adr 0011 direct personal and team skills - Alshival-Ai/neural-labs GitHub Wiki

ADR 0011: Direct personal and team skills

Design history: for current instructions, see Skills and graphical builder. See the decision index for amendments and related records.

  • Status: Accepted
  • Date: 2026-09-02
  • Supersedes: ADR 0006 for first-party skill authoring

ADR 0013 later adds a dedicated OpenClaw agent for each user's interactive Alshival sessions. This ADR's skill storage, ownership, publication, and non-confidentiality decisions remain current.

Context

The Workshop-first Skills UI required administrators to create, evaluate, and apply proposals for every reusable instruction. That lifecycle was appropriate for an untrusted shared catalog but made ordinary personal customization hard to understand. Neural Labs already operates as one trusted, shared developer environment in which approved users can edit workspace files and run shells.

OpenClaw 2026.8 exposes agent-scoped catalog reads but no user- or session-scoped skill install target. A per-user agent therefore does not by itself create a private skill filesystem or publication boundary; Neural Labs continues to own those rules explicitly.

Decision

Let every active workspace developer directly create and edit skills they own. Store personal skills under the persistent tenant home at /home/node/.agents/skills and Team Skills under /home/node/workspace/skills. Store Neural Labs ownership and scope metadata beside each managed skill.

Personal skills are user-invocable but set disable-model-invocation: true. The Alshival picker combines OpenClaw status with the authenticated user's Neural Labs ownership records and excludes other users' personal skills. Team Skills are model-visible and available to every user.

Treat “personal” as a default-attachment and edit-authorization boundary, not a confidentiality boundary. Approved developers share the tenant home and may inspect another user's files through that shared development environment.

Accept skill mutations only through authenticated workspace ingress, derive the actor from the proxy-asserted user header, require same-origin writes, use generated safe directory names, refuse symbolic-link traversal, and reject obvious credential material.

Keep ClawHub installation on the administrator Gateway. It remains a third-party instruction supply-chain mutation requiring operator.admin.

Consequences

  • Personal and first-party Team Skills no longer require proposal approval.
  • Skill owners can share with the team or return a skill to personal scope in one step.
  • Other users do not see personal skills in their Alshival picker by default, but the shared filesystem does not promise secrecy.
  • Name collisions are workspace-wide because OpenClaw skill keys share one effective catalog.
  • The older proposal methods remain available in OpenClaw for advanced or externally sourced governance, but the Neural Labs desktop does not expose them as the normal authoring path.