

capability requirement A type of requirement describing the capability that the
organization or system must provide to satisfy a stakeholder
need.
Note: Capability requirements related to information security and privacy are
derived from stakeholder protection needs and the corresponding security and
privacy requirements.
chain of trust
(supply chain)

A certain level of trust in supply chain interactions such that each
participant in the consumer-provider relationship provides
adequate protection for its component products, systems, and
services.

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chief information officer
[OMB A-130]

The senior official that provides advice and other assistance to
the head of the agency and other senior management personnel
of the agency to ensure that IT is acquired and information
resources are managed for the agency in a manner that achieves
the agency’s strategic goals and information resources
management goals; and is responsible for ensuring agency
compliance with, and prompt, efficient, and effective
implementation of, the information policies and information
resources management responsibilities, including the reduction
of information collection burdens on the public.

chief information security
officer

See Senior Agency Information Security Officer.

classified information See classified national security information.
classified national
security information
[CNSSI 4009]

Information that has been determined pursuant to Executive
Order (E.O.) 13526 or any predecessor order to require
protection against unauthorized disclosure and is marked to
indicate its classified status when in documentary form.

commodity service A system service provided by a commercial service provider to a
large and diverse set of consumers. The organization acquiring or
receiving the commodity service possesses limited visibility into
the management structure and operations of the provider, and
while the organization may be able to negotiate service-level
agreements, the organization is typically not able to require that
the provider implement specific controls.

common control
[OMB A-130]

A security or privacy control that is inherited by multiple
information systems or programs.

common control provider
An organizational official responsible for the development,
implementation, assessment, and monitoring of common
controls (i.e., controls inheritable by organizational systems).

common criteria
[CNSSI 4009]

Governing document that provides a comprehensive, rigorous
method for specifying security function and assurance
requirements for products and systems.
compensating controls The security and privacy controls implemented in lieu of the
controls in the baselines described in NIST Special Publication
800 -53 that provide equivalent or comparable protection for a
system or organization.

component See system component.
confidentiality
[44 USC 3552]

Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and
proprietary information.

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configuration control
[CNSSI 4009]

Process for controlling modifications to hardware, firmware,
software, and documentation to protect the information system
against improper modifications before, during, and after system
implementation.
configuration item
[SP 800-128]

An aggregation of system components that is designated for
configuration management and treated as a single entity in the
configuration management process.
configuration
management
[SP 800-128]

A collection of activities focused on establishing and maintaining
the integrity of information technology products and systems,
through control of processes for initializing, changing, and
monitoring the configurations of those products and systems
throughout the system development life cycle.

configuration settings
[SP 800-128]

The set of parameters that can be changed in hardware,
software, or firmware that affect the security posture and/or
functionality of the system.

continuous monitoring Maintaining ongoing awareness to support organizational risk
decisions.

continuous monitoring
program

A program established to collect information in accordance with
preestablished metrics, utilizing information readily available in
part through implemented security controls.
Note: Privacy and security continuous monitoring strategies and programs can
be the same or different strategies and programs.
control See security control and privacy control.
control assessment The testing or evaluation of the controls in an information
system or an organization to determine the extent to which the
controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and
producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting the
security or privacy requirements for the system or the
organization.

control assessor The individual, group, or organization responsible for conducting
a control assessment. See assessor.

control baseline The set of controls that are applicable to information or an
information system to meet legal, regulatory, or policy
requirements, as well as address protection needs for the
purpose of managing risk.

control designation The process of assigning a control to one of three control types:
common, hybrid, or system-specific.
control effectiveness A measure of whether a given control is contributing to the
reduction of information security or privacy risk.
control enhancement Augmentation of a control to build in additional, but related,
functionality to the control; increase the strength of the control;
or add assurance to the control.

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control inheritance A situation in which a system or application receives protection
from controls (or portions of controls) that are developed,
implemented, assessed, authorized, and monitored by entities
other than those responsible for the system or application;
entities either internal or external to the organization where the
system or application resides. See common control.
control parameter See organization-defined control parameter.
controlled unclassified
information
[32 CFR 2002.4]

Information that the Government creates or possesses, or that
an entity creates or possesses for or on behalf of the
Government, that a law, regulation, or Government-wide policy
requires or permits an agency to handle using safeguarding or
dissemination controls. However, CUI does not include classified
information or information a non-executive branch entity
possesses and maintains in its own systems that did not come
from, or was not created or possessed by or for, an executive
branch agency or an entity acting for an agency.
countermeasures
[FIPS 200]

Actions, devices, procedures, techniques, or other measures that
reduce the vulnerability of a system. Synonymous with security
controls and safeguards.

cybersecurity
[OMB A-130]

Prevention of damage to, protection of, and restoration of
computers, electronic communications systems, electronic
communications services, wire communication, and electronic
communication, including information contained therein, to
ensure its availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality,
and nonrepudiation.
cybersecurity framework
[NIST CSF]

A risk-based approach to reducing cybersecurity risk composed
of three parts: the Framework Core, the Framework Profile, and
the Framework Implementation Tiers.
cybersecurity framework
category
[NIST CSF]

The subdivision of a Function into groups of cybersecurity
outcomes, closely tied to programmatic needs and particular
activities.

cybersecurity framework
core
[NIST CSF]

A set of cybersecurity activities and references that are common
across critical infrastructure sectors and are organized around
particular outcomes. The Framework Core comprises four types
of elements: Functions, Categories, Subcategories, and
Informative References.

cybersecurity framework
function
[NIST CSF]

One of the main components of the Framework. Functions
provide the highest level of structure for organizing basic
cybersecurity activities into Categories and Subcategories. The
five functions are Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and
Recover.

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cybersecurity framework
profile
[NIST CSF]

A representation of the outcomes that a particular system or
organization has selected from the Framework Categories and
Subcategories.

cybersecurity framework
subcategory
[NIST CSF]

The subdivision of a Category into specific outcomes of technical
and/or management activities.

derived requirements
[SP 800-160 v 1 ]

A requirement that is implied or transformed from a higher-level
requirement.
Note 1 : Implied requirements cannot be assessed since they are not contained
in any requirements baseline. The decomposition of requirements throughout
the engineering process makes implicit requirements explicit, allowing them to
be stated and captured in appropriate baselines and allowing associated
assessment criteria to be stated.
Note 2: A derived requirement must trace back to at least one higher-level
requirement.
detect (CSF function)
[NIST CSF]

Develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the
occurrence of a cybersecurity event.
developer A general term that includes developers or manufacturers of
systems, system components, or system services; systems
integrators; vendors; and product resellers. Development of
systems, components, or services can occur internally within
organizations or through external entities.

enterprise
[CNSSI 4009]

An organization with a defined mission/goal and a defined
boundary, using systems to execute that mission, and with
responsibility for managing its own risks and performance. An
enterprise may consist of all or some of the following business
aspects: acquisition, program management, human resources,
financial management, security, and systems, information and
mission management. See organization.
enterprise architecture
[44 USC 3601 ]

A strategic information asset base, which defines the mission;
the information necessary to perform the mission; the
technologies necessary to perform the mission; and the
transitional processes for implementing new technologies in
response to changing mission needs; and includes a baseline
architecture; a target architecture; and a sequencing plan.
environment of operation
[OMB A-130]

The physical surroundings in which an information system
processes, stores, and transmits information.
event
[SP 800-61, Adapted]

Any observable occurrence in a network or information system.

executive agency
[OMB A-130]

An executive department specified in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 101; a military
department specified in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 102; an independent
establishment as defined in 5 U.S.C. Sec. 104(1); and a wholly
owned Government corporation fully subject to the provisions of
31 U.S.C. Chapter 91.

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external system (or
component)

A system or system element that is outside of the authorization
boundary established by the organization and for which the
organization typically has no direct control over the application
of required controls or the assessment of control effectiveness.
external system service A system service that is implemented outside of the
authorization boundary of the organizational system (i.e., a
service that is used by, but not a part of, the organizational
system) and for which the organization typically has no direct
control over the application of required controls or the
assessment of control effectiveness.

external system service
provider

A provider of external system services to an organization
through a variety of consumer-producer relationships including
but not limited to: joint ventures; business partnerships;
outsourcing arrangements (i.e., through contracts, interagency
agreements, lines of business arrangements); licensing
agreements; and/or supply chain exchanges.
external network A network not controlled by the organization.

federal agency See executive agency.
federal enterprise
architecture
[OMB FEA]

A business-based framework for governmentwide improvement
developed by the Office of Management and Budget that is
intended to facilitate efforts to transform the federal
government to one that is citizen-centered, results-oriented, and
market-based.
federal information
system
[40 USC 11331 ]

An information system used or operated by an executive agency,
by a contractor of an executive agency, or by another
organization on behalf of an executive agency.

firmware
[CNSSI 4009]

Computer programs and data stored in hardware - typically in
read-only memory (ROM) or programmable read-only memory
(PROM) - such that the programs and data cannot be
dynamically written or modified during execution of the
programs. See hardware and software.

hardware
[CNSSI 400 9 ]

The material physical components of a system. See software and
firmware.

high-impact system
[FIPS 200]

A system in which at least one security objective (i.e.,
confidentiality, integrity, or availability) is assigned a FIPS
Publication 199 potential impact value of high.

hybrid control
[OMB A-130]

A security or privacy control that is implemented for an
information system in part as a common control and in part as a
system-specific control. See common control and system-specific
control.

identify (CSF function)
[NIST CSF]

Develop and implement the appropriate activities to identify the
occurrence of a cybersecurity event.

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impact With respect to security, the effect on organizational operations,
organizational assets, individuals, other organizations, or the
Nation (including the national security interests of the United
States) of a loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
information or a system. With respect to privacy, the adverse
effects that individuals could experience when an information
system processes their PII.
impact level See impact value.

impact value
[FIPS 199]

The assessed worst-case potential impact that could result from
a compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
information expressed as a value of low, moderate or high.
incident
[44 USC 3552]

An occurrence that actually or imminently jeopardizes, without
lawful authority, the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of
information or an information system; or constitutes a violation
or imminent threat of violation of law, security policies, security
procedures, or acceptable use policies.
independent verification
and validation
[CNSSI 4009]

A comprehensive review, analysis, and testing, (software and/or
hardware) performed by an objective third party to confirm (i.e.,
verify) that the requirements are correctly defined, and to
confirm (i.e., validate) that the system correctly implements the
required functionality and security requirements.
industrial control system
[SP 800-82]

General term that encompasses several types of control systems,
including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
systems, distributed control systems (DCS), and other control
system configurations such as programmable logic controllers
(PLC) often found in the industrial sectors and critical
infrastructures. An ICS consists of combinations of control
components (e.g., electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, pneumatic)
that act together to achieve an industrial objective (e.g.,
manufacturing, transportation of matter or energy).
information
[OMB A-130]

Any communication or representation of knowledge such as
facts, data, or opinions in any medium or form, including textual,
numerical, graphic, cartographic, narrative, electronic, or
audiovisual forms.
information life cycle
[OMB A-130]

The stages through which information passes, typically
characterized as creation or collection, processing,
dissemination, use, storage, and disposition, to include
destruction and deletion.

information owner Official with statutory or operational authority for specified
information and responsibility for establishing the controls for its
generation, collection, processing, dissemination, and disposal.
information resources
[44 USC 3502]

Information and related resources, such as personnel,
equipment, funds, and information technology.

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information security
[44 USC 3552]

The protection of information and systems from unauthorized
access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction
in order to provide confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

information security
architecture
[OMB A-130]

An embedded, integral part of the enterprise architecture that
describes the structure and behavior of the enterprise security
processes, security systems, personnel and organizational
subunits, showing their alignment with the enterprise’s mission
and strategic plans. See security architecture.
information security
program plan
[OMB A-130]

Formal document that provides an overview of the security
requirements for an organization-wide information security
program and describes the program management controls and
common controls in place or planned for meeting those
requirements.
information security risk
[SP 800-30]

The risk to organizational operations (including mission,
functions, image, reputation), organizational assets, individuals,
other organizations, and the Nation due to the potential for
unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or
destruction of information and/or systems.
information steward An agency official with statutory or operational authority for
specified information and responsibility for establishing the
controls for its generation, collection, processing, dissemination,
and disposal.

information system
[44 USC 3502 ]

A discrete set of information resources organized for the
collection, processing, maintenance, use, sharing, dissemination,
or disposition of information.
information system
boundary

See authorization boundary.

information system
security officer
[CNSSI 4009]

Individual with assigned responsibility for maintaining the
appropriate operational security posture for an information
system or program.
information system
security plan
[OMB A-130]

A formal document that provides an overview of the security
requirements for an information system and describes the
security controls in place or planned for meeting those
requirements.

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information technology
[OMB A-130]

Any services, equipment, or interconnected system(s) or
subsystem(s) of equipment, that are used in the automatic
acquisition, storage, analysis, evaluation, manipulation,
management, movement, control, display, switching,
interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information by
the agency. For purposes of this definition, such services or
equipment if used by the agency directly or is used by a
contractor under a contract with the agency that requires its
use; or to a significant extent, its use in the performance of a
service or the furnishing of a product. Information technology
includes computers, ancillary equipment (including imaging
peripherals, input, output, and storage devices necessary for
security and surveillance), peripheral equipment designed to be
controlled by the central processing unit of a computer,
software, firmware and similar procedures, services (including
cloud computing and help-desk services or other professional
services which support any point of the life cycle of the
equipment or service), and related resources. Information
technology does not include any equipment that is acquired by a
contractor incidental to a contract which does not require its
use.
information technology
product

See system component.

information type
[FIPS 199]

A specific category of information (e.g., privacy, medical,
proprietary, financial, investigative, contractor-sensitive, security
management) defined by an organization or in some instances,
by a specific law, executive order, directive, policy, or regulation.
interface
[CNSSI 4009]

Common boundary between independent systems or modules
where interactions take place.

integrity
[44 USC 3552]

Guarding against improper information modification or
destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation
and authenticity.
joint authorization Authorization involving multiple authorizing officials.

low-impact system
[FIPS 200]

A system in which all three security objectives (i.e.,
confidentiality, integrity, and availability) are assigned a FIPS
Publication 199 potential impact value of low.

media
[FIPS 200]

Physical devices or writing surfaces including, but not limited to,
magnetic tapes, optical disks, magnetic disks, Large-Scale
Integration memory chips, and printouts (but excluding display
media) onto which information is recorded, stored, or printed
within a system.

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moderate-impact system
[FIPS 200]

A system in which at least one security objective (i.e.,
confidentiality, integrity, or availability) is assigned a FIPS
Publication 199 potential impact value of moderate and no
security objective is assigned a potential impact value of high.
national security system
[44 USC 3552]

Any system (including any telecommunications system) used or
operated by an agency or by a contractor of an agency, or other
organization on behalf of an agency—(i) the function, operation,
or use of which involves intelligence activities; involves
cryptologic activities related to national security; involves
command and control of military forces; involves equipment that
is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system; or is critical
to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions
(excluding a system that is to be used for routine administrative
and business applications, for example, payroll, finance, logistics,
and personnel management applications); or (ii) is protected at
all times by procedures established for information that have
been specifically authorized under criteria established by an
Executive Order or an Act of Congress to be kept classified in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy.

network
A system implemented with a collection of interconnected
components. Such components may include routers, hubs,
cabling, telecommunications controllers, key distribution
centers, and technical control devices.
network access Access to a system by a user (or a process acting on behalf of a
user) communicating through a network (e.g., a local area
network, a wide area network, and Internet).
operational technology Programmable systems or devices that interact with the physical
environment (or manage devices that interact with the physical
environment). These systems/devices detect or cause a direct
change through the monitoring and/or control of devices,
processes, and events. Examples include industrial control
systems, building management systems, fire control systems,
and physical access control mechanisms.

operations technology See operational technology.
organization
[FIPS 200, Adapted]

An entity of any size, complexity, or positioning within an
organizational structure (e.g., federal agencies, private
enterprises, academic institutions, state, local, or tribal
governments, or as appropriate, any of their operational
elements).
organizationally-tailored
control baseline

A control baseline tailored for a defined notional (type of)
information system using overlays and/or system-specific control
tailoring, and intended for use in selecting controls for multiple
systems within one or more organizations.

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organization-defined
control parameter

The variable part of a control or control enhancement that can
be instantiated by an organization during the tailoring process by
either assigning an organization-defined value or selecting a
value from a pre-defined list provided as part of the control or
control enhancement.

overlay
[OMB A-130]

A specification of security or privacy controls, control
enhancements, supplemental guidance, and other supporting
information employed during the tailoring process, that is
intended to complement (and further refine) security control
baselines. The overlay specification may be more stringent or
less stringent than the original security control baseline
specification and can be applied to multiple information systems.

personally identifiable
information
[OMB A-130]

Information that can be used to distinguish or trace an
individual’s identity, either alone or when combined with other
information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual.
plan of action and
milestones

A document that identifies tasks needing to be accomplished. It
details resources required to accomplish the elements of the
plan, any milestones in meeting the tasks, and scheduled
completion dates for the milestones.

potential impact
[FIPS 199]

The loss of confidentiality, integrity, or availability could be
expected to have a limited adverse effect (FIPS Publication 199
low); a serious adverse effect (FIPS Publication 199 moderate);
or a severe or catastrophic adverse effect (FIPS Publication 199
high) on organizational operations, organizational assets, or
individuals.
privacy architect Individual, group, or organization responsible for ensuring that
the system privacy requirements necessary to protect
individuals’ privacy are adequately addressed in all aspects of
enterprise architecture including reference models, segment and
solution architectures, and information systems processing PII.
privacy architecture An embedded, integral part of the enterprise architecture that
describes the structure and behavior for an enterprise’s privacy
protection processes, technical measures, personnel and
organizational sub-units, showing their alignment with the
enterprise’s mission and strategic plans.

privacy control
[OMB A-130]

The administrative, technical, and physical safeguards employed
within an agency to ensure compliance with applicable privacy
requirements and manage privacy risks.
Note: Controls can be selected to achieve multiple objectives; those controls
that are selected to achieve both security and privacy objectives require a
degree of collaboration between the organization’s information security
program and privacy program.

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privacy control
assessment
[OMB A-130]

The assessment of privacy controls to determine whether the
controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and
sufficient to ensure compliance with applicable privacy
requirements and manage privacy risks. A privacy control
assessment is both an assessment and a formal document
detailing the process and the outcome of the assessment.
privacy control baseline A collection of controls specifically assembled or brought
together by a group, organization, or community of interest to
address the privacy protection needs of individuals.
privacy impact
assessment
[OMB A-130]

An analysis of how information is handled to ensure handling
conforms to applicable legal, regulatory, and policy requirements
regarding privacy; to determine the risks and effects of creating,
collecting, using, processing, storing, maintaining, disseminating,
disclosing, and disposing of information in identifiable form in an
electronic information system; and to examine and evaluate
protections and alternate processes for handling information to
mitigate potential privacy concerns. A privacy impact assessment
is both an analysis and a formal document detailing the process
and the outcome of the analysis.

privacy plan
[OMB A-130]

A formal document that details the privacy controls selected for
an information system or environment of operation that are in
place or planned for meeting applicable privacy requirements
and managing privacy risks, details how the controls have been
implemented, and describes the methodologies and metrics that
will be used to assess the controls.
privacy posture
The privacy posture represents the status of the information
systems and information resources (e.g., personnel, equipment,
funds, and information technology) within an organization based
on information assurance resources (e.g., people, hardware,
software, policies, procedures) and the capabilities in place to
comply with applicable privacy requirements and manage
privacy risks and to react as the situation changes.
privacy program plan
[OMB A-130]

A formal document that provides an overview of an agency’s
privacy program, including a description of the structure of the
privacy program, the resources dedicated to the privacy
program, the role of the Senior Agency Official for Privacy and
other privacy officials and staff, the strategic goals and
objectives of the privacy program, and the program
management controls and common controls in place or planned
for meeting applicable privacy requirements and managing
privacy risks.

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privacy requirement
A requirement that applies to an information system or an
organization that is derived from applicable laws, executive
orders, directives, policies, standards, regulations, procedures,
and/or mission/business needs with respect to privacy.
Note: The term privacy requirement can be used in a variety of contexts from
high-level policy activities to low-level implementation activities in system
development and engineering disciplines.

privacy information (^) Information that describes the privacy posture of an information system or organization. protect (CSF function) [NIST CSF] Develop and implement the appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical infrastructure services. provenance The chronology of the origin, development, ownership, location, and changes to a system or system component and associated data. It may also include personnel and processes used to interact with or make modifications to the system, component, or associated data. reciprocity Agreement among participating organizations to accept each other’s security assessments to reuse system resources and/or to accept each other’s assessed security posture to share information. records [44 USC 3301 ] All recorded information, regardless of form or characteristics, made or received by a Federal agency under Federal law or in connection with the transaction of public business and preserved or appropriate for preservation by that agency or its legitimate successor as evidence of the organization, functions, policies, decisions, procedures, operations, or other activities of the United States Government or because of the informational value of data in them. recover (CSF function) [NIST CSF] Develop and implement the appropriate activities to maintain plans for resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a cybersecurity event. resilience [CNSSI 4009] The ability to prepare for and adapt to changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions. Resilience includes the ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring threats or incidents. respond (CSF function) [NIST CSF] Develop and implement the appropriate activities to take action regarding a detected cybersecurity event. risk [OMB A-130] A measure of the extent to which an entity is threatened by a potential circumstance or event, and typically is a function of: (i) the adverse impact, or magnitude of harm, that would arise if the circumstance or event occurs; and (ii) the likelihood of occurrence.

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risk assessment
[SP 800-30]

The process of identifying risks to organizational operations
(including mission, functions, image, reputation), organizational
assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation, resulting
from the operation of a system.
risk executive (function)
[SP 800-39]

An individual or group within an organization, led by the senior
accountable official for risk management, that helps to ensure
that security risk considerations for individual systems, to
include the authorization decisions for those systems, are
viewed from an organization-wide perspective with regard to the
overall strategic goals and objectives of the organization in
carrying out its missions and business functions; and managing
risk from individual systems is consistent across the organization,
reflects organizational risk tolerance, and is considered along
with other organizational risks affecting mission/business
success.

risk management
[OMB A-130]

The program and supporting processes to manage risk to agency
operations (including mission, functions, image, reputation),
agency assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation,
and includes: establishing the context for risk-related activities;
assessing risk; responding to risk once determined; and
monitoring risk over time.
risk mitigation
[CNSSI 4009]

Prioritizing, evaluating, and implementing the appropriate risk-
reducing controls/countermeasures recommended from the risk
management process.

risk response
[OMB A-130]

Accepting, avoiding, mitigating, sharing, or transferring risk to
agency operations, agency assets, individuals, other
organizations, or the Nation.
sanitization
[SP 800-88]

A process to render access to target data on the media infeasible
for a given level of effort. Clear, purge, and destroy are actions
that can be taken to sanitize media.
scoping considerations A part of tailoring guidance providing organizations with specific
considerations on the applicability and implementation of
controls in the control baselines. Considerations include
policy/regulatory, technology, physical infrastructure, system
element allocation, operational/environmental, public access,
scalability, common control, and security objective.

security
[CNSSI 4009]

A condition that results from the establishment and
maintenance of protective measures that enable an organization
to perform its mission or critical functions despite risks posed by
threats to its use of systems. Protective measures may involve a
combination of deterrence, avoidance, prevention, detection,
recovery, and correction that should form part of the
organization’s risk management approach.

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security architect Individual, group, or organization responsible for ensuring that
the information security requirements necessary to protect the
organization’s core missions and business processes are
adequately addressed in all aspects of enterprise architecture
including reference models, segment and solution architectures,
and the resulting information systems supporting those missions
and business processes.
security architecture
[SP 800 -39]

[SP 800-160 v1]

An embedded, integral part of the enterprise architecture that
describes the structure and behavior for an enterprise’s security
processes, information security systems, personnel and
organizational sub-units, showing their alignment with the
enterprise’s mission and strategic plans. See information security
architecture.
A set of physical and logical security-relevant representations
(i.e., views) of system architecture that conveys information
about how the system is partitioned into security domains and
makes use of security-relevant elements to enforce security
policies within and between security domains based on how
data and information must be protected.
Note: The security architecture reflects security domains, the placement of
security-relevant elements within the security domains, the interconnections
and trust relationships between the security-relevant elements, and the
behavior and interactions between the security-relevant elements. The security
architecture, similar to the system architecture, may be expressed at different
levels of abstraction and with different scopes.
security categorization The process of determining the security category for information
or a system. Security categorization methodologies are described
in CNSS Instruction 1253 for national security systems and in
FIPS Publication 199 for other than national security systems.
See security category.

security category
[OMB A-130]

The characterization of information or an information system
based on an assessment of the potential impact that a loss of
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of such information or
information system would have on agency operations, agency
assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.

security control
[OMB A-130]

The safeguards or countermeasures prescribed for an
information system or an organization to protect the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its
information.
security control
assessment
[OMB A-130]

The testing or evaluation of security controls to determine the
extent to which the controls are implemented correctly,
operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with
respect to meeting the security requirements for an information
system or organization.

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security control baseline
[OMB A-130]

The set of minimum security controls defined for a low-impact,
moderate-impact, or high-impact information system. See also
control baseline.

security objective
[FIPS 199]

Confidentiality, integrity, or availability.

security plan See information system security plan.

security posture
[CNSSI 4009]

The security status of an enterprise’s networks, information, and
systems based on information assurance resources (e.g., people,
hardware, software, policies) and capabilities in place to manage
the defense of the enterprise and to react as the situation
changes. Synonymous with security status.
security requirement
[FIPS 200, Adapted]

A requirement levied on an information system or an
organization that is derived from applicable laws, executive
orders, directives, policies, standards, instructions, regulations,
procedures, and/or mission/business needs to ensure the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information that is
being processed, stored, or transmitted.
Note: Security requirements can be used in a variety of contexts from high-
level policy activities to low-level implementation activities in system
development and engineering disciplines.
security information Information within the system that can potentially impact the
operation of security functions or the provision of security
services in a manner that could result in failure to enforce the
system security policy or maintain isolation of code and data.
selection statement A control parameter that allows an organization to select a value
from a list of pre-defined values provided as part of the control
or control enhancement (e.g., selecting to either restrict an
action or prohibit an action).
See assignment statement and organization-defined control
parameter.

senior agency
information security
officer
[44 USC 3544 ]

Official responsible for carrying out the Chief Information Officer
responsibilities under FISMA and serving as the Chief
Information Officer’s primary liaison to the agency’s authorizing
officials, information system owners, and information system
security officers.

senior agency official for
privacy
[OMB A-130]

The senior official, designated by the head of each agency, who
has agency-wide responsibility for privacy, including
implementation of privacy protections; compliance with Federal
laws, regulations, and policies relating to privacy; management
of privacy risks at the agency; and a central policy-making role in
the agency’s development and evaluation of legislative,
regulatory, and other policy proposals.

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senior accountable official
for risk management
[OMB M-17-25]

The senior official, designated by the head of each agency, who
has vision into all areas of the organization and is responsible for
alignment of information security management processes with
strategic, operational, and budgetary planning processes.
software
[CNSSI 4009]

Computer programs and associated data that may be
dynamically written or modified during execution.
specification
[IEEE 610.12]

A document that specifies, in a complete, precise, verifiable
manner, the requirements, design, behavior, or other
characteristics of a system or component and often the
procedures for determining whether these provisions have been
satisfied. See specification requirement.
specification requirement A type of requirement that provides a specification for a specific
capability that implements all or part of a control and that may
be assessed (i.e., as part of the verification, validation, testing,
and evaluation processes).

statement of work
requirement

A type of requirement that represents an action that is
performed operationally or during system development.

subsystem A major subdivision or element of an information system
consisting of information, information technology, and
personnel that performs one or more specific functions.
supply chain
[OMB A-130]

Linked set of resources and processes between multiple tiers of
developers that begins with the sourcing of products and
services and extends through the design, development,
manufacturing, processing, handling, and delivery of products
and services to the acquirer.
supply chain risk
[OMB A-130]

Risks that arise from the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of information or information systems and reflect the
potential adverse impacts to organizational operations (including
mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets,
individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.
supply chain risk
management
[OMB A-130]

The process of identifying, assessing, and mitigating the risks
associated with the global and distributed nature of information
and communications technology product and service supply
chains.

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system
[CNSSI 4009]

[ISO 15288 ]

Any organized assembly of resources and procedures united and
regulated by interaction or interdependence to accomplish a set
of specific functions. See information system.
Note: Systems also include specialized systems such as industrial/process
controls systems, telephone switching and private branch exchange (PBX)
systems, and environmental control systems.
Combination of interacting elements organized to achieve one or
more stated purposes.
Note 1: There are many types of systems. Examples include: general and
special-purpose information systems; command, control, and communication
systems; crypto modules; central processing unit and graphics processor
boards; industrial/process control systems; flight control systems; weapons,
targeting, and fire control systems; medical devices and treatment systems;
financial, banking, and merchandising transaction systems; and social
networking systems.
Note 2: The interacting elements in the definition of system include hardware,
software, data, humans, processes, facilities, materials, and naturally occurring
physical entities.
Note 3: System of systems is included in the definition of system.
system boundary See authorization boundary.

system component
[SP 800-128]

A discrete identifiable information technology asset that
represents a building block of a system and may include
hardware, software, and firmware.
system element
[ISO 15288]

Member of a set of elements that constitute a system.
Note 1: A system element can be a discrete component, product, service,
subsystem, system, infrastructure, or enterprise.
Note 2: Each element of the system is implemented to fulfill specified
requirements.
Note 3: The recursive nature of the term allows the term system to apply
equally when referring to a discrete component or to a large, complex,
geographically distributed system-of-systems.
Note 4: System elements are implemented by: hardware, software, and
firmware that perform operations on data/information; physical structures,
devices, and components in the environment of operation; and the people,
processes, and procedures for operating, sustaining, and supporting the system
elements.
Note 5: System elements and information resources (as defined at 44 U.S.C. Sec.
3502 and in this document) are interchangeable terms as used in this
document.^
system development life
cycle

The scope of activities associated with a system, encompassing
the system’s initiation, development and acquisition,
implementation, operation and maintenance, and ultimately its
disposal that instigates another system initiation.
system privacy officer Individual with assigned responsibility for maintaining the
appropriate operational privacy posture for a system or
program.
systems privacy engineer Individual assigned responsibility for conducting systems privacy
engineering activities.

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systems privacy
engineering

Process that captures and refines privacy requirements and
ensures their integration into information technology
component products and information systems through
purposeful privacy design or configuration.
systems security engineer Individual assigned responsibility for conducting systems security
engineering activities.
systems security
engineering

Process that captures and refines security requirements and
ensures their integration into information technology
component products and information systems through
purposeful security design or configuration.

system security officer Individual with assigned responsibility for maintaining the
appropriate operational security posture for an information
system or program.
system security plan See information system security plan.
system-related privacy
risk
[OMB A-130]

Risk to an individual or individuals associated with the agency’s
creation, collection, use, processing, storage, maintenance,
dissemination, disclosure, and disposal of their PII. See risk.

system-related security
risk
[SP 800-30]

Risk that arises through the loss of confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of information or systems and that considers impacts
to the organization (including assets, mission, functions, image,
or reputation), individuals, other organizations, and the Nation.
See risk.

system-specific control
[OMB A-130]

A security or privacy control for an information system that is
implemented at the system level and is not inherited by any
other information system.
tailored control baseline A set of controls resulting from the application of tailoring
guidance to a control baseline. See tailoring.
tailoring
[OMB A-130]

The process by which security control baselines are modified by
identifying and designating common controls; applying scoping
considerations; selecting compensating controls; assigning
specific values to agency-defined control parameters;
supplementing baselines with additional controls or control
enhancements; and providing additional specification
information for control implementation. The tailoring process
may also be applied to privacy controls.
threat
[SP 800-30]

Any circumstance or event with the potential to adversely
impact organizational operations, organizational assets,
individuals, other organizations, or the Nation through a system
via unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of
information, and/or denial of service.

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threat source
[FIPS 200]

The intent and method targeted at the intentional exploitation
of a vulnerability or a situation and method that may
accidentally trigger a vulnerability. See threat agent.

trustworthiness
[CNSSI 4009]

The attribute of a person or enterprise that provides confidence
to others of the qualifications, capabilities, and reliability of that
entity to perform specific tasks and fulfill assigned
responsibilities.
trustworthiness
(system)

The degree to which an information system (including the
information technology components that are used to build the
system) can be expected to preserve the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of the information being processed,
stored, or transmitted by the system across the full range of
threats and individuals’ privacy.
trustworthy information
system
[OMB A-130]

An information system that is believed to be capable of
operating within defined levels of risk despite the environmental
disruptions, human errors, structural failures, and purposeful
attacks that are expected to occur in its environment of
operation.
system user Individual, or (system) process acting on behalf of an individual,
authorized to access a system.
vulnerability
[CNSSI 4009]

Weakness in an information system, system security procedures,
internal controls, or implementation that could be exploited or
triggered by a threat source.
Note: The term weakness is synonymous for deficiency. Weakness may result in
security and/or privacy risks.
vulnerability assessment
[CNSSI 4009]

Systematic examination of an information system or product to
determine the adequacy of security measures, identify security
deficiencies, provide data from which to predict the
effectiveness of proposed security measures, and confirm the
adequacy of such measures after implementation.

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APPENDIX C

ACRONYMS
COMMON ABBREVIATIONS

CIO Chief Information Officer
CNSS Committee on National Security Systems

CNSSI Committee on National Security Systems Instruction
CNSSP Committee on National Security Systems Policy
CUI Controlled Unclassified Information

DoD Department of Defense
EO Executive Order

FedRAMP Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program
FIPS Federal Information Processing Standards

FISMA Federal Information Security Modernization Act
FOCI Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence
GRC Governance Risk Compliance

GSA General Services Administration
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission

IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
ISCM Information Security Continuous Monitoring

IT Information Technology
IR Internal Report or Interagency Report
ISO International Organization for Standardization

NARA National Archives and Records Administration
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology

NSA National Security Agency
ODNI Office of the Director of National Intelligence

OMB Office of Management and Budget
OT Operations Technology
PCM Privacy Continuous Monitoring

PII Personally Identifiable Information
PL Public Law

RMF Risk Management Framework

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SCRM Supply Chain Risk Management

SDLC System Development Life Cycle
SecCM Security-focused Configuration Management

SP Special Publication

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APPENDIX D

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES
KEY PARTICIPANTS IN THE RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS

he following sections describe the roles and responsibilities of key participants involved in
an organization’s risk management process.^112 Recognizing that organizations have varying
missions, business functions, and organizational structures, there may be differences in
naming conventions for risk management roles and how risk management responsibilities are
allocated among organizational personnel (e.g., multiple individuals filling a single role or one
individual filling multiple roles).^113 However, the basic functions remain the same. The
application of the RMF described in this publication is flexible, allowing organizations to
effectively accomplish the intent of the specific tasks within their respective organizational
structures to best manage security and privacy risks. Many risk management roles defined in
this publication have counterpart roles in the SDLC processes carried out by organizations.
Organizations align their risk management roles with similar (or complementary) roles defined
for the SDLC whenever possible.^114

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL

The authorizing official is a senior official or executive with the authority to formally assume
responsibility and accountability for operating a system; providing common controls inherited
by organizational systems; or using a system, service, or application from an external provider.
The authorizing official is the only organizational official who can accept the security and privacy
risk to organizational operations, organizational assets, and individuals.^115 Authorizing officials
typically have budgetary oversight for the system or are responsible for the mission and/or
business operations supported by the system. Accordingly, authorizing officials are in
management positions with a level of authority commensurate with understanding and
accepting such security and privacy risks. Authorizing officials approve plans, memorandums of
agreement or understanding, plans of action and milestones, and determine whether significant
changes in the information systems or environments of operation require reauthorization.

Authorizing officials coordinate their activities with common control providers, system owners,
chief information officers, senior agency information security officers, senior agency officials for
privacy, system security and privacy officers, control assessors, senior accountable officials for
risk management/risk executive (function), and other interested parties during the authorization
process. With the increasing complexity of the mission/business processes in an organization,
partnership arrangements, and the use of shared services, it is possible that a system may

(^112) Organizations may define other roles to support the risk management process. (^113) Organizations ensure that there are no conflicts of interest when assigning the same individual to multiple risk management roles. See RMF Prepare-Organization Level step, Task P-1. (^114) For example, the SDLC role of system developer or program manager can be aligned with the role of system owner; and the role of mission or business owner can be aligned with the role of authorizing official. [SP 800- 64 ] provides guidance on information security in the SDLC. (^115) The responsibility and accountability of authorizing officials described in [FIPS 200] was extended in [SP 800- 53 ] to include risks to other organizations and the Nation. T

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involve co-authorizing officials.^116 If so, agreements are established between the co-authorizing
officials and documented in the security and privacy plans. Authorizing officials are responsible
and accountable for ensuring that authorization activities and functions that are delegated to
authorizing official designated representatives are carried out as specified. For federal agencies,
the role of authorizing official is an inherent U.S. Government function and is assigned to
government personnel only.

AUTHORIZING OFFICIAL DESIGNATED REPRESENTATIVE

The authorizing official designated representative is an organizational official designated by the
authorizing official who is empowered to act on behalf of the authorizing official to coordinate
and conduct the day-to-day activities associated with managing risk to information systems and
organizations. This includes carrying out many of the activities related to the execution of the
RMF. The only activity that cannot be delegated by the authorizing official to the designated
representative is the authorization decision and signing of the associated authorization decision
document (i.e., the acceptance of risk).

CHIEF ACQUISITION OFFICER

The chief acquisition officer is an organizational official designated by the head of an agency to
advise and assist the head of agency and other agency officials to ensure that the mission of the
agency is achieved through the management of the agency’s acquisition activities. The chief
acquisition officer monitors the performance of acquisition activities and programs; establishes
clear lines of authority, accountability, and responsibility for acquisition decision making within
the agency; manages the direction and implementation of acquisition policy for the agency; and
establishes policies, procedures, and practices that promote full and open competition from
responsible sources to fulfill best value requirements considering the nature of the property or
service procured. The Chief Acquisition Officer coordinates with mission or business owners,
authorizing officials, senior accountable official for risk management, system owners, common
control providers, senior agency information security officer, senior agency official for privacy,
and risk executive (function) to ensure that security and privacy requirements are defined in
organizational procurements and acquisitions.

CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER

The chief information officer^117 is an organizational official responsible for designating a senior
agency information security officer; developing and maintaining security policies, procedures,
and control techniques to address security requirements; overseeing personnel with significant
responsibilities for security and ensuring that the personnel are adequately trained; assisting
senior organizational officials concerning their security responsibilities; and reporting to the
head of the agency on the effectiveness of the organization’s security program, including
progress of remedial actions. The chief information officer, with the support of the senior
accountable official for risk management, the risk executive (function), and the senior agency
information security officer, works closely with authorizing officials and their designated
representatives to help ensure that:

(^116) [OMB A-130] provides additional information about authorizing officials and co-authorizing officials. (^117) When an organization has not designated a formal chief information officer position, [FISMA] requires that the associated responsibilities be handled by a comparable organizational official.

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- An organization-wide security program is effectively implemented resulting in adequate security for all organizational systems and environments of operation;
- Security and privacy (including supply chain) risk management considerations are integrated into programming/planning/budgeting cycles, enterprise architectures, the SDLC, and acquisitions;
- Organizational systems and common controls are covered by approved system security plans and possess current authorizations;
- Security activities required across the organization are accomplished in an efficient, cost- effective, and timely manner; and
- There is centralized reporting of security activities.

The chief information officer and authorizing officials determine the allocation of resources
dedicated to the protection of systems supporting the organization’s missions and business
functions based on organizational priorities. For information systems that process personally
identifiable information, the chief information officer and authorizing officials coordinate any
determination about the allocation of resources dedicated to the protection of those systems
with the senior agency official for privacy. For selected systems, the chief information officer
may be designated as an authorizing official or a co-authorizing official with other senior
organizational officials. The role of chief information officer is an inherent U.S. Government
function and is assigned to government personnel only.

COMMON CONTROL PROVIDER

The common control provider is an individual, group, or organization that is responsible for the
implementation, assessment, and monitoring of common controls (i.e., controls inherited by
organizational systems).^118 Common control providers also are responsible for ensuring the
documentation of organization-defined common controls in security and privacy plans (or
equivalent documents prescribed by the organization); ensuring that required assessments of
the common controls are conducted by qualified assessors with an appropriate level of
independence; documenting assessment findings in control assessment reports; and producing
plans of action and milestones for controls having deficiencies. Security and privacy plans,
security and privacy assessment reports, and plans of action and milestones for common
controls (or summary of such information) are made available to the system owners of systems
inheriting common controls after the information is reviewed and approved by the authorizing
officials accountable for those common controls.

The senior agency official for privacy is responsible for designating which privacy controls may
be treated as common controls. Privacy controls that are designated as common controls are
documented in the organization’s privacy program plan.^119 The senior agency official for privacy

(^118) Organizations can have multiple common control providers depending on how security and privacy responsibilities are allocated organization-wide. Common control providers may be system owners when the common controls are resident within an organizational system. (^119) A privacy program plan is a formal document that provides an overview of an agency’s privacy program, including a description of the structure of the privacy program; the role of the senior agency official for privacy and other privacy officials and staff; the strategic goals and objectives of the privacy program; the resources dedicated to the privacy program; and the program management controls and common controls in place or planned for meeting applicable privacy requirements and managing privacy risks.

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has oversight responsibility for common controls in place or planned for meeting applicable
privacy requirements and managing privacy risks and is responsible for assessing those controls.
At the discretion of the organization, privacy controls that are designated as common controls
may be assessed by an independent assessor. In all cases, however, the senior agency official for
privacy retains responsibility and accountability for the organization’s privacy program, including
any privacy functions performed by independent assessors. Privacy plans and privacy control
assessment reports are made available to systems owners whose systems inherit privacy
controls that are designated as common controls.

CONTROL ASSESSOR

The control assessor is an individual, group, or organization responsible for conducting a
comprehensive assessment of implemented controls and control enhancements to determine
the effectiveness of the controls (i.e., the extent to which the controls are implemented
correctly, operating as intended, and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting
the security and privacy requirements for the system and the organization). For systems,
implemented system-specific controls and system-implemented parts of hybrid controls are
assessed. For common controls, implemented common controls and common control-
implemented parts of hybrid controls are assessed. The system owner and common control
provider rely on the security and privacy expertise and judgment of the assessor to assess the
implemented controls using the assessment procedures specified in the security and privacy
assessment plans. Multiple control assessors who are differentiated by their expertise in specific
control requirements or technologies may be required to conduct the assessment effectively.
Prior to initiating the control assessment, assessors review the security and privacy plans to
facilitate development of the assessment plans. Control assessors provide an assessment of the
severity of the deficiencies discovered in the system, environment of operation, and common
controls and can recommend corrective actions to address the identified vulnerabilities. For
system-level control assessments, control assessors do not assess inherited controls, and only
assess the system-implemented portions of hybrid controls. Control assessors prepare security
and privacy assessment reports containing the results and findings from the assessment.

The required level of assessor independence is determined by the authorizing official based on
laws, executive orders, directives, regulations, policies, standards, or guidelines. When a control
assessment is conducted in support of an authorization decision or ongoing authorization, the
authorizing official makes an explicit determination of the degree of independence required.
Assessor independence is a factor in preserving an impartial and unbiased assessment process;
determining the credibility of the assessment results; and ensuring that the authorizing official
receives objective information to make an informed, risk-based authorization decision.

The senior agency official for privacy is responsible for assessing privacy controls and for
providing privacy information to the authorizing official. At the discretion of the organization,
privacy controls may be assessed by an independent assessor. However, in all cases, the senior
agency official for privacy retains responsibility and accountability for the privacy program of the
organization, including any privacy functions performed by the independent assessors.

ENTERPRISE ARCHITECT

The enterprise architect is an individual or group responsible for working with the leadership
and subject matter experts in an organization to build a holistic view of the organization's

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missions and business functions, mission/business processes, information, and information
technology assets. With respect to information security and privacy, enterprise architects:

Implement an enterprise architecture strategy that facilitates effective security and privacy solutions;
Coordinate with security and privacy architects to determine the optimal placement of systems/system elements within the enterprise architecture and to address security and privacy issues between systems and the enterprise architecture;
Assist in reducing complexity within the IT infrastructure to facilitate security;
Assist with determining appropriate control implementations and initial configuration baselines as they relate to the enterprise architecture;
Collaborate with system owners and authorizing officials to facilitate authorization boundary determinations and allocation of controls to system elements;
Serve as part of the Risk Executive (function); and
Assist with integration of the organizational risk management strategy and system-level security and privacy requirements into program, planning, and budgeting activities, the SDLC, acquisition processes, security and privacy (including supply chain) risk management, and systems engineering processes.

HEAD OF AGENCY

The head of agency is responsible and accountable for providing information security
protections commensurate with the risk to organizational operations and assets, individuals,
other organizations, and the Nation—that is, risk resulting from unauthorized access, use,
disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction of information collected or maintained by or
on behalf of the agency; and the information systems used or operated by an agency or by a
contractor of an agency or other organization on behalf of an agency. The head of agency is also
the senior official in an organization with the responsibility for ensuring that privacy interests
are protected and that PII is managed responsibly within the organization. The heads of
agencies ensure that:

Information security and privacy management processes are integrated with strategic and operational planning processes;
Senior officials within the organization provide information security for the information and systems supporting the operations and assets under their control;
Senior agency officials for privacy are designated who are responsible and accountable for ensuring compliance with applicable privacy requirements, managing privacy risk, and the organization’s privacy program; and
The organization has adequately trained personnel to assist in complying with security and privacy requirements in legislation, executive orders, policies, directives, instructions, standards, and guidelines.

The head of agency establishes the organizational commitment and the actions required to
effectively manage security and privacy risk and protect the missions and business functions
being carried out by the organization. The head of agency establishes security and privacy

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accountability and provides active support and oversight of monitoring and improvement for
the security and privacy programs. Senior leadership commitment to security and privacy
establishes a level of due diligence within the organization that promotes a climate for mission
and business success.

INFORMATION OWNER OR STEWARD

The information owner or steward is an organizational official with statutory, management, or
operational authority for specified information and the responsibility for establishing the
policies and procedures governing its generation, collection, processing, dissemination, and
disposal. In information-sharing environments, the information owner/steward is responsible
for establishing the rules for appropriate use and protection of the information and retains that
responsibility even when the information is shared with or provided to other organizations. The
owner/steward of the information processed, stored, or transmitted by a system may or may
not be the same individual as the system owner. An individual system may contain information
from multiple information owners/stewards. Information owners/stewards provide input to
system owners regarding the security and privacy requirements and controls for the systems
where the information is processed, stored, or transmitted.

MISSION OR BUSINESS OWNER

The mission or business owner is the senior official or executive within an organization with
specific mission or line of business responsibilities and that has a security or privacy interest in
the organizational systems supporting those missions or lines of business. Mission or business
owners are key stakeholders that have a significant role in establishing organizational mission
and business processes and the protection needs and security and privacy requirements that
ensure the successful conduct of the organization’s missions and business operations. Mission
and business owners provide essential inputs to the risk management strategy, play an active
part in the SDLC, and may also serve in the role of authorizing official.

RISK EXECUTIVE (FUNCTION)

The risk executive (function) is an individual or group within an organization that provides a
comprehensive, organization-wide approach to risk management. The risk executive (function)
is led by the senior accountable official for risk management and serves as the common risk
management resource for senior leaders, executives, and managers, mission/business owners,
chief information officers, senior agency information security officers, senior agency officials for
privacy, system owners, common control providers, enterprise architects, security architects,
systems security or privacy engineers, system security or privacy officers, and any other
stakeholders having a vested interest in the mission/business success of organizations. The risk
executive (function) is an inherent U.S. Government function and is assigned to government
personnel only.

The risk executive (function) ensures that risk considerations for systems (including
authorization decisions for those systems and the common controls inherited by those systems),
are viewed from an organization-wide perspective regarding the organization’s strategic goals
and objectives in carrying out its core missions and business functions. The risk executive
(function) ensures that managing risk is consistent throughout the organization, reflects
organizational risk tolerance, and is considered along with other types of risk to ensure

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mission/business success. The risk executive (function) coordinates with senior leaders and
executives to:

Establish risk management roles and responsibilities;
Develop and implement an organization-wide risk management strategy that provides a strategic view of security risks for the organization^120 and that guides and informs organizational risk decisions (including how risk is framed, assessed, responded to, and monitored over time);
Provide a comprehensive, organization-wide, holistic approach for addressing risk—an approach that provides a greater understanding of the integrated operations of the organization;^
Manage threat, vulnerability, and security and privacy risk (including supply chain risk) information for organizational systems and the environments in which the systems operate;
Establish organization-wide forums to consider all types and sources of risk (including aggregated risk);
Identify the organizational risk posture based on the aggregated risk from the operation and use of systems and the respective environments of operation for which the organization is responsible;
Provide oversight for the risk management activities carried out by organizations to help ensure consistent and effective risk-based decisions;
Develop a broad-based understanding of risk regarding the strategic view of organizations and their integrated operations;
Establish effective vehicles and serve as a focal point for communicating and sharing risk information among key stakeholders (e.g., authorizing officials and other senior leaders) internally and externally to organizations;
Specify the degree of autonomy for subordinate organizations permitted by parent organizations regarding framing, assessing, responding to, and monitoring risk;
Promote cooperation and collaboration among authorizing officials to include authorization actions requiring shared responsibility (e.g., joint authorizations);
Provide an organization-wide forum to consider all sources of risk (including aggregated risk) to organizational operations and assets, individuals, other organizations, and the Nation;
Ensure that authorization decisions consider all factors necessary for mission and business success; and
Ensure shared responsibility for supporting organizational missions and business functions using external providers receives the needed visibility and is elevated to appropriate decision-making authorities.

The risk executive (function) presumes neither a specific organizational structure nor formal
responsibility assigned to any one individual or group within the organization. Heads of agencies

(^120) Authorizing officials may have narrow or localized perspectives in rendering authorization decisions without fully understanding or explicitly accepting the organization-wide risks being incurred from such decisions.

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or organizations may choose to retain the risk executive (function) or to delegate the function.
The risk executive (function) requires a mix of skills, expertise, and perspectives to understand
the strategic goals and objectives of organizations, organizational missions/business functions,
technical possibilities and constraints, and key mandates and guidance that shape organizational
operations. To provide this needed mixture, the risk executive (function) can be filled by a single
individual or office (supported by an expert staff) or by a designated group (e.g., a risk board,
executive steering committee, executive leadership council). The risk executive (function) fits
into the organizational governance structure in such a way as to facilitate efficiency and
effectiveness.

SECURITY OR PRIVACY ARCHITECT

The security or privacy architect is an individual, group, or organization responsible for ensuring
that stakeholder protection needs and the corresponding system requirements necessary to
protect organizational missions and business functions and individuals’ privacy are adequately
addressed in the enterprise architecture including reference models, segment architectures, and
solution architectures (systems supporting mission and business processes). The security or
privacy architect serves as the primary liaison between the enterprise architect and the systems
security or privacy engineer and coordinates with system owners, common control providers,
and system security or privacy officers on the allocation of controls.

Security or privacy architects, in coordination with system security or privacy officers, advise
authorizing officials, chief information officers, senior accountable officials for risk management
or risk executive (function), senior agency information security officers, and senior agency
officials for privacy on a range of security and privacy issues. Examples include establishing
authorization boundaries; establishing security or privacy alerts; assessing the severity of
deficiencies in the system or controls; developing plans of action and milestones; creating risk
mitigation approaches; and potential adverse effects of identified vulnerabilities or privacy risks.

When the security architect and privacy architect are separate roles, the security architect is
generally responsible for aspects of the enterprise architecture that protect information and
information systems from unauthorized system activity or behavior to provide confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. The privacy architect is responsible for aspects of the enterprise
architecture that ensure compliance with privacy requirements and manage the privacy risks to
individuals associated with the processing of PII. Security and privacy architect responsibilities
overlap regarding aspects of the enterprise architecture that protect the security of PII.

SENIOR ACCOUNTABLE OFFICIAL FOR RISK MANAGEMENT

The senior accountable official for risk management is the individual that leads and manages the
risk executive (function) in an organization and is responsible for aligning information security
and privacy risk management processes with strategic, operational, and budgetary planning
processes. The senior accountable official for risk management is the head of the agency or an
individual designated by the head of the agency. The senior accountable official for risk
management determines the organizational structure and responsibilities of the risk executive
(function), and in coordination with the head of the agency, may retain the risk executive
(function) or delegate the function to another organizational official or group. The senior
accountable official for risk management is an inherent U.S. Government function and is
assigned to government personnel only.

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SENIOR AGENCY INFORMATION SECURITY OFFICER

The senior agency information security officer is an organizational official responsible for
carrying out the chief information officer security responsibilities under FISMA, and serving as
the primary liaison for the chief information officer to the organization’s authorizing officials,
system owners, common control providers, and system security officers. The senior agency
information security officer is also responsible for coordinating with the senior agency official
for privacy to ensure coordination between privacy and information security programs. The
senior agency information security officer possesses the professional qualifications, including
training and experience, required to administer security program functions; maintains security
duties as a primary responsibility; and heads an office with the specific mission and resources to
assist the organization in achieving trustworthy, secure information and systems in accordance
with the requirements in FISMA. The senior agency information security officer may serve as
authorizing official designated representative or as a security control assessor. The role of senior
agency information security officer is an inherent U.S. Government function and is therefore
assigned to government personnel only. Organizations may also refer to the senior agency
information security officer as the senior information security officer or chief information
security officer.

SENIOR AGENCY OFFICIAL FOR PRIVACY

The senior agency official for privacy is the senior official or executive with agency-wide
responsibility and accountability for ensuring compliance with applicable privacy requirements
and managing privacy risk. Among other things, the senior agency official for privacy is
responsible for:

Coordinating with the senior agency information security officer to ensure coordination of privacy and information security activities;
Reviewing and approving the categorization of information systems that create, collect, use, process, store, maintain, disseminate, disclose, or dispose of personally identifiable information;
Designating which privacy controls will be treated as program management, common, system-specific, and hybrid privacy controls;
Identifying assessment methodologies and metrics to determine whether privacy controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended, and sufficient to ensure compliance with applicable privacy requirements and manage privacy risks;
Reviewing and approving privacy plans for information systems prior to authorization, reauthorization, or ongoing authorization;
Reviewing authorization packages for information systems that create, collect, use, process, store, maintain, disseminate, disclose, or dispose of personally identifiable information to ensure compliance with privacy requirements and manage privacy risks;
Conducting and documenting the results of privacy control assessments to verify the continued effectiveness of all privacy controls selected and implemented at the agency; and
Establishing and maintaining a privacy continuous monitoring program to maintain ongoing awareness of privacy risks and assess privacy controls at a frequency sufficient to ensure compliance with privacy requirements and manage privacy risks.

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The role of senior agency official for privacy is an inherent U.S. Government function and is
therefore assigned to government personnel only.

SYSTEM ADMINISTRATOR

The system administrator is an individual, group, or organization responsible for setting up and
maintaining a system or specific system elements. System administrator responsibilities include,
for example, installing, configuring, and updating hardware and software; establishing and
managing user accounts; overseeing or conducting backup, recovery, and reconstitution
activities; implementing controls; and adhering to and enforcing organizational security and
privacy policies and procedures. The system administrator role includes other types of system
administrators (e.g., database administrators, network administrators, web administrators, and
application administrators).

SYSTEM OWNER

The system owner is an organizational official responsible for the procurement, development,
integration, modification, operation, maintenance, and disposal of a system.^121 The system
owner is responsible for addressing the operational interests of the user community (i.e., users
who require access to the system to satisfy mission, business, or operational requirements) and
for ensuring compliance with security requirements. In coordination with the system security
and privacy officers, the system owner is responsible for the development and maintenance of
the security and privacy plans and ensures that the system is operated in accordance with the
selected and implemented controls.

In coordination with the information owner/steward, the system owner decides who has access
to the system (and with what types of privileges or access rights).^122 The system owner ensures
that system users and support personnel receive the requisite security and privacy training.
Based on guidance from the authorizing official, the system owner informs organizational
officials of the need to conduct the authorization, ensures that resources are available for the
effort, and provides the required system access, information, and documentation to control
assessors. The system owner receives the security and privacy assessment results from the
control assessors. After taking appropriate steps to reduce or eliminate vulnerabilities or
security and privacy risks, the system owner assembles the authorization package and submits
the package to the authorizing official or the authorizing official designated representative for
adjudication.^123

(^121) Organizations may refer to system owners as program managers or business/asset owners. (^122) The responsibility for deciding who has access to specific information within an organizational system (and with what types of privileges or access rights) may reside with the information owner/steward. (^123) The authorizing official may choose to designate an individual other than the system owner to compile and assemble the information for the authorization package. In this situation, the designated individual coordinates the compilation and assembly activities with the system owner.

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SYSTEM SECURITY OR PRIVACY OFFICER

The system security or privacy officer^124 is an individual responsible for ensuring that the security
and privacy posture is maintained for an organizational system and works in close collaboration
with the system owner. The system security or privacy officer also serves as a principal advisor
on all matters, technical and otherwise, involving the controls for the system. The system
security or privacy officer has the knowledge and expertise to manage the security or privacy
aspects of an organizational system and, in many organizations, is assigned responsibility for the
day-to-day system security or privacy operations. This responsibility may also include, but is not
limited to, physical and environmental protection; personnel security; incident handling; and
security and privacy training and awareness.

The system security or privacy officer may be called on to assist in the development of the
system-level security and privacy policies and procedures and to ensure compliance with those
policies and procedures. In close coordination with the system owner, the system security or
privacy officer often plays an active role in the monitoring of a system and its environment of
operation to include developing and updating security and privacy plans, managing and
controlling changes to the system, and assessing the security or privacy impact of those
changes.

When the system security officer and system privacy officer are separate roles, the system
security officer is generally responsible for aspects of the system that protect information and
information systems from unauthorized system activity or behavior to provide confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. The system privacy officer is responsible for aspects of the system that
ensure compliance with privacy requirements and manage the privacy risks to individuals
associated with the processing of PII. The responsibilities of system security officers and system
privacy officers overlap regarding aspects of the system that protect the security of PII.

SYSTEM USER

The system user is an individual or (system) process acting on behalf of an individual that is
authorized to access information and information systems to perform assigned duties. System
user responsibilities include, but are not limited to, adhering to organizational policies that
govern acceptable use of organizational systems; using the organization-provided information
technology resources for defined purposes only; and reporting anomalous or suspicious system
behavior.

SYSTEMS SECURITY OR PRIVACY ENGINEER

The systems security or privacy engineer is an individual, group, or organization responsible for
conducting systems security or privacy engineering activities as part of the SDLC. Systems
security and privacy engineering is a process that captures and refines security and privacy
requirements for systems and ensures that the requirements are effectively integrated into

(^124) Organizations may define a system security manager or security manager role with similar responsibilities as a system security officer or with oversight responsibilities for a security program. In these situations, system security officers may, at the discretion of the organization, report directly to system security managers or security managers. Organizations may assign equivalent responsibilities for privacy to separate individuals with appropriate subject matter expertise.

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systems and system elements through security or privacy architecting, design, development,
and configuration. Systems security or privacy engineers are part of the development team—
designing and developing organizational systems or upgrading existing systems along with
ensuring continuous monitoring requirements are addressed at the system level. Systems
security or privacy engineers employ best practices when implementing controls including
software engineering methodologies; system and security or privacy engineering principles;
secure or privacy-enhancing design, secure or privacy-enhancing architecture, and secure or
privacy-enhancing coding techniques. Systems security or privacy engineers coordinate security
and privacy activities with senior agency information security officers, senior agency officials for
privacy, security and privacy architects, system owners, common control providers, and system
security or privacy officers.

When the systems security engineer and privacy engineer are separate roles, the systems
security engineer is generally responsible for those activities associated with protecting
information and information systems from unauthorized system activity or behavior to provide
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The privacy engineer is responsible for those activities
associated with ensuring compliance with privacy requirements and managing the privacy risks
to individuals associated with the processing of PII. The responsibilities of systems security
engineers and privacy engineers overlap regarding activities associated with protecting the
security of PII.

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APPENDIX E

SUMMARY OF RMF TASKS
RMF TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SUPPORTING ROLES

TABLE E-1: PREPARE TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SUPPORTING ROLES

RMF TASKS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORTING ROLES

Organization Level

TASK P-1
Risk Management Roles
Identify and assign individuals to
specific roles associated with
security and privacy risk
management.

Head of Agency
Chief Information Officer
Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function)
- Senior Agency Information Security Officer

TASK P-2
Risk Management Strategy
Establish a risk management
strategy for the organization
that includes a determination of
risk tolerance.

Head of Agency • Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function)
Chief Information Officer
Senior Agency Information Security Officer
Senior Agency Official for Privacy

TASK P-3
Risk Assessment—Organization
Assess organization-wide
security and privacy risk and
update the risk assessment
results on an ongoing basis.

Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function)
Senior Agency Information Security Officer
Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- Chief Information Officer
- Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- Mission or Business Owner

TASK P-4
Organizationally-Tailored
Control Baselines and
Cybersecurity Framework
Profiles (Optional)
Establish, document, and
publish organizationally-tailored
control baselines and/or
Cybersecurity Framework
Profiles.

Mission or Business Owner
Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) - Chief Information Officer - Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative - Senior Agency Information Security Officer - Senior Agency Official for Privacy

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RMF TASKS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORTING ROLES

TASK P-5
Common Control Identification
Identify, document, and publish
organization-wide common
controls that are available for
inheritance by organizational
systems.

Senior Agency Information Security Officer
Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- Mission or Business Owner
- Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function)
- Chief Information Officer
- Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- Common Control Provider
- System Owner

TASK P-6
Impact-Level Prioritization
(Optional)
Prioritize organizational systems
with the same impact level.

Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) - Senior Agency Information Security Officer - Senior Agency Official for Privacy - Mission or Business Owner - System Owner - Chief Information Officer - Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative

TASK P-7
Continuous Monitoring
Strategy—Organization
Develop and implement an
organization-wide strategy for
continuously monitoring control
effectiveness.

Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) - Chief Information Officer - Senior Agency Information Security Officer - Senior Agency Official for Privacy - Mission or Business Owner - System Owner - Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative

System Level

TASK P-8
Mission or Business Focus
Identify the missions, business
functions, and mission/business
processes that the system is
intended to support.

Mission or Business Owner • Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
System Owner
Information Owner or Steward
Chief Information Officer
Senior Agency Information Security Officer
Senior Agency Official for Privacy

TASK P-9
System Stakeholders
Identify stakeholders who have
an interest in the design,
development, implementation,
assessment, operation,
maintenance, or disposal of the
system.

Mission or Business Owner
System Owner
- Chief Information Officer
- Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- Information Owner or Steward
- Senior Agency Information Security Officer
- Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- Chief Acquisition Officer

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RMF TASKS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORTING ROLES

TASK P-10
Asset Identification
Identify assets that require
protection.

System Owner • Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
Mission or Business Owner
Information Owner or Steward
Senior Agency Information Security Officer
Senior Agency Official for Privacy
System Administrator

TASK P-11
Authorization Boundary
Determine the authorization
boundary of the system.

Authorizing Official • Chief Information Officer
- Mission or Business Owner
- System Owner
- Senior Agency Information Security Officer
- Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- Enterprise Architect

TASK P-12
Information Types
Identify the types of information
to be processed, stored, and
transmitted by the system.

System Owner
Information Owner or Steward
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer
- Mission or Business Owner

TASK P-13
Information Life Cycle
Identify and understand all
stages of the information life
cycle for each information type
processed, stored, or
transmitted by the system.

Senior Agency Official for Privacy
System Owner
Information Owner or Steward
- Chief Information Officer
- Mission or Business Owner
- Security Architect
- Privacy Architect
- Enterprise Architect
- Systems Security Engineer
- Privacy Engineer

TASK P-14
Risk Assessment—System
Conduct a system-level risk
assessment and update the risk
assessment results on an
ongoing basis.

System Owner
System Security Officer
System Privacy Officer
- Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function)
- Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- Mission or Business Owner
- Information Owner or Steward
- System Security Officer

TASK P-15
Requirements Definition
Define the security and privacy
requirements for the system
and the environment of
operation.

Mission or Business Owner
System Owner
Information Owner or Steward
System Privacy Officer
- Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- Senior Agency Information Security Officer
- Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- System Security Officer
- Chief Acquisition Officer
- Security Architect
- Privacy Architect
- Enterprise Architect

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RMF TASKS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORTING ROLES

TASK P-16
Enterprise Architecture
Determine the placement of the
system within the enterprise
architecture.

Mission or Business Owner
Enterprise Architect
Security Architect
Privacy Architect
- Chief Information Officer
- Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- Senior Agency Information Security Officer
- Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- System Owner
- Information Owner or Steward

TASK P-17
Requirements Allocation
Allocate security and privacy
requirements to the system and
to the environment of
operation.

Security Architect
Privacy Architect
System Security Officer
System Privacy Officer
- Chief Information Officer
- Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- Mission or Business Owner
- Senior Agency Information Security Officer
- Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- System Owner

TASK P-18
System Registration
Register the system with
organizational program or
management offices.

System Owner • Mission or Business Owner
- Chief Information Officer
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer

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TABLE E-2: CATEGORIZATION TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SUPPORTING ROLES

RMF TASKS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORTING ROLES

TASK C-1
System Description
Document the characteristics of the
system.

System Owner (^) • Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative

Information Owner or Steward
System Security Officer
System Privacy Officer

TASK C-2
Security Categorization
Categorize the system and
document the security
categorization results.

System Owner
Information Owner or Steward
- Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function)
- Chief Information Officer
- Senior Agency Information Security Officer
- Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer

TASK C-3
Security Categorization Review and
Approval
Review and approve the security
categorization results and decision.

Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
Senior Agency Official for Privacy (for systems processing PII) - Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) - Chief Information Officer - Senior Agency Information Security Officer

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TABLE E-3: SELECTION TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SUPPORTING ROLES

RMF TASKS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORTING ROLES

TASK S-1
Control Selection
Select the controls for the system
and the environment of operation.

System Owner
Common Control Provider
- Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- Information Owner or Steward
- Systems Security Engineer
- Privacy Engineer
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer

TASK S-2
Control Tailoring
Tailor the controls selected for the
system and the environment of
operation.

System Owner
Common Control Provider
- Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- Information Owner or Steward
- Systems Security Engineer
- Privacy Engineer
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer

TASK S- 3
Control Allocation
Allocate security and privacy
controls to the system and to the
environment of operation.

Security Architect
Privacy Architect
System Security Officer
System Privacy Officer
- Chief Information Officer
- Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- Mission or Business Owner
- Senior Agency Information Security Officer
- Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- System Owner

TASK S- 4
Documentation of Planned Control
Implementations
Document the controls for the
system and environment of
operation in security and privacy
plans.

System Owner
Common Control Provider
- Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- Information Owner or Steward
- Systems Security Engineer
- Privacy Engineer
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer

TASK S- 5
Continuous Monitoring Strategy—
System
Develop and implement a system-
level strategy for monitoring control
effectiveness that is consistent with
and supplements the organizational
continuous monitoring strategy.

System Owner
Common Control Provider
- Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function)
- Chief Information Officer
- Senior Agency Information Security Officer
- Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- Information Owner or Steward
- Security Architect
- Privacy Architect
- Systems Security Engineer
- Privacy Engineer
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer

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RMF TASKS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORTING ROLES

TASK S- 6
Plan Review and Approval
Review and approve the security
and privacy plans for the system
and the environment of operation.

Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative - Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) - Chief Information Officer - Senior Agency Information Security Officer - Senior Agency Official for Privacy - Chief Acquisition Officer

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TABLE E-4: IMPLEMENTATION TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SUPPORTING ROLES

RMF TASKS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORTING ROLES

TASK I- 1
Control Implementation
Implement the controls in the
security and privacy plans.

System Owner
Common Control Provider
- Information Owner or Steward
- Security Architect
- Privacy Architect
- Systems Security Engineer
- Privacy Engineer
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer
- Enterprise Architect
- System Administrator

TASK I- 2
Update Control Implementation
Information
Document changes to planned
control implementations based on
the “as-implemented” state of
controls.

System Owner
Common Control Provider
- Information Owner or Steward
- Security Architect
- Privacy Architect
- Systems Security Engineer
- Privacy Engineer
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer
- Enterprise Architect
- System Administrator

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TABLE E-5: ASSESSMENT TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SUPPORTING ROLES

RMF TASKS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORTING ROLES

TASK A-1
Assessor Selection
Select the appropriate assessor
or assessment team for the type
of control assessment to be
conducted.

Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative - Chief Information Officer - Senior Agency Information Security Officer - Senior Agency Official for Privacy

TASK A-2
Assessment Plan
Develop, review, and approve
plans to assess implemented
controls.

Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
Control Assessor
- Senior Agency Information Security Officer
- Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- System Owner
- Common Control Provider
- Information Owner or Steward
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer

TASK A-3
Control Assessments
Assess the controls in accordance
with the assessment procedures
described in assessment plans.

Control Assessor • Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
System Owner
Common Control Provider
Information Owner or Steward
Senior Agency Information Security Officer
Senior Agency Official for Privacy
System Security Officer
System Privacy Officer

TASK A-4
Assessment Reports
Prepare the assessment reports
documenting the findings and
recommendations from the
control assessments.

Control Assessor • System Owner
- Common Control Provider
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer

TASK A-5
Remediation Actions
Conduct initial remediation
actions on the controls and
reassess remediated controls.

System Owner
Common Control Provider
Control Assessor
- Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- Senior Agency Information Security Officer
- Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function)
- Information Owner or Steward
- Systems Security Engineer
- Privacy Engineer
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer

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RMF TASKS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORTING ROLES

TASK A-6
Plan of Action and Milestones
Prepare the plan of action and
milestones based on the findings
and recommendations of the
assessment reports.

System Owner
Common Control Provider
- Information Owner or Steward
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer
- Senior Agency Information Security Officer
- Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- Chief Acquisition Officer
- Control Assessor

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TABLE E-6: AUTHORIZATION TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SUPPORTING ROLES

RMF TASKS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORTING ROLES

TASK R-1
Authorization Package
Assemble the authorization
package and submit the package
to the authorizing official for an
authorization decision.

System Owner
Common Control Provider
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer
- Senior Agency Information Security Officer
- Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- Control Assessor

TASK R-2
Risk Analysis and Determination
Analyze and determine the risk
from the operation or use of the
system or the provision of
common controls.

Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative - Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) - Senior Agency Information Security Officer - Senior Agency Official for Privacy

TASK R-3
Risk Response
Identify and implement a
preferred course of action in
response to the risk determined.

Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative - Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function) - Senior Agency Information Security Officer - Senior Agency Official for Privacy - System Owner or Common Control Provider - Information Owner or Steward - Systems Security Engineer - Privacy Engineer - System Security Officer - System Privacy Officer

TASK R-4
Authorization Decision
Determine if the risk from the
operation or use of the
information system or the
provision or use of common
controls is acceptable.

Authorizing Official • Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function)
Chief Information Officer
Senior Agency Information Security Officer
Senior Agency Official for Privacy
Authorizing Official Designated Representative

TASK R-5
Authorization Reporting
Report the authorization decision
and any deficiencies in controls
that represent significant security
or privacy risk.

Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative - System Owner or Common Control Provider - Information Owner or Steward - System Security Officer - System Privacy Officer - Senior Agency Information Security Officer - Senior Agency Official for Privacy

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TABLE E-7: MONITORING TASKS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND SUPPORTING ROLES

RMF TASKS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY SUPPORTING ROLES

TASK M-1
System and Environment Changes
Monitor the information system
and its environment of operation
for changes that impact the security
and privacy posture of the system.

System Owner or Common Control Provider
Senior Agency Information Security Officer
Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function)
- Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- Information Owner or Steward
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer

TASK M-2
Ongoing Assessments
Assess the controls implemented
within and inherited by the system
in accordance with the continuous
monitoring strategy.

Control Assessor • Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
System Owner or Common Control Provider
Information Owner or Steward
System Security Officer
System Privacy Officer
Senior Agency Information Security Officer
Senior Agency Official for Privacy

TASK M-3
Ongoing Risk Response
Respond to risk based on the results
of ongoing monitoring activities,
risk assessments, and outstanding
items in plans of action and
milestones.

Authorizing Official
System Owner
Common Control Provider
- Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function)
- Senior Agency Information Security Officer
- Senior Agency Official for Privacy; Authorizing Official Designated Representative
- Information Owner or Steward
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer
- Systems Security Engineer
- Privacy Engineer
- Security Architect
- Privacy Architect

TASK M-4
Authorization Package Updates
Update plans, assessment reports,
and plans of action and milestones
based on the results of the
continuous monitoring process.

System Owner
Common Control Provider
- Information Owner or Steward
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer
- Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- Senior Agency Information Security Officer

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TASK M-5
Security and Privacy Reporting
Report the security and privacy
posture of the system to the
authorizing official and other
organizational officials on an
ongoing basis in accordance with
the organizational continuous
monitoring strategy.

System Owner
Common Control Provider
Senior Agency Information Security Officer
Senior Agency Official for Privacy
- System Security Officer
- System Privacy Officer

TASK M-6
Ongoing Authorization
Review the security and privacy
posture of the system on an
ongoing basis to determine whether
the risk remains acceptable.

Authorizing Official • Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function)
Chief Information Officer
Senior Agency Information Security Officer
Senior Agency Official for Privacy
Authorizing Official Designated Representative

TASK M-7
System Disposal
Implement a system disposal
strategy and execute required
actions when a system is removed
from operation.

System Owner • Authorizing Official or Authorizing Official Designated Representative
Information Owner or Steward
System Security Officer
System Privacy Officer
Senior Accountable Official for Risk Management or Risk Executive (Function)
Senior Agency Information Security Officer
Senior Agency Official for Privacy

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APPENDIX F

SYSTEM AND COMMON CONTROL AUTHORIZATIONS
AUTHORIZATION DECISIONS AND SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

his appendix provides information on the system and common control authorization
processes to include: types of authorizations; content of authorization packages;
authorization decisions; authorization decision documents; ongoing authorization;
reauthorization; event-driven triggers and significant changes; type and facility authorizations;
and authorization approaches.

TYPES OF AUTHORIZATIONS

Authorization is the process by which a senior management official, the authorizing official ,
reviews security and privacy information describing the current security and privacy posture of
information systems or common controls that are inherited by systems. The authorizing official
uses this information to determine if the mission/business risk of operating a system or
providing common controls is acceptable—and if it is, explicitly accepts the risk. Security and
privacy information is presented to the authorizing official in an authorization package, which
may consist of a report from an automated security/privacy management and reporting tool.^125
System and common control authorization occurs as part of the RMF Authorize step. A system
authorization or a common control authorization can be an initial authorization, an ongoing
authorization, or a reauthorization as defined below:

Initial authorization is defined as the initial (start-up) risk determination and risk acceptance decision based on a complete, zero-based review of the system or of common controls. The zero-based review of the system includes an assessment of all implemented system-level controls (including the system-level portion of the hybrid controls) and a review of the security status of inherited common controls as specified in security and privacy plans.^126 The zero-based review of common controls (other than common controls that are system- based) includes an assessment of applicable controls (e.g., policies, operating procedures, implementation information) that contribute to the provision of a common control or set of common controls.
Ongoing authorization is defined as the subsequent (follow-on) risk determinations and risk acceptance decisions taken at agreed-upon and documented frequencies in accordance with the organization’s mission/business requirements and organizational risk tolerance. Ongoing authorization is a time-driven or event-driven authorization process. The authorizing official is provided with the necessary information regarding the near real-time security and privacy posture of the system to determine whether the mission/business risk of continued system

(^125) [SP 800- 137 ] provides information on automated security management and reporting tools. Future publications will address privacy management and reporting tools. (^126) The zero-based review of a system does not require a zero-based review of the common controls that are available for inheritance by that system. The common controls are authorized under a separate authorization process with a separate authorizing official accepting the risk associated with the provision of those controls. The review of the security and privacy plans containing common controls is necessary to understand the current state of the controls being inherited by organizational systems and factoring this information into risk-based decisions associated with the system. T

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operation or the provision of common controls is acceptable. Ongoing authorization is
fundamentally related to the ongoing understanding and ongoing acceptance of security
and privacy risk and is dependent on a robust continuous monitoring program.

Reauthorization is defined as the static, single point-in-time risk determination and risk acceptance decision that occurs after initial authorization. In general, reauthorization actions may be time-driven or event-driven. However, under ongoing authorization, reauthorization is in most instances, an event-driven action initiated by the authorizing official or directed by the senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive (function) in response to an event that results in security and privacy risk above the level of risk previously accepted by the authorizing official. Reauthorization consists of a review of the system or the common controls similar to the review carried out during the initial authorization. The reauthorization differs from the initial authorization because the authorizing official can choose to initiate a complete zero-based review of the system or of the common controls or to initiate a targeted review based on the type of event that triggered the reauthorization. Reauthorization is a separate activity from the ongoing authorization process. However, security and privacy information generated from the continuous monitoring program may be leveraged to support reauthorization. The reauthorization actions may necessitate a review of and changes to the organization’s information security and privacy continuous monitoring strategies which may in turn affect ongoing authorization.

AUTHORIZATION PACKAGE

The authorization package provides a record of the results of the control assessments and
provides the authorizing official with the information needed to make a risk-based decision on
whether to authorize the operation of a system or common controls.^127 The system owner or
common control provider is responsible for the development, compilation, and submission of
the authorization package. This includes information available from reports generated by an
automated security/privacy management and reporting tool. The system owner or common
control provider receives inputs from many sources during the preparation of the authorization
package (e.g., senior agency information security officer; senior agency official for privacy,
senior accountable official for risk management or risk executive [function]; control assessors;
system security or privacy officer; and the continuous monitoring program). The authorization
package^128 includes the following:

Executive summary;
Security and privacy plans;^129 130

(^127) Authorization packages for common controls that are not system-based may not include a security or privacy plan, but do include a record of common control implementation details. (^128) The authorizing official determines what additional supporting information, artifacts, or references may be required in the authorization package. The additional documentation may include, for example, risk assessments, contingency plans, or SCRM plans. (^129) [SP 800- 18 ] provides guidance on system security plans. Guidance on privacy plans will be addressed in a planned publication specific to privacy plans. (^130) In accordance with [OMB A-130], the information system security plan and the privacy plan may be integrated into one consolidated document.

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- Security and privacy assessment reports;^131 and
- Plans of action and milestones.

The executive summary provides a consolidated view of the security and privacy information in
the authorization package. The executive summary identifies and highlights risk management
issues associated with protecting information systems and the environments in which the
systems operate. The summary provides the essential information needed by the authorizing
official to understand the security and privacy risks to the organization’s operations and assets,
individuals, other organizations, and the Nation. The executive summary information can be
used by the authorizing official to make informed, risk-based decisions regarding the operation
and use of the system or the provision of common controls that can be inherited by
organizational systems.

The security and privacy plans provide an overview of the security and privacy requirements and
describe the controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements.^132 The plans provide
sufficient information to understand the intended or actual implementation of the controls
implemented within the system and indicate the controls that are implemented via inherited
common controls. Additionally, privacy plans describe the methodologies and metrics that will
be used to assess the controls. The security and privacy plans may also include as supporting
appendices or as references, additional documents such as a privacy impact assessment,
interconnection security agreements, security and privacy configurations, contingency plan,
configuration management plan, supply chain risk management plan, incident response plan,
and system-level continuous monitoring strategy. The security and privacy plans are updated
whenever events dictate changes to the controls implemented within or inherited by the
system.

The security and privacy assessment reports, prepared by the control assessor or generated by
automated security/privacy management and reporting tools, provide the findings and results of
assessing the implementation of the controls identified in the security and privacy plans to
determine the extent to which the controls are implemented correctly, operating as intended,
and producing the desired outcome with respect to meeting security and privacy requirements.
The assessment reports may contain recommended corrective actions for deficiencies identified
in the controls.^133 The authorizing official reviews the reports and determines the appropriate
risk response [Task R-3].

Supporting the near real-time risk management objectives of the authorization process, the
assessment reports are updated on an ongoing basis whenever changes are made to the
controls implemented within or inherited by the system.^134 Updates to the assessment reports

(^131) [SP 800-53A] provides guidance on security assessment reports. Guidance on privacy assessment reports will be addressed in future publications. (^132) The information system security plan and the privacy plan may be integrated into one consolidated document. (^133) An executive summary provides an authorizing official with an abbreviated version of the security and privacy assessment reports focusing on the highlights of the assessment, synopsis of findings, and recommendations for addressing deficiencies in the security and privacy controls. (^134) Because the desired outcome of ongoing tracking and response to assessment findings to facilitate risk management decisions is the focus (rather than the specific process used), organizations can manage and update security assessment report information using any format or method consistent with internal organizational processes.

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ensure that system owners, common control providers, and authorizing officials maintain an
awareness of control effectiveness. The effectiveness of the controls directly affects the security
and privacy posture of the system and decisions regarding explicit acceptance of risk.

The plan of action and milestones describes t