Restore procedure for the backend database with privacy guarantees (BUC-007/BUC-008, B-BR-016, ADR-008). Traffic stays closed until the deletion ledger replays: no restored erased data is served before replay.

• Off-host encrypted backup artifact with checksum manifest (backup pipeline in P08-T03; until then, the documented pg_dump custom format plus SHA-256 manifest).
• Snapshot timestamp of the backup (when the snapshot started).
• Operator identity (--operator or ANPFUEL_OPERATOR_ID) and the access model from access.md.
• A fresh isolated database (never restore over live production).

1. Stop API/worker traffic (disable writes at the edge; keep the database reachable for the operator only).

2. Restore the snapshot into the isolated database and verify row counts plus the migration ledger (migrate reports current; checksum mismatch fails the drill).

3. Replay every deletion ledger row present in the restored snapshot:

   go run ./cmd/ops privacy replay --contributor <id> --operator op-7

   Repeat for each contributor with ledger rows (list pending rows with SELECT contributor_id FROM privacy_deletion_ledger WHERE replayed_at IS NULL). Scopes with no matching rows report zero and still stamp: replays converge.

4. Cross-check deletion receipts newer than the snapshot: any erasure completed after the snapshot started is absent from a stale backup. Re-run it explicitly:

   go run ./cmd/ops privacy erase --contributor <id> --reason "post-restore re-issue (backup <timestamp>)" --operator op-7

   A documented deletion request for backed-up persistent data may take until backup expiry to age out of immutable backups; notices must explain this accurately (SECURITY_PRIVACY).

5. Run retention expiry (P07-T05 sweeper) so transient rows older than their caps do not survive through the backup.

6. Rebuild projections that depend on unlinked rows (community consensus jobs drain through the worker; verify current-price reads before opening traffic).

7. Smoke the release endpoints, then reopen traffic.

• Ledger rows carry identifiers plus scope only: enough to find reappeared rows, never payload. The ledger itself ages out with the backup horizon under retention (35 days max: 7 daily + 4 weekly).
• Price facts stay for history with anonymized references (ADR-008); private payload, links, keys, sessions, objects, trust views and export bytes go.
• A failed replay blocks traffic: fix the scope error, re-run privacy replay (convergent), and only then proceed. Never bypass with manual SQL edits.
• Full encrypted off-host restore drills with measured RPO/RTO land in P08-T04; this runbook's deletion-replay path is proven by the P07-T04 restore simulation test.