docs release evidence p08 t08 security - AlexandreZanata/Abastevo GitHub Wiki

P08-T08 security and dependency release review (local evidence)

Date: 2026-09-30. Scope: launch-blocking auth/privacy/storage review on head 8ff3797 (phase codex/phase-08-hardening). Method follows SECURITY_PRIVACY STRIDE plus the pinned scans in scripts/check-security.sh (static review, govulncheck, focused adversarial suites) proven by scripts/tests/test-security.sh. No product behavior changed; this is a review gate with evidence, not a feature.

Verdict

No unresolved critical/high findings on the reviewed tree. Release still needs P09 staging acceptance (30-minute matrix, live R2/edge, restore on provisioned infra) before any pilot claim.

What was reviewed

  • Spoofing/tampering: P-256/RFC 9421 vectors (P03-T01), single-use nonce with concurrent-replay refusal, covered-component/body-digest rejection, append-only facts, checksummed official revisions, server-verified frozen evidence (different final key, orphan sweep).
  • Disclosure: private bucket by construction (no ACL grants in evidence/adapters/storage), 60 s case-bound evidence URLs never logged, redacted config/telemetry logs, owner-scoped reads sharing one 404 shape, edge strips Cookie/Authorization on the shared set (P08-T06 invariance tests), metrics loopback-only.
  • DoS: 1 MiB API body cap, 30 MiB ANP fetch cap, 3 MiB JPEG cap with 12 MP/8192 px pre-decode bounds, quotas (10/day uploads, registration/write limits with 429/Retry-After), lease/fencing queues with dead-letter replay, bounded alerts.
  • Elevation: no public admin routes; moderation/privacy operator work via restricted cmd/ops with mandatory actor+reason audit; migrator-only DDL; staging/prod DB has no published ports; Caddy admin off, trusted_proxies private_ranges, TLS 1.2/1.3 only.
  • SSRF: ANP fetcher allowlist + redirect-target recheck + public-IP dial policy with explicit denied prefixes, TLS 1.2 minimum, size/timeout/conditional-fetch bounds, temp-file cleanup.

Dependency and image inventory (reviewed pins)

Go go1.27 / toolchain go1.27.1. Direct: chi v5.3.2, pgx v5.11.0, kin-openapi v0.149.0 (all MIT, permissive transitives only; no replace directives; go.sum present). Tool pins: sqlc v1.31.1, staticcheck v0.8.1, govulncheck v1.8.0, vacuum v0.30.6 (see backend/README.md).

Images: golang:1.27.1-bookworm@sha256:69a7b978ā€¦f99195 (builder), gcr.io/distroless/static-debian12:nonroot@sha256:afa5c872ā€¦57f7ab (runtime, USER 65532:65532 all roles), postgis/postgis:18-3.6@sha256:60f6ad1dā€¦80b8677, caddy:2.10.2-alpine@sha256:4c6e91c6ā€¦e530d; roles ship immutable ANPFUEL_RELEASE tags, never latest. Full module list: cd backend && go list -m all.

Commands and outcomes (tested tree)

  • bash scripts/check-security.sh ā€” full gate green: static review ok, govulncheck ./... reports no vulnerabilities, 18 focused adversarial packages green (config, telemetry, httpserver, identity/profile+domain+adapters/auth+application, official/adapters/source, evidence/storage+media+domain, community/adapters/http, moderation/domain+application, privacy/domain+application).
  • bash scripts/tests/test-security.sh ā€” 10/10: reviewed static tree accepted; 7 mutants refused (public DB port, floating image, open trusted_proxies, dev secret, unpinned builder, root runtime, go.mod replace); live govulncheck clean; adversarial selection executes. RED per fault class proven by the refusals, GREEN on the reviewed tree.
  • bash scripts/scan-secrets.sh ā€” green via the gate (tracked files plus secret-shaped patterns in compose/Caddy/Dockerfile/examples).

Limits (explicit non-claims)

  • Emulator plus isolated R2 staging pending (no registry access for the minio image, no staging credentials here); the storage adapter targets real SigV4 so both run when available (P05-T02).
  • Live edge TLS/proxy-authority and the 30-minute acceptance load (100k stations, 1M rows, signed-write admission, shared cache) run on provisioned staging in P09, not here.
  • Dependency scan is govulncheck on Go modules plus digest/secret static review; OS-layer/image CVE scanning runs at build/deploy time on provisioned infra.
  • A failed candidate blocks release: fix on this phase branch, rerun the affected gate on the new head, never weaken thresholds or hide test absence.